











The Economic Value of Natural Resources around the 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and Implications 








Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
 




School of Economics 














The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 

























This thesis is my original work. Where other people’s work is used, acknowledgements have 




Candidate: Johane Dikgang 
 




































I am grateful to Kelly Scheepers, Christine du Plessis, Louise Swemmer, Wendy Annecke 
and Joep Stevens of SANParks (South African National Parks) for assistance with data and 
materials. I am also grateful to Peter Mokomele from Rural Development and Land Affairs in 
Kimberly for assistance with materials. I would like to acknowledge financial support from 
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) through the 
Environment for Development Initiative (EfD) of the Department of Economics, University 
of Gothenburg and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, in the United States of America. 
Additional funding from the National Treasury of South Africa through ERSA (Economic 
Research Southern Africa) and the Swedish Research Council Formas is also gratefully 
acknowledged.  
 
I also want to thank my supervisor, Edwin Muchapondwa whose support, through insightful 
and valuable inputs, has been invaluable in shaping this thesis. The combination of patience, 
dedication, enthusiasm, friendship and sharp criticism made him the ideal supervisor. I am 
sincerely grateful. 
 
The PhD specialization course in environmental valuation I took played a crucial role in the 
development and maturity of this thesis. For that I would like to express gratitude to all my 
teachers at the Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg. Many thanks to: Gunnar 
Köhlin, Wiktor Adamowicz, Dale Whittington and Francisco Alpizar. 
 
Several others have kindly and enthusiastically participated in improving the chapters of this 
thesis, providing ideas, comments and, above all, their precious time. My gratitude goes out 
to Deirdre McCloskey, Elina Lampi, Gardner Brown, James Fenske, Jesper Stage, Lisa 
Chase, Mitesh Kataria, Paulo Nunes, Peter Berck, Precious Zikhali, Pushpam Kumar, 
Timothy Swanson, Razack Lokina, William Greene and Xiangping Liu.  
 
I am also grateful for the comments I received from participants at the EfD annual meetings; 












Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity Conservation” in Italy, in 2010; 13
th
 Annual Bioecon 
conference in Geneva, Switzerland, in 2011; 19th annual conference of the EAERE 
(European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists), Prague, Czech 
Republic, in 2012; XVITH WEHC (World Economic History Congress) in Stellenbosch, 
South Africa, in 2012; the University of Cape Town, School of Economics seminar in 2012 
and 20th annual conference of the EAERE, Toulouse, France, in 2013.  
 
I would also like to thank everyone at EPRU (Environmental-Economics Policy Research 
Unit), University of Cape Town for the most enjoyable, intellectually stimulating, fun, and 
rewarding time in my life. The research unit created a rich environment for growth and 
exploration. In particular, I would like to thank Mare Sarr, Tony Leiman, Martine Visser, 
Stephanie Giamporcarco and Jane Turpie for encouraging me in my research.  
 
Special thanks to Fulbert Tchana Tchana, Albert Touna Mama and Amos Peters for their 
mentorship. My deepest acknowledgements go to fellow PhD candidates Kerri Brick, Sunday 
Adewara, Coretha Komba, Esther Kimani, Emmanuel Letete, Sidwell Hove, Byela 
Tibesigwa, Josephine Musango and Synman Sue. Together we shared the challenges required 
in completing a PhD thesis. 
 
Furthermore, I am indebted to many of my fellow researchers and scholars at Rhodes 
University and University of Stellenbosch for their collaboration. In particular, Gladman 
Thondhlana, Lelani Mannetti, and Sheona Shackleton provided a forum for presenting my 
ideas. I would also like to thank all the research assistants for making it all possible.  
 
Special thanks to Samson Mukanjari, Willem-Schalk Afrikaner, Serena Van Wyk, Patric 
Gatogang, Unathi Mercy Lutshaba, Dumisani Luzuko Bekwa, Shakiraah Smitsdorff, 
Gerhardus Afrikaner, Hendrik Martin Jors, Gerald William Engelbrecht, Shawayne Neels and 
Roeline Neels: you made my days in the field so much fun.  
 
Thank you Hannetjie van der Westhuzen for your kind accommodation during my 
fieldworks. I am forever grateful. Thanks to SASI (South African San Institute) and the 












thanks to David Grossman and Phillipa Holden. The Khomani San and Mier community took 
me in and made me welcome.  
 
Also, many thanks to Brenda Adams, Letitia Sullivan and Paula Bassingthwaighte, who 
kindly helped me with various administrative difficulties. 
 
I would like to thank my family and friends for their support through the years. My mother 
(Setlhokilwe Esther Seleka) and in-laws (Clive and Ursula Serfontein) have never ceased to 
encourage me through the long journey to this point. I want them to know how much they 
mean to me. In the same spirit, thanks to Reginah Dikgang, Gaogakwe Palelo, Galeboe 
Dikgang, Mmereki and Neo Dikgang, Ketso Kgakgamatso, Arnold Somolekae, Nteseng 
Seleka, Jason Serfontein, Craig and Natalie Bruinders. 
 
Thank you Kabo and Lebogang Molapisi, John and Samantha Satisfied, Isaac Johane, 
Mfundo Ntamo, Mathews Pitso, Lone and Noloyiso Mokgosi, Patric Gatogang, Lenyatso 
Mudongo, Gaoboelwe Pelaelo, Gaolathe Seelo, Francis Wasswa, Hugo Ribeiro, Sam 
Mwashimba, Moses and Theodora Mlangeni, Genevieve Pereira, Noluntu Dyubhele, Ronney 
Ncwadi, Solomon and Ndaiziveyi Mudege, William Akoto, Requier Wait, Unathi Bekwa, 
and Eddie Kodisang as I always have been able to rely on your friendship. Your friendship 
together with support of my family means everything for me.  
 
While an attempt has been made to mention names, this thesis has benefitted from specialised 
essential contributions from many other people and institutions too many to mention. Their 
valuable input is acknowledged with appreciation as well. 
  
Finally, I have the source of my inspiration and the rock in my life from my lover, my friend, 
my partner and wife, all in one, Cindy. She has sacrificed as much as I have, professionally 
and emotionally, as we travelled the rough road of academia together. I can only hope that the 
rewards of the journey have been worth her sacrifice. I thank you from the bottom of my 

















To my wife Cindy Lynn Dikgang, son Carter Dikgang, mother Setlhokilwe Esther Seleka and 






































Table of Contents 
 
 
Plagiarism Dedication ............................................................................................................... i 
Preface ....................................................................................................................................... ii 
Dedication ................................................................................................................................. v 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... vi 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................. x 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... xii 
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Background to the study ........................................................................................................... 3 
1.2.1. Indigenous people of Southern Africa ................................................................................... 3 
1.2.2. The Kgalagadi economy........................................................................................................ 4 
1.3. The study area ............................................................................................................................ 5 
1.4. The research problem ................................................................................................................ 8 
1.5. Research objectives .................................................................................................................... 9 
1.6. Proposed structure ................................................................................................................... 10 
References ............................................................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 2: The effect of the land restitution on poverty reduction among the Khomani 
San “bushmen” in South Africa ........................................................................................... 14 
2.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 15 
2.2. Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3. Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 22 
2.3.1. Programme background and assessment ............................................................................ 22 
2.3.2. Empirical strategy ............................................................................................................... 24 












2.3.4. Descriptive statistics ........................................................................................................... 25 
2.4. Results and discussion ............................................................................................................. 29 
2.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 32 
References ............................................................................................................................... 33 
Appendix: Living standards and development questionnaire ........................................... 38 
Chapter 3: The valuation of biodiversity conservation by the South African Khomani 
San “bushmen” community .................................................................................................. 57 
3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 58 
3.2. Economic valuation of biodiversity ........................................................................................ 60 
3.3. The survey................................................................................................................................. 64 
3.3.1. The survey ........................................................................................................................... 64 
3.3.2. Descriptive statistics from the survey ................................................................................. 66 
3.4. Results and discussion ............................................................................................................. 69 
3.4.1. For whom is the proposed biodiversity conservation programme good or bad? ............... 69 
3.4.2. The determinants of willingness to pay for implementing the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme of planting trees, shrubs, and grasslands in the Kgalagadi area ........ 73 
3.4.3. The welfare measures of willingness to pay for implementing or preventing the proposed 
biodiversity conservation programme of planting trees, shrubs, and grasslands in the Kgalagadi 
area ............................................................................................................................................... 77 
3.5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 82 
References ............................................................................................................................... 83 
Appendix: Environme tal questionnaire – community issue on the economic benefits of 
biodiversity conservation....................................................................................................... 86 
Chapter 4: Conservation fees in the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park between Botswana 
and South Africa in the presence of land restitution .......................................................... 98 
4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 99 
4.2. Background on the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park............................................................. 101 
4.2.1. Structure of the South African parks system ..................................................................... 101 
4.2.2. The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park ................................................................................... 103 
4.3. Literature review ................................................................................................................... 107 












4.4.1. The Contingent Behaviour Method ................................................................................... 111 
4.4.2. Data Collection ................................................................................................................. 114 
4.4.3. Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................................... 116 
4.4.4. Estimation Technique ........................................................................................................ 120 
4.5. Results ..................................................................................................................................... 122 
4.5.1. Random effects Tobit model for park visitation demand by South African residents ....... 122 
4.5.2. Optimal conservation fees for domestic visitors at KTP ................................................... 124 
4.6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 127 
References ............................................................................................................................. 128 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire on the optimal pricing of South African National Parks .. 133 
Appendix 2: Estimation of optimal conservation fees for international park visitors .. 140 
A2.1 Data collection ...................................................................................................................... 140 
A2.2. Empirical results ................................................................................................................. 143 
A2.3. Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 146 
Chapter 5: The economic valuation of dryland ecosystem services in the South African 
Kgalagadi area and implications for PES involving the Khomani San .......................... 147 
5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 148 
5.2. Literature review ................................................................................................................... 150 
5.3. Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 153 
5.3.1. Main effects vs. interactive effects .................................................................................... 154 
5.3.2. Generic versus specific alternative designs ...................................................................... 154 
5.3.3. Determining the sample size ............................................................................................. 155 
5.3.4. Generating the choice sets ................................................................................................ 156 
5.3.5. Optimal (or statistically efficient) designs ........................................................................ 157 
5.4. Choice modelling framework for Kgalagadi dryland ecosystem services ........................ 158 
5.5. The economic model .............................................................................................................. 161 
5.6. Data collection and descriptive statistics ............................................................................. 166 
5.7. Results and discussion ........................................................................................................... 171 












References ............................................................................................................................. 186 
Appendix 1: Ecosystem service valuation questionnaire ................................................. 192 
Appendix 2: Attributes levels in Choice Modelling .......................................................... 202 
Chapter 6: Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 203 
6.1. Summary ................................................................................................................................. 203 














List of Tables 
 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis ........................................... 26 
Table 2.2: Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the effect of proximity to Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park on use of restituted land ............................................................................. 30 
Table 2.3: IV Probit estimates of the determinants of poverty and access to nature ............... 31 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics from the survey (socio-economic profile) ............................ 67 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics from the survey (other information) ..................................... 68 
Table 3.3: Binary Probit model on the determinants of supporting the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme on different land types..................................................................... 71 
Table 3.4: Marginal effects of the Tobit model on the determinants of WTP for the proposed 
biodiversity conservation programme on different land types ................................................ 75 
Table 3.5: Annual WTP for implementing and preventing proposed biodiversity conservation 
programme on communal land, municipal land, and parkland ................................................ 77 
Table 3.6: The benefit-cost analysis for implementation of the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme for 320 Khomani San and 8,000 Mier households .......................... 81 
Table 4.1: Sample of contingent behaviour chart visitation questions posed to respondents 113 
Table 4.2: A selection of descriptive statistics of the 385 domestic overnight visitors 
interviewed ............................................................................................................................. 117 
Table 4.3: Random effects Tobit model for park visitation demand by South African residents
................................................................................................................................................ 123 
Table 4.4: Various conservation fee options for domestic visitors (in 2011 South African 
Rand) ...................................................................................................................................... 125 
Table 5.1: A typical choice set presented to visitors ............................................................. 159 
Table 5.2: Choice frequencies for local communities ........................................................... 160 
Table 5.3: Choice frequencies for Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park visitors ............................. 160 
Table 5.4: Summary statistics of the respondents .................................................................. 168 
Table 5.5: RPL, RPL with interactions and LCM – local communities ................................ 174 
Table 5.6: Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP) for dryland ecosystem attributes ............ 179 
Table 5.7: Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP) for dryland ecosystem attributes ............ 180 
Table 5.8: RPL and RPL with interactions – Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park visitors ............ 181 
















List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of the Kgalagadi area ...................................................................................... 6 
































List of Acronyms 
 
 
AFNP Augrabies Falls National Park 
ASC Alternative Specific Constant 
CB Contingent Behaviour 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CE Choice Experiment 
CL Conditional Logit Model 
CV Compensating Variation 
CVM Contingent Valuation Method 
DEAT Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
EV Equivalent Variation 
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature 
IV Instrument variable 
KNP Kruger National Park 
KTP Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park 
LCM Latent Class Model 
MEA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
ML Mixed Logit Models 
MRS Marginal Rates of Substitution 
MWTP Marginal Willingness to Pay 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NWPTB North West Parks and Tourism Board 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PES Payment for Ecosystem Services 
PNP Pilanesberg National Park 
RPL Random Parameter Logit 
SADC Southern Africa Development Community 
SANParks South African National Parks 
TCM Travel Cost Method 












WCMC World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
WTA Willingness to Accept 















Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Introduction  
The term ‘bushmen’ is used generically to refer to the Khoisan. Although the term is still 
used in several countries in the Southern African region (SADC), it is considered derogatory 
by some. Culturally the Khoisan are divided into the hunter-gatherer San (originally a 
derogatory term used by the Khoi), and the pastoral Khoi (Barnard, 1992). 
 
Anthropologists from the West adopted the term ‘San’ extensively in the 1970’s, and this is 
now the preferred term in academic circles. This is a study in economic anthropology which 
seeks to fully understand the complexity of the economics of a hunter gatherer people in the 
Kgalagadi area. Despite the change in the lifestyle and values of the San people, they have 
and continue to provide valuable information in the fields of anthropology and genetics (see 
Thomas, 1958, 1989, 2006; Lee, 1976, 1979; Barnard, 1992; Hogan, 2008). 
 
Scientific evidence suggests that they are one of the oldest; if not the oldest, peoples in the 
world, from which all humans can ultimately trace their genetic heritage (Wells, 2003). The 
expansion of Bantu tribe into Bushman’s land around AD 1, 000 is the main reason they 
occupied harsh environments such as the Kgalagadi desert (Mtyala, 2008). 
 
In the case of South Africa, the opportunity cost of national parks has historically been borne, 
in some measure, by indigenous communities’ displacement. The Khomani San people are 
one such community that was removed from their land to make way for the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park (KTP). This occurred despite the fact that access to land is considered a 
critical factor to poverty
1
 reduction, particularly in rural areas. According to Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1998) and Hoff (1996), asset ownership has an impact on subsequent economic 
success at a household level. 
 
                                                          
1
 Poverty generally refers to an inability to attain a minimum standard of living and is a reflection of deprivation 












Land restitution is thus seen as a tool for empowering people. Under South Africa’s 
restitution laws, all people who were forcefully removed or evicted after the 19
th
 of June 
1913 are eligible to reclaim their ancestral land. Land restitution is considered critical for 
political stability, economic growth and the protection of property rights in South Africa. 
 
The land restitution programme and it’s post settlement support to beneficiaries is a crucial 
component of South Africa’s development strategy and is envisaged as the key driving force 
for rural development. The objective of this strategy is to create viable and sustainable local 
economies that can create job opportunities and generate rural income (van der Walt, 2006).  
 
Land restitution in protected areas is a highly debated issue, and one that continues to 
challenge many affected governments, agencies, individuals and communities around the 
world (Kepe, 2008). The critical question is whether land restitution within protected areas 
will inevitably compromise conservation objectives. Out of the 22 national parks managed by 
South African National Parks (SANParks)
2
, six have been affected by land claims from 
indigenous communities. SANParks are concerned about challenges at the post-restitution 
phase, and want to know how to move forward. The main challenge faced by land authorities 
under these arrangements is whether it is possible to achieve the twin objectives of 
conservation and development, particularly where the land claimants are indigenous people 
who rely heavily on natural resource extraction and use.  
 
The finalization of the Khomani San and Mier community land claim in May 2002 resulted in 
a drastic change in land ownership and land use choices in the Kgalagadi area. Local 
communities were awarded land and resource rights both inside and outside the park. It was 
agreed by all stakeholders that the land acquired inside the park would be used for 
conservation purposes. This marked a significant step forward in conservation in the 
Kgalagadi area as communities then became co-owners of international parklands. 
 
The key challenge facing the Kgalagadi area is how to balance conservation objectives and 
beneficiaries’ rights to land and natural resources. The proposed research asks four research 
questions posed to help address the aforementioned challenge. The findings of this research 
                                                          
2
 SANParks (known as the National Parks Board prior to 1997) is the overarching government agency 












are important, as they will provide the kind of information that is needed to aid policy makers 
to make well-informed decisions with regard to environmental issues. It is envisaged that 
providing such useful information will assist policy makers to implement policies that strike a 
balance between sustainable resource use and poverty reduction.  
 
1.2. Background to the study 
1.2.1. Indigenous people of Southern Africa 
Indigenous people are unique all over the world as they have a unique way of living with 
much emphasis on their culture, tradition and access to nature (UNESCHR, 2005). According 
to the Kalahari Peoples Fund (2009), the population of San people is presently estimated to 
be approximately 100 000. They live in the SADC region, mostly in Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa. Botswana has almost half the total population (46 000), with Namibia having a 
third (38 000). About 4 000 are in Angola, 3 000 in Zambia and a few hundred in Zimbabwe. 
South Africa has an estimated population of 6 500, of which 1 500 are the Khomani San 
community.  
 
According to UNESCHR (2005), the various indigenous groups in South Africa are estimated 
to include 1 500 Khomani San, 1 100 Khwe San, 4 500 !Xun San, 10 000 Nama people and 
300 000 Griquas. The groups differ from each other in terms of their demography, the 
institutions that they have adopted and the nature of their subsistence economy. 
 
Although indigenous people are not officially recognized as such in South Africa, the 1996 
constitution makes reference to the Khoi, Nama and San languages. Beginning in November 
2004, the South African government has promised to amend the laws so that these people can 
officially be recognized as “vulnerable indigenous communities”. There are six groups that 
identify themselves as indigenous in South Africa. The six ethnic groups are comprised of the 
three main San peoples (!Xun, Khwe and Khomani) and the various Nama communities 
(Griqua, Khoisan and Koranna) (UNESCHR, 2005). 
 
The San people in the SADC have historically faced difficulties with regard to land and 
resource rights, human rights, capacity building and development (Geingos and Brormann, 
2002). The group then known as “the Southern Kgalagadi San” were forcefully removed 












1931, and spread over the Southern Kgalagadi in a wide diaspora into South Africa, 
Botswana and Namibia (Chennells, 2002). The Southern Kgalagadi San were made up of 
disparate groups known as the Khomani, /Auni, and Namani speaking San (Crawhall, 2001).  
 
The descendants of various San families came together and later decided to call themselves 
the Khomani San (Bosch, 2002). The Khomani were originally the largest of the Southern 
Kgalagadi San groupings, hence the descendants of various San families adoption of the 
name (Chennells, 2002). They are spread over an area of more than 1 000km in the Northern 
Cape Province. Most still live north of Gordonia, at Witdraai, Ashkam, Welkom, Rietfontein 
and the surrounding areas. Others live in Upington, Olifantshoek and the surrounding areas 
(Crawhall, 2001). 
 
The area the Khomani San requested rights in was symbolic as it was where their past 
generations (ancestors) had practiced a nomadic way of life. According to Chennells (2001) 
the challenge facing the Khomani San activists was to establish the rights of the San to their 
ancestral land in a manner that could prove beyond doubt that there was a link between the 
living San individuals of the claimant culture and origin, to the land. Given that the members 
of the San people were dispersed, a simultaneous process of recapturing and recording the 
culture in a manner that bind and defined the community was required. 
 
The Khomani San people who were displaced from the park were awarded land. Their claim 
was unique because they did not want ownership of the land but rather the rights to use it. In 
contrast to the San, the Mier community are mainly interested in the economic benefits (job 
creation and business venture opportunities) that come about because of owning land.  
 
1.2.2. The Kgalagadi economy  
Historically, the San economy was a gift economy, based on the giving of gifts on a regular 
basis rather than on markets (Zanzibar Tribal Art, 2008). However, this profile is not true of 
all the San people as some communities now have a more complex economic structure. For 
example, the economic structure of the Khomani San community has elements of a 
survivalist system, characterized by heavy dependence on the natural environment and 













Over time, some San people have acquired formal education and are therefore participating in 
the cash economy. Although the educated group accounts for a minority of the total Khomani 
San population, there is evidence of San people trading crafts and curios, and dressing up and 
posing for their photos to be taken by tourists in exchange for money. The implication is that 
the Khomani San people cannot entirely ignore the cash economy although there are still 
those who are more traditional hunters and gatherers. The community is not homogeneous 
and their value systems, resource use, and cultural preferences have changed, influenced by 
external factors. Younger generations have lost some of the group’s traditional knowledge 
and have been more heavily influenced by western value systems.  
 
Since the Khomani people acquired land and resource rights in the Kgalagadi, their leaders, 
have brought young and old people together to talk about their history and to learn traditional 
skills, which they can use to create new livelihoods. This has been accomplished with the 
assistance of non-government organisations (NGOs) such as the South African San Institute 
(SASI) and the Bushman Council. Other programmes set up to improve the livelihoods of the 
Khomani San community include a tracker-training programme for young people, the 
creation of jobs for youths in heritage tours and the development of cultural products for 
tourists. 
 
The Khomani San are engaged in some hunting and gathering, game farming, and sale of 
crafts. Some have wage employment and the community earns dividends from their 
guesthouse in the park (!Xaus Lodge).  
 
1.3. The study area 
The Kgalagadi area in question lies in the Siyanda District Municipality (comprising six local 
municipalities) of the Northern Cape province of South Africa, bordering Botswana and 
Namibia. The district is approximately 120,000 square kilometres and includes large areas in 
the Kgalagadi desert. The Mier Local Municipality (one of the six local municipalities) is 
















Figure 1.1: Map of the Kgalagadi area 
 
Source: SANParks, 2012.  
 
The population density of the Mier Local Municipality is low, with an estimated 8,000 Mier 
community households and 320 Khomani San households (located in Rietfontein, Askam and 
Witdraai – see figure 1.1).  
 
The Mier Local Municipality region is semi-arid and has infrequent rainfall, mostly during 
summer (Seymour, 2001). The region is used predominantly for sheep and game farming, 
although an increasing number of cattle and goats are being introduced, despite the area not 
being best suited to such livestock.  
 
While the Kgalagadi desert, including the area inside South Africa, is a physically harsh 
environment, the region has a rich biodiversity. The Kgalagadi area, including areas outside 
the park, is characterised by red sand dunes, saltpans, and open plains, as well as flat 
bushveld, grasslands, Camel thorn trees, scrub bush, and woodlands. According to Cooper et 













According to the DEAT (2008), because of the sparse vegetation and concentration of 
animals in the dry riverbeds of the Auob and Nossob Rivers, the KTP offers premium 
mammal viewing. More than 58 mammal species are found in the area. The area is also 
renowned for predator viewing (cheetah, leopard, brown and spotted hyena, and black-maned 
lion), which is the park’s main attraction. The park is also home to a wide variety of birds, 
particularly birds of prey. 
 
The total area of the park is 387,991 square kilometres, of which approximately 75 percent is 
on the Botswana side (Swatuk, 2006). On the South African side (the Kalahari Gemsbok 
National Park section), the KTP has been divided into areas representing five different 
ownership types: (i) belonging to SANParks and with no local community access, (ii) 
belonging to SANParks but with Khomani San access for symbolic cultural use, (iii) 
belonging to SANParks but with Khomani San access for commercial joint ventures, (iv) 
belonging to the Khomani San but managed as a contract park with SANParks, and (v) 
belonging to the Mier community but managed as a contract park with SANParks. SANParks 
has an obligation to maintain any infrastructure related to conservation and the integrity of 
the environment inside the Transfrontier Park on the South African side (Bosch and 
Hirschfeld, 2002).  
 
The park is probably less accessible than most other parks in South Africa, with the closest 
airport located in Upington, which is 260km from the park. However, the park has a landing 
strip for small aircraft. The park is approximately 610km from the biggest city in the province 
(Kimberley), 904km from Johannesburg (the city in South Africa from which most visitors, 
domestic and foreign, are likely to visit the park) and around 1080km away from Cape Town 
(arguably the main tourist city in South Africa). 
 
The two San communities own the !Xaus lodge inside the park jointly with SANParks. The 
lodge is on the border of the Mier contract park and the Khomani San contract park. A 
concession to run the lodge was given to a private firm called Transfrontier Parks 
Destination. The lodge has been in operation since 2007.  
 
There is a need for more land in the highly fragile Kgalagadi ecosystem to be under 












their land under conservation. The Khomani San have also agreed to use two of their farms 
(namely, Farm 24 and 26), which are adjacent to the park (near the Twee Rivieren entrance 
gate – see figure 1.1), for conservation purposes in addition to making use of the area for 
their cultural activities. Thus, these farms will act as a buffer zone protecting the Mier 
contract park, the Khomani San Contract Park, and the rest of the KTP (Bosch and 
Hirschfeld, 2002). 
 
1.4. The research problem 
The agreement with SANparks to co-manage the park with the Khomani and Meir 
communities suggest that the South African government, like the governments of many other 
countries, recognises that conservation cannot be guaranteed in the future unless it has the 
backing of the local communities (Cock and Koch, 1991). However, joint management of the 
park for multiple resource use as compared to the previous ‘preservationist’ approach to 
conservation has its difficulties and opportunities (SANParks, 2006).  
 
In many settings, there is an ecological inter-linkage between areas inside and outside the 
protected areas. Hansen and DeFries (2007) observed that biodiversity
3
 conservation targets 
are not being met inside protected areas, which are at the frontline of conservation, partly 
because of the increasingly adverse influences of activities undertaken outside protected 
areas. This seems to indicate that biodiversity conservation ought to take place outside 
protected areas as well. 
 
The actions of local communities crucially influence the success or failure of biodiversity 
conservation for two reasons. First, local communities are usually in charge of some areas 
outside protected areas, using these outside areas to provide for their own livelihoods. In 
some cases, the existence of perverse incentives discourages them from prioritising activities 
which complement biodiversity conservation. Second, the same perverse incentives also 
encourage environmentally unsustainable practices by local communities whenever they get 
access to protected areas as a result of either land restitution or pure encroachment.  
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 According to the Convention on Biological Diversity, “biological diversity” means the variability among 
living organisms from all sources, including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species, and of 












Furthermore, failure to conserve biodiversity outside protected areas will lead to more 
pressure being put on the protected areas, especially where local communities also have 
resource rights inside these areas. Harvesting of natural resources inside protected areas could 
potentially have two impacts. First, it could compromise the integrity of biodiversity, 
compared to regimes of no use. Second, it could negatively affect the ability of the protected 
areas to attract tourists and generate revenues to plough back into conservation. 
 
Thus, the challenge facing the Kgalagadi area is how the area can be managed as a whole in a 
manner that enhances conservation and complementary land-use practices (e.g. medicinal 
plant harvesting), and discourages conflicting practices (e.g. excessive stock farming). The 
implication of such an approach is that conservation also needs to spread to the communal 
and municipal lands adjacent to KTP.
4
 To ensure the success of such an approach, there is a 
need to identify and deal with any factors that militate against sound conservation in the 
whole area. 
 
1.5. Research objectives 
The goal of the KTP is to conserve and enhance their scenic area, maintain the ecological 
integrity of their ecosystems and cultural heritage, and give the public the opportunity to 
understand and enjoy the special qualities of the conservation area. Nowadays, the 
Transfrontier Park also has a duty to foster the economic and social welfare of the local 
communities. Hence, the objectives of this research are to:  
 
1) Establish the direction and magnitude of the impact that access to land and resources, 
as provided for under the Kgalagadi land restitution agreement, has had on the 
livelihoods of the Khomani San and conservation in the KTP. 
 
2) Investigate the value that the Khomani San assign to modern conservation in a broad 
landscape comprising the KTP and the communities’ farms.  
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 Communal and municipal land importance is not limited to its indigenous biodiversity; this is where the local 
communities live, harvests resources, and undertakes game and livestock farming (Norton, 2000). It is for this 
reason that communal and municipal lands can make a significant contribution to conservation of biodiversity 












3) Estimate optimal park conservation fees for the KTP consistent with community and 
parks’ agency objectives. 
 
4) Identify and give a value to the ecosystem services found on the land belonging to the 
Khomani San inside and outside the KTP. 
 
1.6. Proposed structure 
This first chapter has established the nature of the study, provided a background to the study 
and study information, introduced the research issues and outlined the objectives of the 
thesis. The research issues shall be dealt with in four chapters. Chapter 2 is an attempt to test 
whether a positive correlation assumption between land restitution and poverty reduction 
among the beneficiaries (Khomani San people) holds in the Kgalagadi area in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates whether local communities get sufficient rewards from conservation 
and may therefore be expected to be good environmental stewards. Determination of 
economic values for biodiversity will assist to establish the best policy instruments for such 
stewardship. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the pricing of nature-based tourism in the KTP. The issue here is the 
pricing of tourist services, and conservation/entrance fees are used as a proxy for pricing of 
these services at national parks. 
 
Chapter 5 puts a value o  individual attributes of dryland ecosystems. The value of particular 
attributes can be used as a starting point in price negotiations between demanders and 
suppliers of the service. Without external beneficiaries, the value computed can be added to 
the value of resource extraction to derive a full natural income measure. Finally, chapter 6 
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Chapter 2: The effect of the land restitution on poverty reduction among 




This paper looks at the impact of land restitution involving the Khomani San “bushmen” in 
the Kgalagadi area of South Africa. It seeks to test whether there is a positive correlation 
between land restitution and poverty reduction among the beneficiaries. We run instrumental 
variable probit models on poverty and access to nature. Our results suggest that using 
restituted land by the claimants’ has no positive effect on poverty alleviation. However, a 
positive link with greater access to nature is established. Therefore, land restitution should 
become part of a broader, carefully crafted rural developmental strategy for it to be effective. 
Otherwise land restitution risks enabling indigenous communities to continue with their 
“traditional” way of life and, in fact, keep them poor.  
 
 














Note: An extract of this chapter has been submitted to the ERSA (Economics Research 













Land is a key instrument with which to empower and disempower people for a wide variety 
of reasons. For example, during apartheid in South Africa, land was used to disempower 
black people to achieve racial discrimination. No wonder why the country’s first democratic 
election, which took place in 1994, carried with it the obligation to address the injustices of 
the past. The key injustice that the new government sought to tackle was land dispossession 
of blacks by the apartheid regime. This was to be addressed through a land reform 




According to Deininger and Binswanger (1999) these kinds of initiatives are pursued globally 
mainly because of inequality in land distribution. Justification for land reform is based on the 
assumption that there is a strong and positive correlation between access to land and welfare-
generating potential for beneficiaries (Finan et al., 2005). The conventional measures of a 
household’s economic well-being are money income and wealth, both of which reflect the 
financial resources available to the household. An alternative measure, reflecting the current 
standard of living prevailing in a household, is the household’s food and services 
consumption expenditure (Jones et   al., 2010).  
 
Poverty is one of the main challenges faced by the South African government. The national 
poverty rate stood at 54% while the rural poverty rate stood at 77% in 2010 (Leibbrandt et al., 
2010). Poverty is associated with both monetary and non-monetary dimensions. However, 
most poverty studies mainly focus on the monetary dimensions of well-being, income and 
consumption; hence, the literature on non-monetary measures is limited. The assessment of 
both measures of poverty is required to ensure that there is a wider understanding and 
acceptance of findings, and most importantly that poverty analyses resonate with social 
norms in areas where physical environmental resource dependence is high. 
 
A vast literature dealing with land reform shows that land is a source of income (see 
Grootaert et al., 1997; Gunning et al., 2000; Scott, 2000). Among a wide variety of policies 
discussed to reduce poverty, there is a growing body of literature that strongly recommends 
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 Land restitution seeks to restore land ownership or compensate those forced off land prior to 1994; land 
redistribution, of mainly agricultural land, seeks to redress the discriminatory policies by providing the 
disadvantaged and poor with access to land; while land tenure reform, seeks to secure tenure for all South 












improved access to land for the rural poor (Carter, 2003; Deininger, 2003; de Janvry et al., 
2001). Empirically, this can be seen in the increasing number of land reform programmes that 
have taken place in numerous countries around the world (de Janvry, 1981), and particularly 
in Africa.  
 
This paper looks at the land reform programme in South Africa particularly the land 
restitution component. The land restitution programme in South Africa attempts to restore 
land rights lost after the 19
th
 of June in 1913. According to Roux (2006), the 19
th
 June 1913 
cut-off date was agreed upon as it was the date when the Native Land Act, which allowed for 
systematic land dispossession by the apartheid state, was promulgated.
6
 This particular Act 
ratified the colonial land grab of the previous two and a half centuries by dividing South 
Africa’s land surface into racial areas.
7
 The official explanation of the cut-off date was that 
the absence of adequate written documentation prior to 1913 and allowing the process to 





A re-assurance was made that land redistribution, instead of land restitution, would be used to 
address the needs of those whose land claims were constrained by the cut-off date. The 
structure of the land restitution process was influenced by the international context in which 
the transition to democracy took place, during a time when socialism in Eastern Europe 
collapsed and the ascendancy of neo-liberal approaches to economic development. This, 
combined with the relative strength of the main negotiating parties, resulted in the land 
                                                          
6
 “The Native Land Act of 1913 apportioned 8% of the land area of South Africa as reserves for the Africans 
and excluded them from the rest of the country, which was made available to the white minority population. 
Land available for use by Africans was increased by 5% in 1936 bringing the total to 13% of the total area of 
South Africa, although much of the land remained in the ownership of the state through the South African 
Development Trust supposedly held in trust for the African people. Thus 80% of the population was confined to 
13% of the land while less than 20% owned over 80% of the land. Black people were prohibited from buying 
land in areas outside the reserves. This apportionment of land remained until the end of apartheid in early 1990s 
and remains virtually unchanged” (Rugege, 2004).  
7
 The cut-off date therefore prohibited claim of land lost after the main period of the colonial conquest was 
already over. This compromise was acceptable to the main negotiating parties, the National Party and the 
African National Congress (ANC). The compromise was acceptable to the National Party because it insulated 
most of the white minority group’s ownership from the restitution process. On the part of the ANC, this was 
acceptable because it promised to stabilise the property rights order during the democracy period in the interest 
of the market-driven development, the economic model that was then beginning to be popular in the ANC’s 
policy-making structures (Roux, 2006). 
8
 This explanation is relevant to our specific study area as the Khomani San not only lost their land in the 
Kgalagadi area to colonial powers but also to other ethnic groups, including the Mier community (another 












restitution programme in South Africa being legally and conceptually subordinated to the 
protection of the private property rights (Roux, 2006).  
 
According to the restitution legislation, the government has an option to award the successful 
claimants either alternative land or cash compensation in a case where it is not possible to 
award them their ancestral land. Most urban claims were settled financially. The Land Claims 
Commission is of the view that although this solves immediate survival problems, it 
ultimately widens the poverty gap in the long term hence the Commission’s preference to 
restore or provide the land (Land Claims Commission, 2008).  
 
The specific focus of this paper is on land restitution and its impact on poverty alleviation in 
the Kgalagadi area of South Africa. In this area, the Kruiper family -- a part of the Khomani 
San community in the area -- lodged a land claim with the Commission for the Restitution of 
Land Rights in 1995. The declaration of the claim as valid in 1996 was a catalyst for the 
complicated negotiations process that followed (Crawhall, 2001).
9
 The Khomani San was 
initially thought to comprise of 50 adults of one ethnic origin (i.e. the Kruiper family) 
(Crawhall, 2001). However, further community research and outreach during negotiations 
with the Department of Land Affairs in 1998 led to the original claimants agreeing to allow 
for the claimants group to be expanded. They agreed to form a Communal Property 
Association (CPA) and it had 297 registered members
10





The first agreement saw the Khomani San being awarded 40 000 hectares on six farms 
adjacent to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in 1999 (SANParks, 2006). The second 
agreement saw the Khomani San being granted 28 000 hectares of land inside the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park and special user rights on another part of the park in May 2002 
                                                          
9
 The lodging of the land claim by the Khomani San led to many other communities in the country following 
suit. In fact, the Khomani San’s land claim overlapped with that of the Mier community (Crawhall, 2001) who 
historically had occupied the Khomani San’s land but eventually evicted by the colonial government to pave 
way for the creation of the current Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. 
10
 However, according to the Department of Land Affairs, about 320 households are registered as beneficiaries 
of the Khomani San land claim. 
11
 An overlapping land claim was made by the Mier community just before the settlement of the Khomani San 
claim thereby re-opening the negotiations. Therefore, mediation later brought together three negotiating parties, 
namely the Khomani San, the Mier and the park agency, SANParks. The land claim was subsequently divided 














 The area in which the Khomani San got special user rights was 
symbolic as it was where their ancestors had practiced a nomadic way of life. SANParks was 
tasked with co-managing the acquired land inside the park on behalf of the local communities 
as contractual parks. 
 
We contemplate that land restitution can potentially increase average household income, 
improve income distribution, consumption levels and result in more access to natural 
resources, and as a result reduce poverty and inequality. It is on this basis that land restitution 
is expected to contribute towards relieving rural poverty and in promoting broad-based 
sustainable development. This paper addresses the question of what has been the impact of 
the use of restituted land awarded to the Khomani San on poverty alleviation in the Kgalagadi 
area. This is done by using survey data collected from 200 Khomani San households in the 
Kgalagadi area. Instrumental variable probit models are estimated to investigate the impact of 
use of restituted land on “being poor” and “having access to nature”. The approach adopted in 
this paper gives a broader view of the contribution of land restitution on the welfare 
indicators considered relevant to the local communities in South Africa.  
 
Although some studies (see Lahiff, 2007; Lovo, 2011) have been carried out on how land 
reform/restitution affects the livelihoods of the beneficiaries, to the best of our knowledge no 
such study has been carried out with regard to the so-called “vulnerable indigenous 
communities” in South Africa. Thus, this study is the first study of its kind undertaken on the 
Khomani San in South Africa, which suggests that this study could potentially fill an 
important research gap.  
 
This paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 briefly reviews literature on land reform. 
Section 3 presents the methodology used in the study while Section 4 presents the results and 
discussion. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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 Under this agreement, the Mier community also got awarded 30 000 hectares of land inside Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park. The Mier community subsequently gave the Khomani San two farms adjacent to the park as 













2.2. Literature Review  
There is a wide variety of reasons as to why countries embark on land reform programmes. 
These reasons range from augmenting productivity and lessening poverty to preventing social 
turmoil and allaying political pressure from peasants (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999).  
 
The land reform programme is deemed a success if it increases the beneficiaries’ income, 
consumption and wealth (Binswanger and Elgin, 1992). According to Deininger and van den 
Brick (2000) despite many land reform programmes being implemented in a manner that 
reduced their potential impact on equity and efficiency, there is growing evidence worldwide 
that redistributive land reforms have assisted in reducing poverty and increasing efficiency, 
and that it will lead to sustainable growth.  
 
According to Aghion et al. (1999), Bardhan et al. (1999) and Piketty (1999), economic theory 
shows that there is a positive correlation between once-off redistribution of assets and 
permanent higher growth levels, under imperfect markets conditions. This is in contrast to 
earlier developmental models predictions by Lewis (1954), Kaldor (1955) and Kuznets 
(1956). 
 
According to the World Development Report (2006), the history of land reforms has been 
mixed with some partial successes and failures. The prospects for land and resource rights 
restoration to indigenous people are positive in some parts of the world. For example, 
countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand are making remarkable progress in this 
regard (Hitchcock et al., 2003). Elsewhere, empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning 
suggests that a land reform programme may provide equity and efficiency benefits 
(Binswanger et al., 1995). Empirical studies in different countries have identified a positive 
link between access to land and income (Jayne, et al., 2002; Carter and May, 1999; Bouis and 
Haddad, 1990).  
 
India is a vital case study of land reform due to being home to a significant proportion of the 
poor in the third world (Thorner, 1976). A study in India found that land reforms had an 
impact on growth, rural poverty reduction and other aspects of the rural economy. Land 












which these reforms can reduce poverty (Besley and Burgess, 1998), as well as some major 
improvements on productivity in the Indian state of West Bengal (Banerjee et al., 1998).  
 
The Philippines land redistribution programme indicates that there are significant benefits for 
beneficiaries which include higher gains in productivity and incomes and propensity to invest 
in physical and human capital. Specifically, The land reform beneficiaries in the Philippines 
shows that they had invested more in their children’s education than non-beneficiaries and 
that they increased their assets at about three times the levels of non-beneficiaries (Deininger 
et al., 1999).  
 
In Brazil land redistribution has private intermediaries who carry a real credit risk, greater 
involvement of civil society which ensures that the programme is not driven by landlords, as 
well as a stronger focus on capacity building at community level, seems adequate to ensure 
that the programme will be sustainable in the long term. The assessment of the land reform 
programme in Brazil found that it was economically viable and had a scope of increasing the 
beneficiaries’ income by up to five times (Buainain et al., 1998).  
 
A consensus reached about land reform in Japan, Korea and Taiwan was that it significantly 
contributed to overcoming the legacy of colonial development (King, 1977). In these 
countries, land reform led to improvements in productivity and set the stage for an impressive 
rise in non-agricultural development (Jeon and Kim, 2000). 
 
Most known successful cases such as the examples mentioned above used the land reform as 
part of a much wider economic change, particularly rapid urbanisation and industrialization – 
creating a sustainable demand for labour and commodities (Lahiff, 2007). Many developing 
countries have considered land reform as a tool of increasing agricultural production and 
alleviating poverty in rural areas. In addition, policy makers often expect that improved 
conditions in rural areas will stem the large number of immigrants into urban slums. 
However, empirical evidence with regard to land reform reveals that the impact of land 
redistribution in rural areas is highly variable (see Habib, 1989 for a detailed overview of 
case studies) (Moene, 1992). Justification for land reform programmes are based on the 
assumption that land has a strong welfare generating potential for beneficiaries. Yet, land 












of recent studies have called into question the importance of land as a poverty-reducing tool 
(López and Valdés, 2000a). 
 
Land reform initiatives come with key challenges; the programmes are controversial for a 
wide range of reasons. Some economists argue that the abolition of poverty can only come 
from development, not from redistribution (Boulding, 1968; Okun, 1975). The argument here 
is that reform amounts to inefficiency as the very same resources that are scarce are 
redistributed instead of increasing everyone’s wealth. This argument may be true in some 
third world countries, but not necessarily so in the case of countries such as South Africa 
given the country’s historical background. 
 
Some argue that land tenure reforms in lieu of redistribution land restitution. The counter 
argument is that land tenure reform makes no significant contribution. The case in favour of 
redistributive reform is that it is not based on the existence of defective tenure agreements 
(contracts) but rather on the concentration of land ownership rights and the inefficiency, 
inequality and principle of land restitution is thus a redistribution of property rights in 
productive land (Adhikari and Bjørndal, 2009). 
 
Some land reforms in Latin America failed to meet their objectives, hence they remain 
incomplete in many respects (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989). One of the main reasons for 
their minimal impact was that reforms were often motivated by short-term political 
considerations. Moreover, “agrarian” emphasis on full-time farming increased their cost 
while reducing the number of potential beneficiaries and the reforms’ impact on poverty 
(Deininger, 2003).  
 
Although there is little doubt that land is a source of income (see Scott, 2000; Gunning et al., 
2000; Grootaert et al., 1997; Carter and May, 1999), in many studies, this positive correlation 
actually translates into marginal income gains for the range of land endowments provided by 
land reform programmes (Finan et al., 2005). For example, McCulloch and Baulch (2000) 
simulated the effects of a policy giving two hectares of land to households in rural Pakistan 













A study by López and Valdés (2000b) and their co-authors found in previous studies for eight 
Latin American countries that the income generating potential of land is also quite marginal. 
For instance, their estimates of income to land elasticities imply that landholdings in rural 
areas of Colombia would have to quadruple in order for the poorest 40% of farm households 
to reach just the poverty line. This led them to recommend looking into approaches other than 
access to land in order to attack rural poverty. 
 
In Southern Africa (SADC), some land reform have been driven by political considerations 
and based on untested assumptions about the positive correlation between land reform and 
poverty reduction. A land reform based on this possible misconception can potentially result 
in more poverty than was the case before (Chimhowu, 2006). For example, Zimbabwe’s “fast 
track” land reform programme led to adverse consequences to the beneficiaries and the 
economy as a whole.  
 
This study attempts to test whether there is a positive correlation between the land restitution 
and poverty reduction among the active beneficiaries in the Kgalagadi area of South Africa. 
Indeed, greater access to land in South Africa has the potential to increase household 
resources. As a result, it has the potential to contribute directly and indirectly towards poverty 
alleviation efforts and addressing South Africa’s heavily skewed distribution of income. Of 
course, the extent to which greater access to land impacts poverty alleviation is dependent on 
a variety of factors which includes post-settlement support, institutional arrangements and 
capacity building. In a poor rural economy like the Kgalagadi, this implies improving the 
terms on which the poor have access to land. 
 
2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Programme background and assessment 
Even though about 320 households are registered as beneficiaries of the Khomani San land 
claim, only less than half of them actually use the restituted land. By awarding land, it was 
hoped that this would be a catalyst for economic development. We reckon that the effect of 
the Khomani San land restitution on welfare can crudely be measured by comparing the 
levels of welfare between those who use restituted land and those who do not. Of course, we 
realise that this is only a crude measure as a proper evaluation of the effect of land restitution 












those who do not was purely random. A number of methods can help discern the required 
impact under the current situation. For example, the propensity score matching method would 
be an option. However, such a method requires a large sample which our circumstances 
cannot raise given the small pool of registered beneficiaries. Furthermore, we suspect that the 
problem with our circumstances is not about lack of randomness in the decision to use 
restituted land but rather about the simultaneity between use of restituted land and welfare. 
Thus, we reason that use of restituted land affects welfare but, in turn, welfare affects whether 
or not one uses restituted land. Therefore, the method that we prefer is instrumental variable 
(IV) regression.
13
 The basic empirical model is: 
 
                                                                                                                    (2.1) 
 
where Y represents a welfare measure (i.e. per capita income or per capita consumption or 
access to nature), T is an endogenous variable (i.e. use of restituted land), x are exogenous 
regressors (i.e. socioeconomic variables that are expected to impact on household welfare).  
 
A question of whether or not to include too many rather than few variables may arise during a 
case of uncertainty of the right specification. One of the possible reasons why over-
parameterized models should be avoided is that although the inclusion of non-significant 
variables does not necessarily bias the estimates, it has the potential to increase their variance 
(Bryson et al., 2002). Heckman et al. (1997a); Dehejia, and Wahba (1999) show evidence 
that omission of vital variables can lead to an increase in the bias of the resulting estimates. 
Thus, only variables that influence the outcome variable should be included.  
 
On the other hand, it is highly recommended that ‘trimming’ models in the name of 
parsimony should be avoided. It is argued that a variable should only be excluded from the 
analysis if there is an agreement that, that particular variable is either not linked to the 
outcome or not a proper covariate. In a case of any doubt concerning these two points, it is 
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 Although IV techniques are commonly applied to estimate systems of simultaneous equations and to 
counteract bias from measurement error, there is an ever-increasing number of studies for application to omitted 
variables bias in estimates of causal relationships. Studies of this nature are mainly concerned with estimating a 
narrowly defined causal relationship, such as the effect of schooling or training on income, or impact of 
smoking on health. An IV allows for the estimation of the coefficient of interest consistently and free from 













explicitly advised that the variable in question should be included in the estimation (Rubin 
and Thomas, 1996). The arguments raised so far suggest that the choice of variables should 
be based on economic theory and previous empirical findings in addition to some formal 
statistical tests.  
 
Only the variables that are unaffected by participation or the anticipation of it should be the 
ones to be included in the model. This can be achieved if one ensures that variables are either 
fixed over time or measured before participation. Heckman et al. (1998b) emphases this point 
by stressing that the data for participants and non-participants should stem from the same 
source such as the use of the same questionnaire. Some randomness is required to ensure that 
the individuals with identical characteristics can be observed in both states.  
 
The socioeconomic variables expected to influence welfare include gender, age, education, 
marital status and employment status of the household head. Additional controls suitable for 
our study area include having migrants in the household, having food deficits, easy access to 
potable water, involvement in livestock farming, access to electricity and ownership of 
household goods. Given that South Africa is a welfare state, we also control for the presence 
of both child support and old-age pension grants.  
 
An appropriate instrumental variable z for use of restituted land is one that directly influences 
use of restituted land but not the welfare measure except indirectly through its impact on use 
of restituted land (Maddala, 1997). 
 
2.3.2. Empirical strategy 
The main objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the effects of land 
restitution on the welfare of those who use restituted land. The land endowment is captured 
by a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when a household uses restituted land. Our 
approach is similar to that of Lovo (2011). The IV probit models are applied to estimate the 
impact of use of restituted land on “being poor” and “having access to nature”.  
 
Since a household decision to “use restituted land” is likely endogenous, we use proximity of 
the household’s dwelling to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park as an instrument. The 












welfare variables. Those living closer to the park are naturally closer to the restituted land 
which is adjacent to it. The restituted land consists of 40 000 hectares on six farms and is 60 
km away from Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. Our sample is restricted to the Khomani San 
spread in an area of 1 000km. Given that the Khomani San are in the same political or 
economic zone with low population density, proximity to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park is 




According to the department of Land Affairs estimates, about 320 households are registered 
as beneficiaries of the Khomani San land claim. However, only 120 households were using 
the restituted land at the time of the survey. We conducted a face-to-face survey in the 
Kgalagadi area with 100 Khomani San households who used restituted land and another 100 
households who did not. However, the total sample of 200 households comes from the 320 
registered beneficiaries of the Khomani San land claim. Thus, we restricted the sample to the 
Khomani San who could plausibly have taken up the offer to use restituted land. The survey 
was conducted between March and April 2011. The collected data included detailed 




 access to nature,
16
 housing 
services, farming activities, land-use and migration patterns. 
 
2.3.4. Descriptive statistics  
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 The challenge with income is that households at times do not reveal their true income. In a predominantly 
rural economy such as in the Kgalagadi area, much of the income comes from agriculture and informal activities 
such as selling of firewood and crafts. Therefore, determining actual household income may be complex. 
Moreover, income is vulnerable to shocks and is potentially volatile. Nonetheless, income is seen as a potential 
welfare measure. 
15
 Consumption expenditure is considered a more reliable estimate of well-being as it better reflects a 
household’s long-term welfare even though it actually measures a household’s welfare in terms of meeting the 
current basic necessities. Thus, household food consumption can be deemed as realised welfare (Finan et al., 
2005). In the context of third world countries, particularly in rural areas, food consumption expenditure rather 
than income is preferred in poverty studies (Deaton, 1997). 
16
 Collection of medicinal plants, firewood, wild fruits; hunting; and accessing ancestral sites within the 












Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis  
 Khomani San - with 
Access to Land (n=100) 
Khomani San – No Access to 
Land (n=100)  
Household size 4.85                 (2.42) 4.03                       (1.64)  
Age of household head 52.26               (15.32) 51.28                      (15.15)  
Male headed households (%) 80                    (0.40) 59                           (0.49) 
Married household heads (%) 61                    (0.49) 67                           (0.47)  
Years of education of household head  3.84                  (4.04) 4.48                        (4.81) 
Years staying at current residence 8.28                  (5.94) 12.69                      (16.69) 
Households where members have migrated (%) 36                     (0.48) 21.21                      (0.41)  
Migrants who send remittances (%) 51.85                (50.92)      90                           (30.78)  
Employed household heads (%) 29                     (0.46) 36.36                      (0.48)  
Social Grants (Rands/Per Month) 1002.57            (609.61) 1391.63                  (1302.89)  
Monthly Total Household Income (Rands) 3678.76             (9282.25) 3783.71                   (4691.74)  
Frequency Adult goes to Bed without Food (%) 20                     (0.40) 11                            (0.31)  
Monthly Food expenditure (Rands) 761.60              (416.98) 747.86                     (517)  
Brick Structures (%) 44                     (0.50) 34                            (0.48)  
Households with electricity (%) 22                     (0.42) 49                            (0.50)  
Households with livestock (%) 56                     (0.50) 11                            (0.31)  
Households that collect firewood (%) 90                     (0.30) 47.47                       (0.50)  
Households that collect wild fruits/bush food 
(%) 
33                     (0.47) 10.10                       (0.30)  
Households that hunt (%) 23                     (0.42) 8                              (0.27)  
Households that use medicinal plants (%) 79                     (0.41) 21                            (0.41)  
Households selling crafts (%) 32                     (0.47) 6                              (0.24)  
Number of poor people % – (Poverty line R515 
per capita per month)
17
  
67                     (47.26) 36                     (48.24)     
Note: Any monetary KTPs shown in Table 2.1 are in South African Rands, 2011 prices. 
Standard deviations are reported in the parentheses. 
 
It can be seen from a comparison of those who are using the land with those who are not, that 
the former group has a slightly higher average family size, are older, have a lower level of 
education and greater incidence of male heads. Given that those living in the acquired land 
only moved after the first stage of the land claim were agreed in 1999, it came as no surprise 
that they had lived in their current residence for a significantly shorter period relative to those 
                                                          
17 We created a poverty dummy variable showing whether a household is poor or not. The income threshold for 












who live in other areas. Those with access to the land have a higher number of migrants per 
household. Interestingly, about 86% of household’s members without access to the land who 
migrated sent some money back to their households on a monthly basis compared to 39% 
who did so among the group using the land.  
 
The methods of generating income between those using the land and the control group are 
similar. Interestingly, both Khomani San subgroups are much closer in terms of total 
household income despite the control group having substantially higher monthly wages. The 
treatment group have a higher unemployment rate, and receive less both in self-employment 
and social grants. However, they make substantially more income from livestock farming and 
selling crafts. Half of the employed land beneficiaries using the land were employed ‘full-
time’, while the other half is part time workers. 
 
Around 17 percent of Khomani San households using land indicated that they are self-
employed. Of those who are self-employed, an overwhelming majority (71%) are selling 
crafts. Only 12% of the self-employed said that they are selling firewood.
18
 The only source 
of firewood ‘Camel thorn tree’ is considered an endangered tree, hence harvesting for 
commercial purposes is prohibited. This is perhaps the reason for the reluctance of many 
households to declare their involvement. Given the nature of self-employment in this area, it 
generally does not lead to any job creation, as family members tend to assist. A majority of 
this group (74%) are receiving government grants, mainly old-age and child support grants.  
 
In contrast, an overwhelming majority of 87% of the control group are employed ‘full-time’. 
Despite the lower unemployment rate, this group seem to take longer to find a job. Similarly, 
they have a higher number of households (80%) that are receiving government grants.  
 
The differences in food consumption expenditure levels between the two-subgroups are 
negligible. Both sub-groups purchased their food in their respective areas. About 14% of 
those using the land indicated that they are sometimes forced to sell their household 
possessions to generate income. In contrast, none of the other group’s households indicated 
that they ever found themselves in that situation. 
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Those with access to land are more likely to live in a house or brick structure, as these 
structures are common in private farms that they ended up owning as part of the land 
restitution programme. However, in terms of basic infrastructure, they are lagging behind 
with regard to among other things; refuse collection and access to electricity. Therefore those 
who are not using restituted generally live in a better environment, as they are more likely to 
have access to electricity and toilets. Having access to electricity suggests that on average the 
control group have better quality household durable goods that use electricity than their 
treatment group counterparts. Access to electricity enables the latter subgroup to benefit from 
the ‘free 50Kwh’ that the government gives every month to each South African household. 
The former subgroup cannot benefit from such government services due to not having 
electricity.  
 
The Khomani San households who are not using restituted land are less equipped for 
livestock farming, as they do not have more land available. This is reflected by the 11% 
involvement in livestock farming by this group. Approximately 25% of the households using 
the restituted land and have livestock indicated that they sold some of their livestock 12 
months prior to the period that we collected the data. In contrast, almost all the farmers not 
using restituted land (92%) involved in livestock farming sold their livestock during the same 
period. This further demonstrates that if implemented appropriately and targeting the 
individuals that are likely to use the land, the land restitution programme can contribute to 
poverty reduction. However, given that those living on the restituted land represent a 
minority of the Khomani San population as a whole, suggests that there are distributional 
problems involved – skewed distribution of income. 
 
A comparison of the income poverty between the San using restituted land and those not 
using the land reveal that the former group’s poverty rates are significantly higher than the 
latter group’s poverty rates.  
 
In terms of access to nature, the group living on restituted land have a higher wellbeing in 
most categories. There have much more access to natural resources as there now live on the 
restituted land, with the exception of firewood collection, which seems to be a common 
activity in South Africa particularly in rural and poorer households. The greater access to 












A significant number of those using restituted land have residential houses located in 
Andriesvale (31 percent), which is not surprising given that this particular farm was set aside 
specifically for housing development. Distance from Andriesvale (which is 60 km from the 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park) is used as a proxy for distance from the Khomani San 
restituted land because of its central location, and the fact that it was earmarked for 
community development. The distance from restituted land shows that Khomani San using 
the land are on average 15.91 km from Andriesvale.  
 
The difference in income-generating activities and food consumption expenditure between 
those households using restituted land and those who do not are negligible. However, when 
one looks at access to nature, a different picture emerges; with the beneficiaries using 
restituted land having greater access.  
 
The differences between the family size, greater incidence of male heads, years staying at 
current residence, number of migrants per household, migrants who send remittances, 
receiving of social grants, access to electricity, livestock farming, selling crafts, poverty rates 
and access to nature (firewood, wild plants, hunting, medicinal plants) are statistically 
significant. These differences were validated by t-tests.  
 
2.4. Results and discussion 
We start by estimating an OLS model on use of restituted land (i.e. binary variable) on 
proximity to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. A point to note is that the land dummy shows 



















Table 2.2: Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the effect of proximity to Kgalagadi 




Dependent Variable: Use of restituted land 
  
Proxity to Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park -0.005***      (-78.13) 
Cons 1.344***        (79.10) 
  







t statistics in parentheses 
legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01               
 
The negative coefficient of the proximity to the park implies that proximity to the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park is negatively correlated with whether a household uses restituted land or 
not. This means that those households’ located further away from the park tend not to use 
restituted land. The significance of the whole regression means that proximity to the park is a 
good instrument for use of restituted land. 
 
In Table 2.3, we run a regression of the poverty dummy variable on explanatory variables 
that we believe influence whether a household is poor or not in our context. The explanatory 
variables in this study are similar to those in many studies of this nature. The variables in 
question include age, gender, household-size, education, infrastructure as well as regional 
variables. However, the regional variables are different as the study area is unique, with 
unique physical attributes as well as the people concerned. The findings from this study, 
together with the one analysing resource use in livelihoods (by Thondhlana et al., 2012) will 
make it possible to compare the effect of the land restitution along historical lines and along 
spatial lines.  
 
The regression also includes the predicted values of the land dummy in Table 2.2 above. In 
running the current regression we use the probit model. Thus we are effectively running an 
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 Proximity to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park is correlated with “use of restituted land” but not with “being 












instrumental variable probit model. We also run a similar regression but using “having access 
to nature” as a dependent variable. 
 
Table 2.3: IV Probit estimates of the determinants of poverty and access to nature  
Dependent Variable: Poverty Dummy - Model 1 Access to Nature – Model 2 
Marital status (1=Married) 0.843***  (2.93) -0.058   (-0.22) 
Household size 0.317***  (4.80) 0.113     (1.83) 
Age of HH Head -0.030*** (-3.23) 0.006     (0.74) 
Whether HH Head is Male -0.742**   (-2.54) 0.053     (0.19) 
Education attainment of HH Head -0.054       (-1.67) -0.009    (-0.32) 
Migration by any member 0.191         (0.78) -0.256    (-0.98) 
Wage Income -0.396        (-1.62) 0.322     (1.35) 
Receive government grant -0.425        (-1.39) 0.269     (0.92) 
Go without food 0.229          (0.75) 0.245     (0.80) 
Sell household possessions 0.164          (0.36) -0.315    (-0.66) 
Fetch-water (portable water) 0.277          (0.95) -0.012    (-0.04) 
Livestock production -0.433         (-1.54) 0.727** (2.52) 
Access to electricity -0.516         (-1.91) -0.640**(-2.34) 
Own household goods -0.924**     (-2.55) -0.771**(-2.03) 
Use of restituted land 1.268***     (3.48) 1.281***(3.41) 
Cons 1.066           (1.32) -0.429     (-0.52) 
   
Sample size 198 198 
Pseudo  0.358 0.320 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The results show that use of restituted land has a statistically significant effect on poverty and 
access to nature. However, use of restituted land does not reduce poverty even though it 
increases access to nature. Therefore, the land restitution involving the Khomani San has only 
achieved one of its objectives i.e. providing them with access to nature. There is a need for 
the land restitution to do more on the developmental side in order to reduce poverty among 
the Khomani San. Greater involvement of the Khomani San in conservation in the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park could be the panacea. However, there needs to be an assessment of 
whether the Khomani San can be good environmental stewards and what mechanisms could 












We observe that household characteristics such as marital status, age of household head, 
gender of household head, household size and ownership of household goods greatly impact 
towards the poverty level of a household.  
 
The coefficient for marital status is positive, implying that those who are married are most 
likely to be poor. This result is logical given that married couples share resources, which has 
an effect of lowering the per capita income when one party has no income. A similar 
explanation holds for household size. Poverty levels are lower for households who reported 
owning assets.  
 
Government grants are not significant in determining the poverty level despite most 
household’s indication that they received some sort of grant. In addition, education is not a 
significant determinant of poverty levels. This may be due to the general low education levels 
in the study area. An overwhelming majority of the respondents in this area spent just over 4 
years in school, on average.  
 
Households headed by females are most likely to be poor. The Kgalagadi environment is 
harsh and it is not surprising that there is a negative relationship between female heads and 
poverty levels as there are certain things that women are physically unable to perform, such 
as tracking and hunting. Households with younger heads tend to be poor. Involvement in 
livestock production seems to have positive effects on access to nature only. The result that 
having access to electricity is a determinant of access to nature is surprising, as there is not 
much collection activities that we know of that involve having access to electricity that can 
possibly be linked to access to nature. 
 
2.5. Conclusion  
This study attempts to test whether there is a positive correlation between land restitution and 
poverty reduction among the Khomani San active beneficiaries in the Kgalagadi area of 
South Africa. We run instrumental variable probit models of “being poor” and “having access 
to nature” using proximity to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park as an instrument. Our results 












alleviation. However, a positive link with greater access to nature is established.
20
 The policy 
implication of the results from this study is that land restitution should become part of a 
broader, carefully crafted rural developmental strategy for it to be effective. Otherwise land 
restitution risks enabling indigenous communities to continue with their “traditional” way of 
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Appendix: Living standards and development questionnaire 
                                                   
                                             
 
 (A) NAME OF PERSON ADMINISTERING QUESTIONNAIRE (NOT RESPONDENT): ______________________ 
(B) DATE INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: ______________________ 
(C) LOCATION INTERVIEW CONDUCTED: ______________________ 
 
RESPONDENT DETAILS: 
FULL NAME  
COMMUNITY  
SETTLEMENT/VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY  
TELEPHONE NUMBER  
PREFERRED LANGUAGE AT HOME  
 
SECTION A: HOUSEHOLD ROSTER 
INTERVIEWER READ OUT: WE WOULD LIKE TO START BY ASKING YOU QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PEOPLE WHO ARE PART 
OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD. 
 
1. HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD __________?  
INTERVIEWER: READ OUT THE MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA BEFORE PROCEEDING. 
 MEMBER HH HEAD 1 2 3 4 5 6 




              
1.2 RELATIONSHIP TO HH (SEE LIST)               
1.3 WAS THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD BORN IN 
THIS VILLAGE [1=YES & 2=NO] 
       
1.4 IF ‘NO’: HOW LONG HAS THE 
HOUSEHOLD HEAD LIVED IN THE 
VILLAGE 
       
1.5 WHERE DID HE/SHE COME FROM        
1.6 WHAT IS ____ MARITAL STATUS? (SEE 
LIST) 
              
1.7 WHO TAKES AND MAKES THE 
DECISION IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD  
       
1.8 IF THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD IS 
AWAY, WHO MAKES MOST OF THE 
DOMESTIC DECISIONS (SEE LIST) 
       
1.9 DATE OF BIRTH         
1.10 GENDER (MALE = 1; FEMALE = 2)               

















YOU ARE A HOUSEHOLD MEMBER IF: 
(i) YOU HAVE LIVED UNDER THIS "ROOF" OR WITHIN THE SAME COMPOUND/HOMESTEAD/STAND AT LEAST 15 DAYS 
DURING THE LAST 12 MONTHS OR YOU ARRIVED HERE IN THE LAST 15 DAYS AND THIS IS NOW YOUR USUAL 
RESIDENCE, 
(ii) WHEN YOU ARE TOGETHER YOU SHARE FOOD FROM A COMMON SOURCE WITH OTHER HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, 
(iii) YOU CONTRIBUTE TO OR SHARE IN A COMMON RESOURCE POOL. 
 
2. IF THE CHILDREN ARE NOT ATTENDING SCHOOL, WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR NOT ATTENDING? 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
SECTION B: MIGRATION 
 
1. HAVE ANY MEMBERS OF THIS HOUSEHOLD LEFT THE AREA FOR OVER A MONTH IN THE PAST YEAR? ................... 
YES / NO 
IF ‘NO’: GO TO SECTION C 
 
NAME OF MIGRANT DESTINATION TIME INTERVAL (MONTHS) ACTIVITY / MOTIVATION AND DURATION SPENT AWAY 
.................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
2. IS THE MIGRANT EXPECTED TO SEND HOME FOOD OR MONEY (REMITTANCES) OR CAN HE USE ALL HIS EARNINGS 
FOR PERSONAL EXPENSES? 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
  
3. IF YES, SPECIFY THE AMOUNT OR LIST THE ITEMS THAT THEY NORMALLY SEND HOME INCLUDING THEIR VALUES 
IF YOU CAN? 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
SECTION C: HEALTH 
 
1. DOES ANY MEMBER OF THE HOUSEHOLD HAVE ANY ILLNESS OR DISABILITY..........................?  
 




























3. WHAT ARE THE FIVE MOST COMMON DISEASES IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD? 
HEALTH PROBLEM CODE TICK 
HEART RELATED DISEASES 1  
MISUSE OF ALCOHOL 2  
HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE 3  
MALARIA 4  
TB 5  
DRUG ABUSE 6  
DIARRHOEA 7  
MALNUTRITION 8  
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE 9  
SIGHT IMPAIRMENT 10  
HIV 11  
AIDS 12  
MENTAL DISABILITY 13  
CHRONIC RESPIRATORY (ASTHMA, BRONCHITIS) 14  
OTHER 15  
SPECIFY OTHER: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
4. HAS ANY MEMBER OF THIS HOUSEHOLD, WHO USUALLY LIVED HERE FOR AT LEAST FOUR NIGHTS A WEEK, DIED 
IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS __________?(IF NOT, SKIP TO SECTION D). 
 MEMBER HH HEAD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
NAME OF THE DECEASED HOUSEHOLD 
MEMBER – STARTING WITH THE MOST 
RECENT DEATH 
 
              
RELATIONSHIP TO HH (SEE LIST IN 
SECTION A) 
              
WHAT WAS THE GENDER (MALE = 1; 
FEMALE = 2) 
              
DATE OF DEATH        
WHAT WAS THE AGE WHEN THEY DIED        
WHAT CAUSED THE DEATH 
(1=NATURAL, 2=ACCIDENT & 
3=VIOLENCE) 

























SECTION D: INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
 
1. PLEASE SUPPLY THE FOLLOWING GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE EMPLOYMENT /UNEMPLOYMENT 
AND INCOME GENERATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS. 
MEMBER HH HEAD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A. EMPLOYMENT STATUS (1=EMPLOYED, 
2=SELF EMPLOYED & 3=UNEMPLOYED) 
SKIP TO B IF UNEMPLOYED; C IF SELF 
EMPLOYED AND/OR EMPLOYED  
       
IF YES, STATE THE NATURE OF THE JOB         
NAME OF EMPLOYER        
IS THE JOB FULL TIME OR PART TIME 
(1=FULL TIME & 2=PART TIME) 
       
IF EMPLOYED, PLEASE INDICATE INCOME 
PER MONTH: WAGES/SALARIES (TAKE 
HOME PAY) (R)  
              
HOW DID YOU GET THE JOB (SEE LIST)        
B.IF UNEMPLOYED INDICATED HOW LONG 
YOU HAVE BEEN UNEMPLOYED (YRS)? 
              
REASON FOR NOT WORKING               
WOULD YOU ACCEPT A JOB OFFER IF IT 
WAS OFFERED (1=YES OR 0=NO) 
              
MINIMUM WAGE REQUIRED TO TAKE A JOB 
PER MONTH (R) 
       
C. MONTHLY INCOME FROM SELF 
EMPLOYMENT (R) 
              
NATURE OF THE SELF EMPLOYMENT 
ACTIVITY 
       
DO YOU EMPLOY ANY OTHER PEOPLE (1= 
YES & 2=NO) 
       
IF YES, HOW MANY OTHER PEOPLE DO YOU 
EMPLOY 

























2. PLEASE INDICATE (A) WHETHER THE HOUSEHOLD MEMBER HAS BEEN SEEKING EMPLOYMENT IN THE LAST 30 





















YES NO  
HEAD OF 
HH                 
 
1                  
2                  
3                  
4                  
5                  
6                  
 
3. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD: 
 YES NO APPROXIMATE TOTAL AMOUNT PER MONTH 
RECEIVES A DISABILITY GRANT    
RECEIVES AN OLD AGE GRANT    
RECEIVES A PENSION    
RECEIVES A CHILD GRANT    
RECEIVES ANY OTHER GRANT (NOT MENTIONED 
ABOVE) 
   
RECEIVES INTEREST ON AN INVESTMENT    
OTHER INCOME SOURCE (SUCH AS POSING FOR 
PHOTOS - SPECIFY BELOW) 
   
 
SECTION E: HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 
 
1. WHERE DO YOU DO YOUR SHOPPING FOR FOOD, CLOTHING, AND OTHER GOODS 
_________________________________________________? (EXAMPLE: COMMUNITY SHOP/SPAZA, STREET VENDOR, 
DEPARTMENTAL STORE, MEAT MARKET OR VEGETABLE MARKET) 
 
CODES FOR QUESTION 2 & 3; (1=NEVER, 2=SELDOM, 3=SOMETIMES, 4= OFTEN, 5=ALWAYS & 0=NOT APPLICABLE) 
 
2. IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS, HOW OFTEN DID ANY ADULT IN THIS HOUSEHOLD GO TO BED HUNGRY BECAUSE THERE 





















3. HOW MUCH MONEY DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD SPEND ON AVERAGE PER MONTH ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING 
CONSUMABLE ITEMS? ENTER 0 IF NONE. (B) WHERE DO YOU USUALLY BUY THESE ITEMS, IN YOUR OWN TOWN OR IN 
ANOTHER TOWN? 






MAIZE MEAL     
BREAD    
MEAT / CHICKEN    
VEGETABLES    
MILK    
WILD MEAT    
CLEANING MATERIALS (SOAP & WASHING 
POWDER) 
   
CIGARETTES, TOBACCO, 
HOMEMADE BEER, BEER & SPIRITS 
   
OTHER    
 




4b). WHAT IS THE COST OF A NUTRITIONAL BASKET CONSIDERED MINIMAL FOR THE HEALTHY SURVIVAL OF THIS 
HOUSEHOLD?....................................................................................... 
 
5. ON AVERAGE, HOW MUCH MONEY (AMOUNT IN RAND) DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD SPEND PER MONTH ON EACH OF 
THE FOLLOWING? ENTER 0 IF NONE. INDICATE WHETHER YOU SPEND THE MONEY INSIDE YOUR AREA OR IN AREA 
TOWN(S)? 
ITEM RAND PER MONTH IN YOUR AREA OUTSIDE / 
OTHER AREAS 
WATER    
CLOTHING    
SCHOOL    
MEDICAL EXPENSES    
LICENCES (E.G. TV, VEHICLE)     
TELEPHONE    
CELL PHONE    
FURNITURE    
OTHER: SPECIFY    
 
6· WHICH TYPES OF EXPENDITURE HAVE INCREASED MOST SHARPLY OVER TIME? 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
 




















8b. WHAT IS THE COST FOR NON-FOOD NEEDS CONSIDERED MINIMAL FOR THE HEALTHY SURVIVAL OF THIS 
HOUSEHOLD................................................................................................................ 
 
SECTION F: HOUSEHOLD SERVICES 
INTERVIEWER READ OUT: WE WOULD NOW LIKE TO ASK YOU QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR DWELLING, YOUR ACCESS 
TO SERVICES AND YOUR HOUSEHOLDS’ INCOME. 
 
1. HOUSING 
1. TYPE OF DWELLING? 
HOUSE OR BRICK STRUCTURE ON SEPARATE STAND  




HOUSE IN BACK YARD  
INFORMAL DWELLING/SHACK IN BACK YARD  
INFORMAL DWELLING/SHACK NOT IN BACK YARD  
ROOM NOT IN BACK YARD BUT ON SHARED PROPERTY  
CARAVAN OR TENT  
OTHER (SPECIFY)  
 
2. WHAT ARE THE MAIN MATERIALS USED FOR THE ROOF, WALL AND FLOOR? 
 2(A)ROOF 2(B)WALLS 2(C)FLOOR COVERING 
BRICKS    
CEMENT BLOCKS    
GRASS    
CORRUGATED IRON    
WOOD    
PLASTIC    
CARDBOARD    
MIXTURE OF MUD AND CEMENT    
WATTLE AND DAUB    
TILE    
CARPET    
MUD    
THATCHING    
OTHER (SPECIFY)    
 
3. HOW MANY BEDROOMS DOES THE DWELLING HAVE?---------------------------------------- 
   
4. IS THIS HOME OWNED, RENTED OR OCCUPIED FREE? -------------------------------------------  
 
5. (IF OWNED) WHO IN THE HOUSEHOLD ACTUALLY OWNS THE PROPERTY? 
.......................................................................................................................... 












7. DID THIS HOUSEHOLD OBTAIN A PLOT OR LAND FOR RESIDENCE OR FARMING THROUGH THE LAND 
RESTITUTION PROCESS? 
 
                              OR 
 
       DID THIS HOUSEHOLD RECEIVE A GOVERNMENT-HOUSING SUBSIDY TO   
       OBTAIN THIS DWELLING ANY OTHER DWELLING? 
                                                          
                                    OR 
 
      DID THIS HOUSEHOLD RECEIVE A GOVERNMENT LAND GRANT TO OBTAIN A       
      PLOT OF LAND FOR RESIDENCE OR FOR FARMING? 
 
2. WATER 
IN THIS SECTION, WE ARE GOING TO TALK ABOUT WATER USED BY THIS 
HOUSEHOLD FOR DRINKING, COOKING, BATHING, OR WASHING CLOTHES AND 
OTHER HOUSEHOLD PURPOSES LIKE THESE. 
 
1. DOES THE WATER USED FOR DRINKING COME FROM THE SAME SOURCE AS THE 
WATER USED FOR OTHER PURPOSES LIKE BATHING OR WASHING CLOTHES? 
MOSTLY YES  
SOMETIMES  





WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF WATER USED MOST OFTEN IN THIS HOUSEHOLD FOR THINGS 
LIKE DRINKING OR BATHING AND WASHING CLOTHES? 
 
PIPED - YARD TAP       
PIPED- TAP 
COMMUNAL 
   
BOREHOLE ON SITE    
WATER-CARRIER/TANKER    
OTHER (SPECIFY)    
    
 
3. DOES THE HOUSEHOLD HAVE TO FETCH AND CARRY WATER TO THE HOUSE EACH DAY 
AND HOW FAR IS THE WATER SOURCE FROM THE DWELLING? 
 
YES    







1. WHAT KIND OF TOILET DOES THE HOUSEHOLD USE? 




   

















OUTSIDE DWELLING – ON SAND   
OUTSIDE DWELLING – OFF SAND   
 
4. ENERGY 
IN THIS SECTION, WE ARE GOING TO TALK ABOUT THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF ENERGY 
THAT THIS HOUSEHOLD USES FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES. 
1. IS THIS HOUSE CONNECTED TO AN ELECTRICAL SUPPLY? 
YES   
NO   
 
       ENERGY  
2. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DOES THE HOUSEHOLD USE AS ITS PRIMARY ENERGY FOR COOKING, LIGHTING AND 
HEATING? 
 COOKING HEATING LIGHTING AVERAGE COST PER 
MONTH 
ELECTRICITY     
PARAFFIN     
GAS     
WOOD     
COAL/CHARCOAL     
CANDLES     
OTHER (SPECIFY)     
 
5. HOUSEHOLD DURABLES  
  
1. DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD OWN__________?  
 
CIRCLE APPROPRIATE CHOICE 
VALUE OF HOUSEHOLD 
POSSESSIONS (RANDS) 
BICYCLES   
RADIO   
ELECTRIC STOVE   
GAS STOVE   
PRIMUS STOVE   
FRIDGE   
TV   
GEYSER   




      :CELLPHONE  
COMPUTERS   
MOTOR VEHICLE IN A RUNNING CONDITION   
DONKEY CART   
FURNITURE (BED, CHAIRS AND TABLES)   
SOLAR PANEL   
OTHER   













SECTION G: INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
1. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER THE FOLLOWING FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE IN YOUR COMMUNITY? 
SERVICES AND FACILITIES HOW MANY [ ] 
SERVE THIS 
COMMUNITY 
(WRITE 5 WHEN 5 
OR MORE) 
HOW FAR IS THE NEAREST 
[ .. ]? (KM) (DISTANCE FROM 
CENTER OF 
COMMUNITY) 
CLINIC/MOBILE CLINIC/ HEALTH 
POST/HOSPITAL 
  
POLICE STATION   
POST OFFICE   
DAILY PERMANENT MARKET   
PERIODIC MARKET   
PUBLIC PHONES   
CELL PHONE SIGNAL   
RADIO AND TV SIGNAL   
SCHOOL   
CRAFT SHOP   
TOURISM ATTRACTION   
STREET LIGHT   
 
2. WHAT IS THE DISTANCE TO THE NEAREST MAIN ROAD USED FOR TRANSPORT TO NEARBY TOWNS, CITIES, AND 
BUSINESS DISTRICTS? (THIS INCLUDES A HIKING SPOT IF PUBLIC TRANSPORT IS NOT AVAILABLE) ________ KM. 
3. IS THERE PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN YOUR AREA __________? 
  
4. IS YOUR REFUSE OR RUBBISH REMOVED AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES__________? 
 
5. IF NOT, HOW DO YOU DISPOSE YOUR WASTE?..................................................................... 
 
SECTION H: AGRICULTURE 
INTERVIEWER READ OUT:  
WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BY YOUR HOUSEHOLD IN THE LAST 12 
MONTHS. THE QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT ANY ANIMALS THAT YOU HAVE KEPT OR TAKEN CARE OF ON LAND YOU 
HOUSEHOLD HAS ACCESS TO. 
 
GENERAL 
1. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU OR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAS PARTICIPATED IN 
ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES: (IF NO, SKIP TO 4) 
 YES NO 
GROWING FOOD OTHER THAN AS PART OF PAID EMPLOYMENT   




INTERVIEWER READ OUT: NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT EVERYTHING THIS HOUSEHOLD 



























WHAT IS THE 
TOTAL 







OR USE FOR OWN 
OR CONSUMPTION? 
CATTLE      
SHEEP     
GOATS     
CHICKENS     
PIGS     
HORSES     
DONKEYS      
OTHER  
 
    
 
3. ARE THERE ANY PROBLEM REGARDING LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF Y, FILL OUT TABLE 
PROBLEMS TICK POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
1. LACK OF WATER   
 
2. DISEASES/LACK OF DIPPING CHEMICALS   
 
3. THEFT    
 
4. LACK OF A RELIABLE MARKET   
 









1. WHAT DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD DO WITH THE SKINS OF SLAUGHTERED ANIMALS? 
LIVESTOCK KEEP SELL (RANDS) THROW AWAY CRAFTS 
CATTLE      
GOATS      
SHEEP     


























1. DO YOU EVER USE YOUR LIVESTOCK FOR TRANSPORT?  YES [  ] NO [  ] IF NOT, GO TO  
 




1. DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD EVER SLAUGHTER CATTLE/GOATS FOR CEREMONIAL OR RITUAL PURPOSES?  
YES [  ] NO [  ] 
 
IF YES. HOW OFTEN? CATTLE______________________GOATS______________________________ 










































SECTION I: NATURAL RESOURCES  
A. ACCESS TO LAND 
B. NATURAL RESOURCE BASE AND CONSUMPTIVE USE 
B1. FIREWOOD  
DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD COLLECT FIREWOOD?  
 
Y/N 
WHERE? [UITKOMS; MIERSHOOP PAN; ANDRIESVALE; SCOTTY’S FORT; WITDRAAI; ERIN]  
HOW MANY TRIPS A WEEK/MONTH DO YOU DO?  
QUANTITIES COLLECTED (LOCAL MEASURE E.G. FULL WHEEL BURROW; SCOTCH CART ETC)  
DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD NOW SPEND MORE OR LESS TIME ON GETTING FIREWOOD THAN 
YOU DID 5 YEARS AGO?  
CODES: M=MORE; S=ABOUT THE SAME; L=LESS 
 
IF DECLINED (CODE ‘D’ ON THE 
QUESTION ABOVE), HOW HAS THE 
HOUSEHOLD RESPONDED TO THE 
DECLINE IN THE AVAILABILITY OF 
FIREWOOD? PLEASE RANK THE MOST 
IMPORTANT RESPONSES, MAX 3.  
RESPONSE  RANK 1-3 
INCREASED COLLECTION TIME (E.G., FROM 
FURTHER AWAY FROM HOUSE) 
 
BUYING (MORE) FUELWOOD AND/OR CHARCOAL  
BUYING (MORE) COMMERCIAL FUELS (GAS OR 
ELECTRICITY) 
 
REDUCED THE NEED FOR USE OF FUELS, SUCH AS 
USING IMPROVED STOVE 
 
MORE CONSERVATIVE USE OF FUELWOOD FOR 
COOKING AND HEATING 
 
REDUCED NUMBER OF COOKED MEALS  
INCREASED USE OF NON-WOOD WILD PRODUCTS 
(E.G. TWIGS) 
 
RESTRICTING ACCESS/USE TO OWN RESOURCES  
10. CONSERVING STANDING TREES FOR FUTURE  
11.OTHER;SPECIFY   
7. LIST THE NAME OF MOSTLY 
USED/MOST IMPORTANT SPECIES. 






8. WHO IS INVOLVED IN COLLECTION OF FIREWOOD? ____________________________________________ 
 
9. METHOD OF TRANSPORTATION ___________________________________________________________ 
 
10. ARE THERE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON FIRE WOOD USE? YES [  ] NO [ ] 
IF YES, EXPLAIN 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
B2.WILD PLANTS (FOOD)  
 
1.DO YOU COLLECT ANY WILD PLANTS? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF YES, WHERE ? [UITKOMS [  ] MIERSHOOP PAN [  ] ANDRIESVALE [  ] SCOTTY’S FORT [  ] WITDRAAI [  ] ERIN [  ] 
 













3. HOW OFTEN DO YOU GO OUT TO COLLECT FOOD PLANTS? 
________/WEEK  __________MONTH  OTHER SPECIFY____________ 
 
4. IF NOT, WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR NOT HARVESTING WILD 
FRUITS?_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________ 
SPECIES MAINLY USED  SEASON/MONTH 
HARVESTED 
USED AT HOME 
(QUANTITY) 
SELL (QUANTITY) PRICE 
BULB/TUBERS;     
     
     
LEAVES;     
     
     
SEEDS;      
     
OTHER;E.G. WILD MELONS     
HOODIA     
 
5. NAME AND GIVE REASONS FOR MOST IMPORTANT SPECIES 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. ARE ANY SPECIES BECOMING SCARCER? YES [  ] NO [  ]  
IF YES, NAME THEM AND GIVE REASONS 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 





1. DO YOU HUNT ANY WILD ANIMALS FOR FOOD? YES [  ] NO [  ].  
IF Y, WHERE? [UITKOMS [  ] MIERSHOOP PAN [  ] ANDRIESVALE [  ] SCOTTY’S FORT [  ] WITDRAAI [  ] ERIN [  ] 
 
2. IS GAME-MEAT AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE HOUSEHOLD DIET? __________ 
 
3. WHO IS INVOLVED IN HUNTING?__________________________________ 
 
4. HOW OFTEN DO YOU GO OUT TO HUNT? 




















5. IF NOT, WHAT IS THE REASON FOR NOT HUNTING? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
SPECIES HUNTED  SEASON/MONTH 
HUNTED 
DOES YOUR HOUSEHOLD CONSUME 
ALL THE MEAT 
SELL (QUANTITY)  PRICE 
 
SPRINGBOK     
WILDEBEEST     
ELAND     
GEMSBOK     
SPRING HARES     
GUINEA FOWL     
OTHER     
     
 
6. NAME AND GIVE REASONS FOR MOST IMPORTANT SPECIES 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. ARE ANY SPECIES BECOMING SCARCER? YES [  ] NO [  ] IF Y NAME THEM AND GIVE REASONS 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ARE THERE ANY ANIMALS THAT ARE NOT HUNTED FOR CULTURAL REASONS?  





1. DOES THIS HOUSEHOLD USE MEDICINAL PLANTS__________? 
 
2. DO YOU COLLECT ANY WILD PLANTS/ANIMALS FOR MEDICINE? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF Y, WHERE ? [UITKOMS [  ] MIERSHOOP PAN [  ] ANDRIESVALE [  ] SCOTTY’S FORT [  ] WITDRAAI [  ] ERIN [  ] 
 
3. WHO IS INVOLVED IN COLLECTION OF PLANTS/ANIMALS? 
__________________________________ 
 
4. ARE THE PLANTS NEEDED FOR MEDICINAL OR ANY OTHER PURPOSES EASILY ACCESSIBLE IN YOUR AREA? 
____________________ 
 
5. HOW OFTEN DO YOU/THEY/HE GO OUT TO COLLECT? 




SEASON/MONTH DO YOU USE 
ALL AT HOME  
SELL  PRICE 
 
     
     
 
6. NAME AND GIVE REASONS FOR MOST IMPORTANT SPECIES 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 













C. CRAFTS FOR SALE 
1. WHAT TYPES OF CRAFT MATERIALS DO YOU MAKE? WHAT RESOURCES DO YOU USE? HOW MUCH ARE CRAFTS 
SOLD AT?  






 MATERIAL AND PART 
USED (PLANT/ANIMAL) 




BRACELETS     
BEADS      
BOW AND ARROW     
ARTIFACTS FOR 
HANGING 
    
OTHER:     
 
DO YOU BUY ANYTHING TO MAKE YOUR CRAFTS? YES/ [  ] NO [  ] 
IF YES, WHAT AND FOR HOW MUCH? FILL OUT THE TABLE. 
MATERIAL BOUGHT FOR WHAT COST 
   
 
4. ARE ANY SPECIES BECOMING SCARCER? YES/ [  ] NO [  ] 
IF YES, NAME THEM AND GIVE REASONS 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. HOW MUCH TIME DO YOU SPEND ON MAKING THESE ITEMS IN A DAY/WEEK/MONTH _____________ 
 
6. WHICH PARTICULAR TIME OF THE YEAR DO YOU HAVE MORE SALES? ________________________________ 
 
7. ARE THERE ANY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE CRAFTS INDUSTRY? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
 
8. IF YES, NAME THEM 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 





























D. CULTURAL VALUES OF PLANTS, ANIMALS AND SITES 
 
1. ARE THERE ANY CULTURAL VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH PLANTS AND ANIMALS USE? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
 
IF Y, WHAT PLANTS, ANIMALS AND SITES ARE IMPORTANT TO YOU CULTURALLY 
SPECIES (LOCAL NAME) CULTURAL USE (PLEASE NAME THE USES) E.G. 
ACTUAL USE IN RITUALS, SACRED SPECIES. 
WHY DOES THIS HAVE CULTURAL IMPORTANCE? 
OVERALL RANKING OF PLANTS, 
ANIMALS, SITES 
(1=VERY IMPORTANT; 2= IMPORTANT; 
3= SLIGHTLY IMPORTANT; 4=NOT 
IMPORTANT) 
PLANTS:   
   
ANIMALS:   
   
SITES:   
 
2. ARE THERE ANY ANNUAL SPECIAL CEREMONIES ASSOCIATED WITH PLANTS AND ANIMALS? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF YES, EXPLAIN? _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. ARE THERE ANY TRADITIONAL PRACTICES/RULES/TABOOS ASSOCIATED WITH PLANT AND ANIMAL USE? YES [  ] 
NO [  ] 
IF YES, IDENTIFY AND EXPLAIN? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. IS COMPLIANCE WITH TRADITIONAL LAWS AS STRONG IN THESE DAYS AS IT WAS IN THE OLD DAYS? YES [  ] NO [ ] 
IF NO, WHY NOT? ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. IS THIS KNOWLEDGE RESTRICTED TO A CERTAIN AGE GROUP OR GENDER? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF YES WHICH? 
 FEMALES MALES 
ELDERLY   
ADULTS   
CHILDREN   
 
7. HOW DO YOU SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8 WOULD YOU BE PREPARED TO SPEND MONEY TO PRESERVE YOUR CULTURE AND SPIRITUAL VALUES 
(TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE WITH REGARD TO PLANT USE AND HANDCRAFT MAKING)?  
 
YES   NO   
 
 
9. IF YOUR ANSWER IS YES, HOW MUCH ARE YOU PREPARED TO PAY TO PRESERVE YOUR CULTURE? (PLEASE 
















SECTION J. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND POWER RELATIONS  
 
1. ARE YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANISATION? 
YES [  ] NO [  ] IF YES TICK BOX 
LIVESTOCK COMMITTEE  
JMB  
WARD COMMITTEE   
BURIAL SOCIETY  
OTHER  
 
2. DOES SOMEONE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD ATTEND THE MEETINGS? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF ‘NO’, GO TO 5. 
 
3. IF ‘YES’: WHO NORMALLY ATTENDS THE MEETINGS? ……………………………………………… 
 
4. ARE THERE ANY FORMAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR ACCESS TO RESOURCES IN THE FARMS? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF YES, EXPLAIN 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
5. ARE THESE RULES FOLLOWED? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF YES, HOW AND BY WHOM? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IF NO, WHY NOT?____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. DO YOU PARTICIPATE IN ANY? YES [  ] NO [  ] IF Y, NAME ___________________________________ 
 
7. IF YOU DON’T PARTICIPATE IN ANY ORGANISATION, WHY 
REASON TICK 
NO ORGANISATION EXISTS IN THE VILLAGE  
I’M NEW IN THE VILLAGE  
ORGANISATION MEMBERS GENERALLY BELONG TO A PARTICULAR FAMILY GROUP (S)  
CANNOT AFFORD TO CONTRIBUTE THE TIME  
CANNOT AFFORD TO CONTRIBUTE THE REQUIRED CASH PAYMENT  
MEMBERSHIP WILL RESTRICT MY USE OF THE RESOURCES, AND I WANT TO USE THE RESOURCES AS I 
NEED  
 
I DON’T BELIEVE ORGANISATIONS ARE VERY EFFECTIVE IN MANAGING THE NATURAL RESOURCES  
LACK OF NATURAL RESOURCES  
NOT INTERESTED IN THE ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY ORGANISATIONS  
CORRUPTION IN PREVIOUS ORGANISATIONS  
INTERESTED IN JOINING BUT NEEDS MORE INFORMATION  
ORGANISATIONS EXIST IN VILLAGE, BUT HOUSEHOLD IS UNAWARE OF THEIR PRESENCE  

















8. HAS THE PRESENCE OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED ORGANIZATIONS HAD ANY IMPACT ON THE ACCESSIBILITY OF 
RESOURCES? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
 
IF YES, TO WHAT EXTENT 
 
LARGE NEGATIVE EFFECT [  ] SMALL NEGATIVE EFFECT [  ]NO EFFECT [  ]SMALL POSITIVE [  ] 
 
9. DO YOU SHARE YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS OF HOW RESOURCES SHOULD BE MANAGED? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
IF YES, HOW AND WHY? ________________________________________________________________ 
 
IF NO, WHY _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. DO YOU THINK YOUR VIEWS ARE CONSIDERED BY COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES/ ORGANISATIONS?          
YES [  ] NO [  ] 
 IF YES OR NO EXPLAIN? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. DO YOU THINK THE PARK MANAGEMENT RESPECTS YOUR VIEWS? YES [  ] NO [  ] 
 IF YES OR NO EXPLAIN? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. WHAT IS YOUR GENERAL COMMENTS/FEELINGS/OPINIONS ABOUT ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE PARK 




























Chapter 3: The valuation of biodiversity conservation by the South African 




The restitution of parkland to the Khomani San “bushmen” and Mier “agricultural” 
communities in May 2002 marked a significant shift in conservation in the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park and environs in South Africa. Biodiversity conservation will benefit from 
this land restitution only if the Khomani San, who interact with nature more than do other 
groups, are good environmental stewards. To assess their attitude toward biodiversity 
conservation, this study used the contingent valuation method to investigate the values the 
communities assign to biodiversity conservation under three land tenure arrangements in the 
Kgalagadi area. For each community and land tenure arrangement, there are winners and 
losers, but the winners benefit by more than the cost that losers suffer. The net worth for 
biodiversity conservation under the various land tenure regimes ranged from R928 to R3,456 
to R4,160 for municipal land, parkland, and communal land respectively for the Khomani 
San, compared to R25,600 to R57,600 to R64,000 for municipal land, parkland, and 
communal land respectively for the Mier. Both communities have the highest preference for 
the implementation of the biodiversity conservation programme on communal land. There are 
no significant differences in the WTP between the two communities when adjusted for annual 
median household income; hence, the Khomani San can be trusted to become good 
environmental stewards. However, in order for all members of the local communities to 
support biodiversity conservation unconditionally, mechanisms for fair distribution of the 
associated costs and benefits should be put in place. 
 
 
Keywords: biodiversity, contingent valuation, Khomani San, land restitution. 
 
Note: An extract of this chapter has been published as a journal article (Dikgang, J., 
Muchapondwa, E., 2012. The valuation of biodiversity conservation by the South African 













In South Africa, land degradation is perceived to be positively correlated with distribution of 
communal rangelands (DEAT, 2010). Many communal lands in four provinces are severely 
degraded. For example, the main challenge in the Kgalagadi area of the Northern Cape 
Province is that the current levels of harvesting of medicinal plants, wood collection, grazing, 
and hunting are highly likely to result in the depletion of the resources. Such a situation is 
generally bad for the area’s conservation because of the inter-linkages between the broader 
Kgalagadi area and the KTP. Given the intimate connection between the land inside and 
outside the KTP, conservation of biodiversity needs to be undertaken in the broader 
Kgalagadi landscape and not just inside the park. The Khomani San “bushmen” are an 
important stakeholder in this regard. 
 
The KTP, located between Botswana and South Africa, encompasses part of the ancestral site 
of the Khomani San. As part of South Africa’s land restitution programme, the Khomani San 
community was awarded land inside and outside the KTP in May 2002, together with the 
adjacent Mier community.
21
 SANParks was tasked with co-managing the acquired land 




It is clear from the way land restitution claims within protected areas have been handled so 
far in South Africa that sustainability and biodiversity conservation are critically important. 
The government has taken the view that land claims by individuals and groups must be 
achieved in the national interest by “taking into consideration the intrinsic biodiversity value 
of the land, and seeking outcomes which will combine the objectives of restitution with the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity” (Callicott, 1986; De Villiers, 1999; 
Wynberg and Kepe, 1999; Hall-Martin and Carruthers, 2003). This notion of intrinsic value 
implies that biodiversity has a value in and of itself.  
 
                                                          
21
 In addition, the Khomani San people were awarded additional and special rights in the remainder of the park 
because they lost more land in comparison to the Mier communities during the establishment of the Park (Bosch 
and Hirschfeld, 2002). 
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 A contract park is a protected area developed on land belonging to the government, private individuals, or a 
community. These parks are co-managed by the park authority in conjunction with the private individuals or 
communities through a joint management board (JMB). Contractual parks are common in South Africa and 












The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the value that the Khomani San assign to 
modern conservation under various land tenure arrangements and to assess whether they may 
generally be expected to be good environmental stewards. This is done by determining the 
economic value assigned by the Khomani San to biodiversity conservation on communal 
land, municipal land, and park land, in a contingent valuation study of a plant conservation 
programme in the Kgalagadi.  
 
Another objective of this study is to investigate the factors which influence the values 
assigned. From a policy point of view, the identification of such factors sheds some light on 
the type of appropriate compensation incentive schemes that may be suitable for enhancing 
biodiversity conservation in the landscape in question. 
 
Lastly, the paper seeks to compare the valuation of biodiversity conservation by a typical 
pristine indigenous
23
 community to that of an average South African rural community, the 
adjacent Mier community. The Mier community (another local community in the area) are 
traditionally livestock farmers and are a fair reflection of South Africa’s rural general 
population. This paper is important because the Khomani San’s attitudes towards modern 
conservation have not been evaluated until now. Furthermore, there is a dearth of literature 
comparing the values of environmental resources between indigenous people and the general 
population. Based on the economics of hunter-gatherer literature, we hypothesize that: “The 
value assigned to biodiversity conservation by the Khomani San people differs from valuation 
by the adjacent Mier community.” This paper will test whether such a hypothesis is supported 
by evidence from the Kgalagadi area in South Africa.  
 
In the next section of this paper, we discuss the economic rationale for valuing biodiversity. 
The third section presents the survey, while the fourth section presents the descriptive 
statistics and results. We discuss our findings in the final section. 
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 In South Africa, the term “indigenous people” refers to all African ethnic groups. In this paper, the term 
“indigenous people” is used to refer to vulnerable indigenous communities in South Africa. The exposure of the 
Khomani San to the cash economy and external factors, particularly the influence of western value systems, is 












3.2. Economic valuation of biodiversity  
Ecosystems provide provisioning services, regulation services, support services, and cultural 
services (MEA, 2005). These services directly enter into economic processes (WCMC, 
1992). As such, it is economically rational to conserve biodiversity because of its 
contribution to human well-being (Clough, 2000).  
 
Successful conservation outside protected areas usually requires the integration of the 
protected land with other land uses, rather than its separation (Hartley, 1997; Kneebone, 
2000; Kneebone et al., 2000; Norton, 2000). There is a need to accommodate the most 
economically beneficial use of the land and minimise the negative impact on biodiversity 
(Kneebone, 2000). However, landowners often lack information and evidence about the 
correct value to assign to biodiversity when making land-use decisions (CBD, 2010). 
Therefore, in order for biodiversity conservation to be successful outside protected areas, 
landowners should become informed about the correct value of biodiversity and subsequently 
use this information in land-use decisions.  
 
One of the main concerns raised by policymakers is that, although they are aware of the 
importance of conserving biodiversity, their efforts are undermined by its undervaluation or 
lack of valuation, which ultimately results in overexploitation. The estimation of the value of 
biodiversity is an essential precondition to the internalisation of this value in decision-making 
(CBD, 2010). This is worthwhile because it may assist in convincing decision-makers of the 
need to conserve biodiversity (Vorhies, 2010). This study provides this value by taking into 
consideration both winners and losers from the implementation of a proposed biodiversity 
conservation project.  
 
The rationale behind environmental valuation is to understand people’s preferences about 
environmental goods and services. In addition, by raising awareness of the value of 
biodiversity among societal actors, valuation can also act as an incentive measure in its own 
right (CBD, 2010).  
 
The estimation of the value of biodiversity conservation does not only provide this particular 
value, but also highlights issues that need to be addressed to achieve sustainable resource use. 














 Economic incentives refer to mechanisms that change the behaviour of 
actors with respect to economic choices by altering their economic conditions (Knowler, 
1999). Economic incentives play a pivotal role in nature conservation at all levels of society, 
particularly at community levels (Emerton, 2001).  
 
The use of economic incentives is an attempt to induce effective and sustainable use of 
natural resources. It is highly likely that local communities, particularly those that live within 
close proximity to national parks, will be willing and able to use natural resources in a 
sustainable way only if they were to have significant tangible economic benefits accruing to 
them. Economic incentives require identifying and overcoming broader economic conditions 
and forces that influence people to degrade the environment.  
 
It is vital that conservation is economically desirable to local communities in a way that will 
improve household welfare as well as nature. This raises the “public goods” market failure. 
Public goods, such as communal lands, are defined as non-rival (one user’s use of the good 
does not preclude another’s) and non-excludable (no one can be excluded from using the 
good). While users of public goods have no difficulty in capturing their benefits, providers 
have difficulty in getting their costs covered due to non-excludability. This is the reason why 
under-supply is notorious with public goods. This implies that as a public good biodiversity is 
underprovided by the market. Nonetheless, economic incentive schemes have evolved over 
time. 
 
Furthermore, it is vital to understand the point at which the market failure affects the 
participants’ ability to capture the full economic benefits of conservation. Property rights 
frequently are applied as economic incentives for local communities that normally use natural 
resources or live in biodiversity landscapes (Emerton, 2000).  
 
Most environmental valuation techniques entail the elicitation of willingness to pay (WTP). 
This is commonly done using the contingent valuation method (CVM), in which respondents 
are asked about their WTP for a hypothetical good or service. The use of dichotomous choice 
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 The tools of institutional economics are highly applicable to the problems involved in the present analysis. 












(binary or closed-ended) questions has gained popularity over open-ended questions 
following the NOAA panel recommendations (Arrow et al., 1993).  
 
However, there are circumstances where some variant of the open-ended question format 
might perform better, for example when the sample size is limited. The payment card method 
seems to be a good compromise between the closed-ended and open-ended formats. 
According to Mitchell and Carson (1989), the payment card method gives respondents some 
assistance in searching for their valuation. It avoids the starting-bid bias of the closed-ended 
format and maintains the positive features of an open-ended format. A recent study by 
Hanley et al. (2008) used the payment card to elicit the WTP for landscape change in a 
national park.  
 
Most CVM studies deal with environmental public goods. As a result, they restrict WTP to 
being non-negative. However, some environmental amenities manifest themselves as costs to 
some and benefits to others. When valuing an increase in the quality of a public “bad,” an 
appropriate consumer surplus measure must be chosen which can measure the loss of utility 




There exist two measures when the policy change decreases utility, namely Compensating 
Variation (CV) and Equivalent Variation
26
 (EV) (Hicks, 1939; Hicks, 1943). The CV 
measures the agents’ maximum WTP for carrying out a proposed measure, the payment that 
would cause them to remain on their original indifference curve (original welfare level) 
although the measure they approve is carried out. The EV measures how much the agents 
who do not approve of the proposed measure would be prepared to pay for its prevention, a 
payment that transfers them to the same (lower) indifference curve to which the undesired 
proposed measure would have transferred them. 
 
A given welfare level is maintained in the first notion, but not in the second, so there is an 
asymmetry. On normative grounds, the second case could be justified by the assumption that 
the people concerned do not deserve the former higher welfare level, so their levels should be 
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 The most commonly used approach to account for welfare losses in a contingent valuation study has been to 
make assumptions concerning the negative tail of the WTP distribution, after eliciting the WTP for a change in 
the provision of a public good/bad. 
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reduced. This suggests that they have no property right to enjoy the situation without the 
suggested measure. 
 
Ordinarily, those who lose from an increase in the environmental good provision would want 
to be compensated and would expect to be asked about their willingness to accept (WTA) 
compensation. However, the NOAA panel strongly recommends against the use of WTA 
scenarios in CVM studies (Arrow et al., 1993). It is widely noted in the contingent valuation 
literature (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) that, in comparison to WTP, WTA appears more prone 
to producing inaccurate estimates of value. In cases where the WTP-WTA gap is closed 
through repetition and learning, most of the changes occur in the WTA estimates (Shogren et 
al., 1994). According to Munro (2007), this implies that the estimates obtained from a one-
shot WTP measure may be a better estimate of true WTA than a one-shot WTA estimate. 
 
Thus, the elicitation format should allow respondents who experience a welfare loss because 
of the proposed environmental change to state a negative WTP (Hanley et al., 2008; 
Muchapondwa et al., 2008), in a manner that we will show later. Otherwise, the exclusion of 
negative WTP may result in an erroneous conclusion with regard to the net social benefits of 
the proposed change when the total values are estimated (Hanley et al., 2008). 
 
Allowing respondents to state a positive WTP (their EV) is one way to include the negative 
WTP (Clinch and Murphy, 2001). An assumption is that WTP to prevent the proposed 
changes can be considered as a proxy of the negative WTP (cost in the welfare terms) for the 
proposed changes. Thus, WTP to prevent the proposed change is assumed symmetric to the 
WTA to tolerate the proposed change (in the sense of the minimum compensation payment 
needed to restore people to their utility levels prior to the introduction of the project). Of 
course, this can only hold as a workable approximation for marginal changes, when the 
environmental good of interest is easily substitutable and income effects are marginal (Clinch 
and Murphy, 2001; Hanley et al., 2008).  
 
Conservation of biodiversity, particularly on communal and municipal lands in a developing 
country such as South Africa, is likely to be viewed as good by some people and bad by 
others; i.e., it produces both winners and losers. The current study will allow respondents to 












is uncertainty about whether the asymmetry between WTP and WTA is negligible. The fact 
that nature is so vital for indigenous people implies that considerable income effects are 
imaginable upon different assignments of property rights. Moreover, one might doubt that 
natural resources such as pasture grounds are easily substitutable for money, particularly in 
traditional societies. Thus, there may be differences in WTA and WTP for the same quantity 
of resources. Nonetheless, determination of the value of biodiversity from the perspectives of 
various stakeholders will assist in establishing the best policy response where biodiversity is 
under threat (OECD, 1999). Given appropriate and adequate economic incentives, 
landowners can become effective stewards of land as well as the biodiversity linked with it 
(Kneebone et al., 2000). 
 
3.3. The survey 
3.3.1. The survey  
A contingent valuation survey was conducted in the Mier Local Municipality. The data were 
gathered through face-to-face interviews from August to October 2009 and March to April 
2011
27
 respectively. Sample size determination took into consideration the elicitation format, 
as well as the budget constraints. One hundred randomly selected households, divided equally 
between the Khomani San and the Mier communities, were interviewed.  
 
The respondents initially were given background information on biodiversity and the possible 
costs and benefits associated with biodiversity conservation. The potential benefits include: a) 
raw materials that directly enter the economic process as inputs; b) other resources such as 
food (wild fruits) that are directly consumed; c) non-food resources such as medicinal plants; 
d) culturally determined services such as the fulfilment of demands for aesthetic services; g) 
improved scenery. The direct and indirect costs include: a) maintenance costs such as wages, 
running costs, monitoring, and policing costs; b) costs to other livelihood options such as 
traditional hunting and gathering; c) opportunity costs in the form of alternative land uses. 
  
The biodiversity conservation programme proposal was as follows: “The government 
proposes to introduce a biodiversity conservation programme where as many native trees, 
shrubs and grasslands as necessary would be planted and protected with the aim of achieving 
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 The figures in our analysis are not deflated across the survey periods because we do not believe that there was 












a reduction in the current biodiversity loss by 10% in terms of the quantities of each of the 
species under threat
28
. The conservation programme would entail increasing the total amount 
of land under conservation in the Kgalagadi area. The proposed programme can be 
undertaken on either communal land or municipal land or park
29
 land with similar successful 
outcomes. In view of budget constraints, the programme will be undertaken on only one type 
of land.”  
 
Thereafter, a two-stage approach was used. First, respondents were asked how their 
households weighed the costs and benefits of the proposed programme on each land type, by 
considering only those benefits and costs applicable to them. On the one hand, those 
respondents who indicated that the potential benefits were greater than the potential costs 
(B>C) were expected to have a non-negative WTP for the biodiversity conservation 
programme. On the other hand, those respondents who indicated that the potential benefits 
were exceeded by the potential costs (B<C) were expected to have a non-positive WTP for 
the biodiversity conservation programme. Our approach so far enables the respondents to be 
classified into distinct categories based on their perceived assessment of the potential benefits 
and costs associated with the introduction of a biodiversity conservation project in their area. 
 
Secondly, depending on their preferences for the programme on each land type, the 
respondents were asked about the highest amount their household was willing to pay as an 
annual conservation levy to ensure that such a programme was undertaken, in the case of 
those for whom B>C, or avoided, in the case of those for whom B<C, on the communal, 
municipal, or park land. The permissible highest amount the household was willing to pay in 
respect of each programme structure had to be chosen from a predesigned payment card with 
13 random amounts carefully selected following a pilot study in the study area.
30
 The 
respondents had to give three WTP answers relating to three types of land. On the one hand, 
for those for whom B>C, the type of land with the highest stated WTP is the type of land on 
which the respondents would most like the proposed project to be implemented. On the other 
hand, for those for whom B<C, the type of land with the highest stated WTP is the type of 
                                                          
28
 Respondents were also told about the trends of biodiversity loss. Biodiversity will continue to be lost for a 
variety of reasons: of all the potential loss, we aim to prevent only 10% and let the other 90% of the loss go on. 
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 In this context, park land refers to either of the contract parks. 
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 As is standard with this method, the 13
th
 slot gave provision for respondents who had WTP amounts not 












land on which he respondents would least like the proposed project to be implemented. The 
logic behind the WTP of those against the proposed programme is that, by paying to prevent 
the biodiversity conservation programme, they would continue to undertake their current land 
use activities without any restrictions, as effective biodiversity conservation would require 
some restrictions on their use of land. In fact, the respondents were told that, if they did not 
want the proposed biodiversity conservation programme, it would have to be undertaken 
elsewhere and that they would contribute to the costs of its implementation there (i.e. 
preventing its adoption in their area). Thus, they would be paying for remote conservation, as 
it were, as opposed to local conservation. 
 
WTP questions were followed up with debriefing questions to understand the motives behind 
the chosen amounts. In particular, the debriefing questions were intended to identify protest 
bids for omission from the analysis, as is standard procedure in CVM studies; this refers to all 
zero bids that are cited for reasons other than budget constraints.  
 
3.3.2. Descriptive statistics from the survey 
The descriptive statistics of the surveyed households are presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2.
31
 
Where the respondents were household members other than the heads, their responses were 
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 This sub-section splits the analysis by ethnic groups, namely the Khomani San people and the Mier 
Communities. The reason for splitting by ethnic groups was due to the two groups being distinct. Splitting will 













Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics from the survey (socio-economic profile) 
 Khomani San Khomani 
San 










Household size 5.37  3.09  5.59 3.03 5.48 3.057 
Age of household head 46.84  15.15  47.79 14.35 47.32 14.73 
Gender of household head (1=M, 
0=F) 
0.60  0.49 0.63 0.49 0.62 0.49 
Years Lived at Property 10.10  9.14  16.49  12.83  13.30 11.57 
Education Years of Household 
Head 
 
4.98  3.62  5.9 3.97 5.44 3.82 
Household Head works for 
wages32(1=Y, 0=N) 
0.32  0.47  0.21 0.41 0.27 0.44 
Household Head Self Employed  
(1=Y, 0=N)  
0.23  0.42  0.54 0.50 0.39 0.49 
Household Income (R33)  26 400.00  28 462.98  43 500.00 80 977.30  34 950.00  61 144.84  
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 Codes; 1 = yes & 0 = no (applies to Table 3.1 and Table 3.2).  
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Ever visited the park (1=Y, 0=N)  0.77  0.42  0.73 0.45 0.75 0.43 
Knowledgeable about the effects 
of biodiversity loss (1=Y, 0=N) 
0.58  0.50  0.67 0.47 0.63 0.48 
Collects firewood from 
communal land (1=Y, 0=N)  
0.80  0.40  0.33  0.47  0.57 0.50  
Uses medicinal plants from 
communal land (1=Y, 0=N)  
0.77  0.42  0.25  0.44  0.51 0.50 
Collects bush food from 
communal land (1=Y, 0=N)  
0.54  0.50  0.20  0.40  0.37  0.48  
Involved in Livestock Farming 
(1=Y, 0=N)  
0.46  0.50 0.96 0.21 0.56  0.50  
Involved in Game Farming (1=Y, 
0=N)  
0.06  0.24  0.13  0.34  0.10  0.29  
Undertakes activities on 
municipal land (1=Y, 0=N) 
0.14 0.35 0.41  0.49  0.28 0.45 
Undertakes activities inside the 
Contract Park (1=Y, 0=N) 
0.65 0.48 0 0 0.33 0.47 
Will stay in area despite 
substantial reduction in 
biodiversity (1=Y, 0=N) 
0.75 0.44 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.43 
No. of Observations 100 100 100 100 200 200 
 
The livelihoods of the majority of the Khomani San are based on the natural environment and 
on social grants from the government. Given their general lack of access to electricity, it is 
not surprising that all Khomani San respondents are involved in the collection of firewood. 
The most harvested tree is the Camel thorn tree, which is the only large tree in the area. Even 
though harvesting of this tree for commercial purposes is prohibited, some locals continue to 
harvest it for such purposes due to unemployment or lack of alternative income-generating 
activities in their area.  
 
The Khomani San do not pay entrance fees to the KTP because of their possession of special 












them to easily attend their meetings and other activities inside the park. About 77% of the 
Khomani San respondents had visited the park sometime in the past. This is important 
because it means that most respondents had an idea of what biodiversity conservation aimed 
to achieve. Their main reason for visiting the park was to undertake traditional and cultural 
activities. Harvesting of medicinal plants was the second most popular activity that took place 
in the area. The traditional doctors were the major harvesters of medicinal plants in the 
contract park portion of the KTP.  
 
In contrast to the Khomani San, the Mier community has access to electricity. This explains 
why only 33% of Mier respondents were involved in firewood collection. Given their heavy 
dependence on livestock farming, lack of grazing land was their major challenge.  
 
Unlike the Khomani San, the Mier pay an entrance fee whenever they visit the park. About 
73% of the Mier respondents had visited the park sometime in the past. Their reason for 
visiting the park was mainly for recreational reasons.  
 
We carried out two-tailed tests assuming unequal variances and a 5 percent significance level 
to see if the means for each attribute are different. We conclude that the difference between 
years lived at property, household head self-employment, household income, collects 
firewood from communal land, uses medicinal plants from communal land, involvement in 
livestock farming, involvement in game farming and undertakes activities on municipal land 
are statistically significant. It is clear from the discussions above that both ethnic groups are 
to varying degrees dependent on nature for their livelihoods.  
 
3.4. Results and discussion 
3.4.1. For whom is the proposed biodiversity conservation programme good or bad? 
We would naturally want to know who consider themselves winners (B>C) or losers (B<C) 
from the proposed biodiversity conservation programme. Unravelling the characteristics of 
the people in each of these two categories requires a discrete choice model. The logit and 
probit models are the two most used discrete choice models (Capps and Cramer, 1985). For 
example, a number of studies have used the probit model to model winners and losers in non-
market valuation studies similar to the current one (e.g., Clinch and Murphy, 2001; 












proposed biodiversity conservation programme good (B>C) or bad (B<C) could assist in 
designing appropriate incentive schemes to enhance biodiversity conservation in the 
Kgalagadi area.  
 
A binary decision of whether the respondents considered the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme good or bad is used as the dependent variable. Because we have 
respondents at a household level, household characteristics such as income and household 
resource use activities are expected to be vital in explaining the households’ attitudes towards 
the proposed biodiversity conservation programme.  
 
Table 3.3 sets out the binary probit model results of whether the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme of planting trees, shrubs, and grasslands to avert a 10% biodiversity 
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 The problem of multicollinearity occurs when a strong linear relationship exists among the explanatory 
variables. A strong association between the explanatory variables makes it increasingly difficult to assess the 
impact of individual variables on the dependent variable. There are various techniques to check for the presence 
of multicollinearity. We checked for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factors for each of the 












Table 3.3: Binary Probit model on the determinants of supporting the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme on different land types 
 Communal Municipal Contract 
VARIABLES Land Land Park 
    
Household is from the Mier community -0.0776 1.203*** 0.773*** 
 (0.311) (0.369) (0.296) 
Log of income -0.0971 -0.277* -0.230* 
 (0.146) (0.144) (0.131) 
Undertakes collection activities on communal land 1.148*** 0.781** 1.126*** 
 (0.307) (0.355) (0.270) 
Practises livestock or game farming 0.290 0.595** 0.418* 
 (0.281) (0.269) (0.235) 
Undertakes activities on municipal land -0.965*** -0.637** -0.789*** 
 (0.306) (0.299) (0.270) 
Believes community has primary responsibility for 
conservation 
0.0210 0.645** 0.754*** 
 (0.340) (0.274) (0.268) 
Will stay in area despite substantial reduction in 
biodiversity 
0.317 0.638** 0.705*** 
 (0.301) (0.274) (0.257) 
Household was sampled in the second wave during 
2011 
-1.356*** 0.525** 0.261 
 (0.294) (0.259) (0.235) 
Constant 2.269 1.575 0.849 
    
Observations 200 200 200 
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
The two variables related to resource use are (1) the collection of medicinal plants, bush food, 
and wild fruits from communal land, and (2) grazing and harvesting activities on municipal 
land. Both variables are significant in all the three models. Given the heavy dependence by 
local communities on nature, it is not surprising that households that collect medicinal plants, 
bush food and wild fruits from communal land are more likely to view the proposed 













Households that undertake grazing and harvesting activities on municipal land are less likely 
to support the proposed programme on any land type. Perhaps those involved in activities on 
municipal land have experienced restrictions, especially on the harvesting of Camel thorn 
trees. It would therefore be rational for them to have a negative attitude toward the proposed 
biodiversity conservation programme, as it brings with it some restrictions about resource 
use.  
 
The other variables which are only significant in the municipal land and contract park models 
are income, the household practice of farming, respondent’s belief that the community has 
primary responsibility for conservation, and the household’s intention to stay in the area 
despite substantial reduction in biodiversity. Households with higher incomes have a higher 
probability of viewing implementation of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme 
on municipal land and contract park as bad. This result seems to suggest that households with 
higher incomes are relatively less reliant on nature, hence their lower incentives to support 
the proposed biodiversity conservation programme. 
 
Those households that practice livestock or game farming are more likely to support 
implementation of the proposed programme on municipal land and contract park. This result 
is plausible, as livestock and game farmers tend to have a symbiotic relationship with nature 
and therefore have a long-term incentive to conserve it. 
 
The households who will stay in the area despite substantial reduction in biodiversity have a 
higher probability of supporting the implementation of the proposed programme on 
municipal land and contract park. Such households reveal their preferences to stay in the area 
in the long run and therefore naturally prefer to see sustainable biodiversity conservation into 
the long run.  
 
Households that believe that the community has primary responsibility for conserving 
biodiversity have a higher probability of seeing the proposed programme as desirable on the 
municipal land and contract park. This result is logical, as is shows that those who identify 













The motivation for having the Mier dummy variable is to check for any systematic 
differences between the preferences of Khomani San and the Mier over biodiversity 
conservation. The results show that the Mier people are more likely than the Khomani San to 
support the implementation of the proposed programme on both municipal land and contract 
park. The result is plausible, as the Mier community tends to be more integrated into 
municipal activities than the Khomani San, who tend to focus on their communal activities 
and interaction.  
 
Given that respondents in the sample were interviewed in two different time periods, we also 
included a dummy variable to check if there are systematic differences between first and 
second wave respondents. Our results show that respondents interviewed in the second wave 
have random differential preferences over the proposed biodiversity conservation 
programme. They have a lower likelihood of supporting its implementation on communal 
land, while they have a higher likelihood of supporting its implementation on municipal land 
when compared to respondents from the first wave. However, they are equally indifferent to 
the implementation of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme on the contract 
park.  
 
3.4.2. The determinants of willingness to pay for implementing the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme of planting trees, shrubs, and grasslands in the Kgalagadi area 
The objective of stated preference surveys is to elicit respondents’ valuation of the projects 
described to them in scenarios. The reliability of each survey is typically measured through 
the estimation of a bid function relating WTP responses to a variety of covariates collected in 
the survey.  
 
The WTP function for individual k is denoted as (Carlsson, 2008): 
 
                                                                                                                                 (3.1) 
 
Where z is a vector of socio-economic characteristics, while a is a vector of experiment 
related characteristics and   is an error term. As is common procedure in these types of 
studies, WTP is censored since it is zero for a significant number of observations. Given the 












coefficients estimates. The censored regression application leads us to a Tobit type I model. 
Thus, the true latent WTP function is: 
 
                                                                  
                                                                 (3.2) 
 
We observe the following: 
 
                                                           
            
                                        (3.3) 
 
Thus the dependent variable is a censored variable. These types of models are called a Tobit 
type 1 model. It is worth noting that the Tobit model assumes that DGP that explains the 
zeros also explains the positive values. However, failure to distinguish between the zero and 
positive responses could lead to a miss-specification. 
 
The value of the censored variable is of particular interest. This implies that there is a need to 
find the expected value of a censored normal variable. The expected value is as follows 
(Greene, 2000): 
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Where  (z) and Ø(z) are the standard normal distribution function and standard normal 
density function respectively. It is worth noting that in the case of the Tobit type 1 model, 
WTP can in principle take on a negative or positive values and an assumption made is that 
zero values are a result of non-observability.  
 
Secondly, we often wish to interpret the coefficients of the WTP function not only with 
regard to their sign and significance, but also with regard to their magnitude. In a case of a 
continuous variable, this is commonly referred to as the marginal effect. In a case of a 
standard OLS model, the marginal effect is simply equal to the coefficient. This is not the 
case for limited variable models. This implies that we cannot interpret Tobit and Probit 
coefficients as marginal effects. The marginal effects for a Tobit type 1 model can be 
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The goal is to assess the extent to which expectations from (i) economic theory, (ii) prior 
intuition, and (iii) observed empirical regularities are fulfilled. The analysis of those variables 
that can potentially affect WTP can shed light on the robustness of the survey design and 
implementation of the study (Hanley and Splash, 1993; Köhlin, 2001; Muchapondwa, et al. 
2008). Accordingly, the determinants of WTP for implementing the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme of planting trees, shrubs, and grasslands in the Kgalagadi area are 




Table 3.4: Marginal effects of the Tobit model on the determinants of WTP for the proposed 
biodiversity conservation programme on different land types 
 Communal Municipal Contract 
VARIABLES Land Land Park 
Household is from the Mier community 37.03 35.32 -0.533 
 (50.74) (30.10) (10.79) 
Household size -10.24 3.683 -0.298 
 (8.423) (4.958) (1.760) 
Gender of the Household Head 15.55 8.574 22.79** 
 (54.09) (33.29) (11.44) 
Education years of the Household Head 21.63*** 4.636 2.534* 
 (6.733) (4.016) (1.441) 
Log of income 150.9*** 28.96* 12.03** 
 (27.15) (16.04) (5.764) 
Respondent is knowledgeable about the effects of 
biodiversity loss 
67.30 67.24** 20.97* 
 (55.31) (33.20) (11.45) 
Household was sampled in the second wave during 
2011 
-112.9* -138.2*** -26.94** 
 (57.31) (35.60) (12.23) 
    
Observations 174 163 153 
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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 Ordinarily, we would have wanted to run a separate set of models for the determinants of willingness to pay 
for preventing the proposed biodiversity conservation programme on the three land types in the Kgalagadi area. 












The reported WTP amounts for implementing the proposed biodiversity conservation 
programme are at least zero. The Tobit model is more efficient for such circumstances. 
Household income and the dummy for the respondents interviewed in the second wave are 
significant in the models of all the three land types. As expected, household income 
positively influences WTP for the proposed biodiversity conservation programme, and this is 
the same for all the land tenure arrangements (communal, municipal, and park). It is logical 
that households with higher income are willing to pay relatively higher amounts. However, 
the marginal effects of income on WTP fall as one moves from communal land to municipal 
land to parkland. The result with respect to the dummy for the respondents interviewed in the 
second wave indicates that respondents in the second wave have relatively lower WTP. This 
implies that the level of benefits they envisage from the proposed biodiversity conservation 
programme is consistently lower than that expected by their peers interviewed earlier. 
Perhaps this also points to increasingly unfulfilled expectations regarding access to natural 
resources in the area.  
 
The results of the set of tobit models also show significant marginal effects for the gender of 
the household head, education years of the household head, and respondents’ knowledge 
about the effects of biodiversity loss. Male-headed households have a higher WTP than 
female-headed households for the proposed biodiversity conservation programme in the 
contract park. Education years of the household head positively influence the WTP for both 
the communal land and contract park. Perhaps highly educated households’ heads participate 
more in platforms where communities have more land rights, i.e. communal land and contract 
park, and therefore benefit more. Those who are knowledgeable about the effects of 
biodiversity loss have higher WTP in both the municipal land and contract park.  
 
Most importantly, the results demonstrate that there is no systematic difference between the 
WTP of the Khomani San and the Mier communities. Thus, the drivers of the value that 
Khomani San attach to modern conservation across the three land types are statistically not 
different from those of other indigenous communities such as the Mier. Our findings suggest 













3.4.3. The welfare measures of willingness to pay for implementing or preventing the 
proposed biodiversity conservation programme of planting trees, shrubs, and grasslands in 
the Kgalagadi area 
The WTP results are presented in Table 3.5 according to the community group, the attitude 
towards the proposed biodiversity conservation programme, and the land tenure arrangement. 
Eventually, a table showing the benefit-cost analysis for implementation of the proposed 
biodiversity conservation programme will be presented. 
 
Table 3.5: Annual WTP for implementing and preventing proposed biodiversity conservation 
programme on communal land, municipal land, and parkland 
 
(B>C) Support Conservation (B<C) Against Conservation  
 
 WTP for implementing Proposed Biodiversity 
Conservation Programme 
WTP for preventing Proposed 
Biodiversity Conservation Programme  
 






































































Note: The absolute numbers above are in South African Rands. 
 
Ninety-two percent of the Khomani San respondents supported implementation of the 
proposed biodiversity conservation programme (i.e. B>C) on communal land while 79% of 
the respondents supported implementation of the same programme (i.e. B>C) on either 
municipal land or inside the park. In contrast, 83% of the Mier respondents supported 
implementation of the biodiversity conservation programme (i.e. B>C) on municipal land, 
while 88% of the respondents supported implementation of the programme on communal 
land, and 74% of the respondents supported implementation of the programme (i.e. B>C) 
inside the park. Therefore, the overall ranking of preferred implementation location is 
communal land, municipal land, and parkland in decreasing order of preference. This seems 
to point toward preference for carrying out programmes in locations where respondents have 












The Khomani San’s mean WTP amounts for implementing the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme on communal land, municipal land, and inside the park, for those 
for whom B>C, are R60.60, R38.42 and R30.89 respectively. These amounts represent about 
0.23%, 0.15%, and 0.12% respectively of Khomani San mean annual income. For those 
Khomani San for whom B<C, the mean WTP amounts for preventing the proposed 
biodiversity conservation programme in their area on communal land, municipal land, and 
inside the park are R70.63, R7.31 and R7.00 respectively. These amounts represent about 
0.27%, 0.03%, and 0.03% respectively of Khomani San mean annual income. Given that 
more Khomani San respondents support than oppose the implementation of the proposed 
biodiversity conservation programme on any one of the land types, the above figures imply 
that the Khomani San people generally derive net positive benefits from the proposed 
biodiversity conservation programme and that, as a result, the majority of them would vote 
for its implementation. 
 
The median WTP figures for the Khomani San are lower than their mean WTP figures for all 
land types. However, the general message still carries through, even on the basis of the 
median WTP figures: the Khomani San people generally derive net positive benefits from the 
proposed biodiversity conservation programme. The median WTP amounts for implementing 
the proposed biodiversity conservation programme on communal land, municipal land, and 
inside the park, for those for whom B>C, are R15.00, R5.00, and R15.00 respectively. These 
amounts represent about 0.05%, 0.02%, and 0.05% respectively of Khomani San median 
annual income. For those for whom B<C, the median WTP amounts for preventing the 
proposed biodiversity conservation programme in their area on communal land, municipal 
land, and inside the park are R10.00, R5.00, and R5.00 respectively. These amounts represent 
about 0.04%, 0.02%, and 0.02% respectively of Khomani San median annual income. 
 
As for the Mier, the mean WTP amounts for implementing the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme on communal land, municipal land and inside the park, for those for 
whom B>C, are R146.45, R70.06, and R40.27 respectively. These amounts represent about 
0.34%, 0.16%, and 0.09% respectively of Mier mean annual income. For those Mier for 
whom B<C, the mean WTP amounts for preventing the proposed biodiversity conservation 
programme in their area on communal land, municipal land, and inside the park are R85.59, 












respectively of Mier mean annual income. We can reach a similar conclusion for the Mier as 
we did for the Khomani San. Thus, given that more Mier respondents support than oppose the 
implementation of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme on any one of the land 
types, the Mier people generally derive net positive benefits from the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme. Consequently, the majority of them would vote for its 
implementation.  
 
Even though the median WTP figures for the Mier are lower than their mean WTP figures for 
all land types, they point to the same conclusion as the mean WTP figures. The median WTP 
amounts for implementing the proposed biodiversity conservation programme on communal 
land, municipal land, and inside the park, for those for whom B>C, are R25.00, R5.00, and 
R15.00 respectively. These amounts represent about 0.03%, 0.01%, and 0.02% respectively 
of Mier median annual income. For those for whom B<C, the median WTP amounts for 
preventing the proposed biodiversity conservation programme in their area on communal 
land, municipal land, and inside the park are R75.00, R10.00 and R15.00 respectively. These 
amounts represent about 0.09%, 0.01%, and 0.02% respectively of Mier median annual 
income. 
 
Comparing the Khomani San and Mier, it is clear that the majority of respondents from both 
communities support the implementation of the proposed biodiversity conservation 
programme on communal land, municipal land, and inside the park. Both communities have 
highest preference for the implementation of the biodiversity conservation programme on 
communal land, i.e. the mean and median WTP and numbers supporting implementation (as 
opposed to prevention) are highest for the communal land. The Mier generally have higher 
WTP than the Khomani San. This is likely an effect of differences in incomes between the 
two communities, as the Mier generally have higher incomes. For example, the Mier 
respondents have almost a double median WTP (R25) than the Khomani San (R15) in the 
category of those in favour of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme on 
communal land. However, when adjusted for annual median household income, there are no 












“bushmen” equally care about modern biodiversity conservation as other indigenous 




The results discussed above are encouraging, as they show a desire for intimate involvement 
in biodiversity conservation by the two indigenous communities. Given the ecological 
symbiosis between the land inside and outside the park, if the local communities are good 
environmental stewards, as the results suggest, then the land restitution that took place in the 
Kgalagadi area will not necessarily be detrimental to biodiversity conservation.  
 
The nature of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme is such that it has winners 
(B>C) and losers (B<C). Thus, winners will enjoy net benefits with its implementation, while 
losers would suffer net costs with its implementation. It is therefore important to balance out 
the net benefits of winners against the net costs of losers to determine the net worth of 
implementation of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme. A decision needs to be 
made first about which summary WTP values to use from the mean and median WTP figures 
reported above.  
 
The median WTP values are preferred because of the presence of outliers in the data. As 
Hanley and Splash (1993) suggest, the problem of outliers is often addressed by using the 
median WTP rather than mean WTP. On the basis of median WTP, we estimate the total 
WTP for respondents in support and against the implementation of the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme. Using this information as well as population statistics, we 
conducted a cost-benefit analysis to determine the net worth of the proposed biodiversity 
conservation programme for each community under the various land tenure arrangements 
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 For those for whom B<C when the proposed programme is implemented on communal land, the Mier’s 
median WTP as a proportion of Mier median income is two and a half times that of a similar measure for the 
Khomani San. This implies that the proposed biodiversity conservation programme potentially imposes a larger 












Table 3.6: The benefit-cost analysis for implementation of the proposed biodiversity 











     Communal Land B>C 92 0.92*320=  294.4  15.00 R 4,416.00 
 
B<C 8 0.08*320=    25.6 -10.00 -R    256.00 
 
Overall 100 320.0 
 
R 4,160.00 
      Municipal Land B>C 79 0.79*320=  252.8 5.00 R 1,264.00 
 
B<C 21 0.21*320=    67.2 -5.00 -R    336.00 
 
Overall 100 320.0 
 
R    928.00 
      Contractual Park B>C 79 0.79*320=  252.8 15.00 R 3,792.00 
 
B<C 21 0.21*320=    67.2 -5.00 -R    336.00 
 




     Communal Land B>C 83 0.83*8000=  6640.0 25.00 R 166,000.00  
 
B<C 17 0.17*8000=  1360.0 -75.00 -R 102,000.00  
 
Overall 100 8000.0 
 
R   64,000.00  
      Municipal Land B>C 88 0.88*8000=7040.0 5.00 R 35,200.00  
 
B<C 12 0.12*8000=  960.0 -10.00 -R   9,600.00  
 
Overall 100 8000.0 
 
R 25,600.00  
      Contractual Park B>C 74 0.74*8000=5920.0 25.00 R 88,800.00  
 
B<C 26 0.26*8000=2080.0 -15.00 -R 31,200.00  
 
Overall 100 8000.0 
 
R 57,600.00  
 
For each community and land tenure arrangement, the results in Table 3.6 suggest that the 
winners benefit from the proposed biodiversity conservation programme by more than the 
cost that losers suffer. Thus, the net worth of the proposed biodiversity conservation 
programme is positive for both communities and all three land types. For both communities, 
the net worth of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme is highest when 
implemented on communal land, followed by implementation inside the park, with 
implementation on municipal land in third place. It is not surprising that the net worth of the 












municipal land than for other land types, as neither community has any substantial rights in 
municipal land.  
 
Overall, when considering the Khomani San and Mier jointly, significantly more people 
benefit than lose from biodiversity conservation programmes in the Kgalagadi area, 
irrespective of land tenure arrangements. The fact that the majority of households in this area 
are in favour of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme is a good outcome for the 
prospects of biodiversity conservation in the Kgalagadi landscape as a whole. However, the 
presence of people who stand to lose from the proposed programme points toward the need 
for incentive schemes which address the potential conflicts between biodiversity conservation 
and other livelihood activities of local communities.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
The Khomani San “bushmen” and Mier “agricultural” communities in the Kgalagadi area are 
heavily dependent on natural resources, but their area is threatened by biodiversity loss due to 
natural ecological causes and the overexploitation of natural resources. There have been 
changes in land ownership in the Kgalagadi area following land restitution to the local 
communities in 2002. Biodiversity conservation will benefit from the land restitution only if 
the local communities, especially the Khomani San who interact more with nature, are good 
environmental stewards. To assess their attitudes towards biodiversity conservation, this 
study used the CVM to investigate the values assigned by the Khomani San and Mier 
communities to biodiversity conservation under three land tenure arrangements: communal 
land, municipal land, and parkland.  
 
The study was designed in a way that allows the identification of winners and losers from the 
proposed biodiversity conservation programme, in which as many native trees, shrubs, and 
grasslands would be planted and protected as necessary to achieve a reduction in the current 
biodiversity loss by 10% of each of the species under threat. For each community and land 
tenure arrangement, there are winners and losers from the proposed programme. However, in 
each case, the winners benefit by more than the cost that losers suffer. The net worth for 
biodiversity conservation under various land tenure regimes by the Khomani San ranged from 
R928 to R3,456 to R4,160 for municipal land, parkland, and communal land respectively, 












communal land respectively. The majority of respondents from both communities support the 
implementation of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme on communal land, 
municipal land, and inside the park. Both communities have the highest preference for the 
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Appendix: Environmental questionnaire – community issue on the 
economic benefits of biodiversity conservation 
 
 
This questionnaire assesses the land use choices in the Kgalagadi area. We would like to know your views 
regarding conservation projects on communal land, inside the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and on public 
land. Your views have important implications for the eventual form of economic incentive to be provided to the 
local people. 
 
NB: There are no right or wrong answers to this survey. We want to know how you feel about conservation 
programmes.  
                                                                            
(A)NAME OF PERSON ADMINISTERING QUESTIONNAIRE (NOT RESPONDENT): ___________________ 
(B) DATE INTERVIEW CONDUCTED______________________ 
(C)LOCATION INTERVIEW CONDUCTED (CONSULT MAP)   _______________ 
 
 
1. RATE THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE YOU ATTACH TO THE FOLLOWING ATTRIBUTES/ATTRIBUTES:  
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT = 5, SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT=4, IMPORTANT=3, INDIFFERENT=2 & UNIMPORTANT = 1 
ACTIVITIES/ ATTRIBUTES      
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING 5 4 3 2 1 
BUSH-FOOD RESOURCES  5 4 3 2 1 
HUNTING 5 4 3 2 1 
STOCK FARMING  5 4 3 2 1 
GAME FARMING 5 4 3 2 1 
AGRICULTURE 5 4 3 2 1 
GRASS AND TIMBER AS BUIDING MATERIAL 5 4 3 2 1 
WALKABOUTS INSIDE THE PARK 5 4 3 2 1 
FIREWOOD 5 4 3 2 1 
BIRD WATCHING 5 4 3 2 1 
VIEWING ANIMALS (ACTIVELY) 5 4 3 2 1 
PRESERVATION OF UNIQUE FEATURES  5 4 3 2 1 
COMMERCIAL – ALL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES- USING PARK PROXIMITY 5 4 3 2 1 
PASSIVE USE- VIEWING CO-INCIDENTLY OR ENJOYMENT NOT RELATED TO 
ACTIVE USE. 
5 4 3 2 1 
IT IS ___ TO ME TO BE RICH. I WANT TO HAVE A LOT OF MONEY AND 
EXPENSIVE THINGS. 
5 4 3 2 1 
BUILDING MY SKILLS IS _____TO MY FUTURE SUCCESS. I LIKE TO BE ONE OF 
THE BEST I CAN. 
5 4 3 2 1 
KNOWING THAT MY FAMILY AND ME ARE SAFE AND AT PEACE IS ____TO 
ME. I WOULD NOT RISK MY HEALTH FOR ANY OPPORTUNITY 
5 4 3 2 1 
 THE OPINIONS AND VIEWS OF MY ELDERS ARE ______ TO ME. I RESPECT 
THEM EVEN THOUGH I DON’T AGREE WITH THEIR VIEWS 
5 4 3 2 1 
CULTURAL CEREMONIES AND CUSTOMS ARE ________TO ME. I ACCEPT THE 
IDEAS ABOUT MY LIFE MY CULTURE PROVIDES. 













2. RACE OF RESPONDENT (THIS QUESTION IS OPTIONAL, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION IF YOU 








3a). HAVE YOU EVER VISITED THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK □ YES □ NO                                  
 
b) IF NOT WHY HAVE YOU NOT VISITED THE PARK 
CAN NOT AFFORD THE ENTRANCE FEE  
THE PARK IS TOO FAR, I DO NOT HAVE MY OWN TRANSPORT  
GET NO OR NEGLIGIBLE VALUE FROM VISITING THE PARK  
OTHER: PLEASE SPECIFY  
 
4. WHICH ETHNIC GROUP DO YOU BELONG TO                                           
COMMUNITY NAME  




OTHER: PLEASE SPECIFY 5………………………………. 
 
5. DATE OF BIRTH ………………………………….. 
 
6. GENDER OF RESPONDENT                        
 MALE 1 
 FEMALE 2 
 
7. IN WHICH SETTLEMENT OR VILLAGE IS YOUR HOME? _______________ 
 
8. WHAT TYPE OF HOME DO YOU LIVE IN (TICK ALL THAT APPLY)  
SINGLE DWELLING  
UNIT  
SHARED UNIT  
OTHER: PLEASE SPECIFY ............................................. 
 
9. HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED AT THIS PROPERTY___________ YEARS 
 
10. DO YOU OWN THE PROPERTY THAT YOU CURRENTLY OCCUPY □ YES □ NO 
 
11. DO YOU CURRENTLY WORK FOR WAGES? □ YES □ NO  
 














13. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION? (PLEASE TICK ALL THAT APPLY)  
STUDENT  
FARMER  
INFORMAL VENDOR  
OTHER  
 
14. IF YOU PARTICIPATE IN ONE OR MORE COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS, PLEASE SPECIFY THE NAME OF THE 
ORGANISATION, PLEASE LIST ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. IF YOU HAVE A PARTNER AND/OR FELLOW HOUSEHOLD MEMBER IN YOUR HOME, AND PLANS WERE MADE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN A CONSERVATION PROJECT SUCH AS PLANTING OF TREES OR MONITORING OF PLANT HARVESTING 
ACTIVITIES, WHO WOULD DECIDE WHETHER YOUR HOUSEHOLDS PARTICIPATES  
YOU  
THEM  
BOTH/ ALL  
 
16. WHAT IS YOUR EDUCATION LEVEL 
EDUCATION LEVEL TICK THE 
APPROPRIATE 
SPECIFY THE HIGHEST 
GRADE COMPLETED 
NEVER ATTENDED SCHOOL   
PRIMARY SCHOOL    
HIGH SCHOOL    
CERTIFICATE   
DIPLOMA   
DEGREE   
POSTGRADUATE    
ANY OTHER FORMAL TRAINING RECEIVED   
 
17. LAST YEARS HOUSEHOLD INCOME BEFORE TAXES                                       
PRE TAX INCOME (RAND)  
0 – 10 000 1 
10 001- 30 000 2 
30 001 –50 000 3 
50 001 – 100 000 4 
100 001 – 150 000 5 
150 001 – 200 000 6 
200 001 – 250 000 7 
250 001 – 350 000 8 
350 001 – 500 000 9 




















18. WHAT ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE WHERE YOU CURRENTLY LIVE (IN THE FARM OR YOUR RESIDENCE ARE)  
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)  
AGRICULTURE  
GAME FARMING  
HUNTING  
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING  
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING  
FIREWOOD COLLECTION  
OTHER -SPECIFY  
 
19a). DO YOU PERFORM ANY OF THESE ACTIVITIES AT OTHER AREAS WITHIN THE COMMUNAL AREA BESIDES WHERE 
YOUR HOUSEHOLD IS CURRENLTY SITUATED (OTHER FARMS BESIDES THE ONE YOU CURRENTLY OCCUPY) - IF NOT – 
SKIP TO QUESTION 20. 
YES 1 
 NO 2 
 
b). IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY THE ACTIVITIES THAT YOU UNDERTAKE OR PERFORM AT THE OTHER COMMUNAL 
AREAS/FARMS 
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)  
AGRICULTURE  
GAME FARMING  
HUNTING  
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING  
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING  
FIREWOOD COLLECTION  
OTHER -SPECIFY  
 
c). WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR UNDERTAKING THESE ACTIVITIES IN THE OTHER AREAS/FARMS 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
20. ARE YOU AWARE OF WHAT OTHER ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE IN OTHER AREAS/FARMS THAT YOU OR ANY MEMBER 
OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD DO NOT TAKE PART IN 
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)  
AGRICULTURE  
GAME FARMING  
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING  
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING  
HUNTING  
FIREWOOD COLLECTION  
OTHER -SPECIFY  
 
21a). DO YOU PERFORM ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES (MENTIONED IN QESTION 18) ON PUBLIC LAND - IF NOT, SKIP TO 
QUESTION 22. 
YES 1 















b). IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY THE ACTIVITIES THAT YOU UNDERTAKE OR PERFORM ON PUBLIC LAND  
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)  
AGRICULTURE  
GAME FARMING  
HUNTING  
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING  
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING  
FIREWOOD COLLECTION  
OTHER -SPECIFY  
 
c). WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR UNDERTAKING THESE ACTIVITIES ON PUBLIC LAND 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. ARE YOU AWARE OF WHAT OTHER ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE ON PUBLIC LAND THAT YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF 
YOUR HOUSEHOLD DO NOT TAKE PART IN 
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)  
AGRICULTURE  
GAME FARMING  
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING  
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING  
HUNTING  
FIREWOOD COLLECTION  
OTHER -SPECIFY  
 
23. WHAT ACTIVITIES DO YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD PERFORM INSIDE THE PARK (IN THE SECTION 
OF THE PARK WHERE YOUR COMMUNITY HAS BEEN AWARDED THE LAND AND RESOURCE RIGHTS) 
HUNTING  
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING  
WALKABOUTS   
TRADITION AND CUSTOMS RITUAL PERFORMANCES  
OTHER -SPECIFY  
 
24. DO YOU CONSIDER YOUR HOME A PART OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT  
□ YES □ NO 
 
25. DO YOU PARTICIPATE IN ACTIVITIES THAT CONSERVE OR PROTECT THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT □ YES □ NO 
 





27. DO YOU CONSIDER YOUR COMMUNITY A PART OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
















28. WHAT PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DO YOU TAKE PART IN THE COMMUNAL LAND 
REPLANTING  
PLANT HARVESTING MONITORING  
GRAZING MONITORING  
ECOLOGICAL MONITORING  
MONITORING HUNTING  
NONE  
 
29. WHAT PRO- ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DO YOU TAKE PART IN THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK 
REPLANTING  
SURVEILLANCE  
ECOLOGICAL AND BIRD MONITORING  
NONE  
 
30. WHAT PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DO YOU TAKE PART IN THE PUBLIC LAND 
REPLANTING  
PLANT HARVESTING MONITORING  
GRAZING MONITORING  
ECOLOGICAL MONITORING  
MONITORING HUNTING  
NONE  
 
31. DO YOU THINK YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONSERVING THE ENVIRONMENT ARE 
VERY EFFECTIVE  
SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE  
INDIFFERENT  
NOT EFFECTIVE  
DON’T KNOW  
 
32. ARE YOU REWARDED IN ANY WAY FOR TAKING PART IN THESE ACTIVITIES  
MONETARY COMPENSATION 1 
NON-MONETARY COMPENSATION (SPECIFY) 2 
 VOLUNTER 3 
 
33. IF YOU RECEIVE MONETARY COMPENSATION TO PERFORM ACTIVITIES THAT CONSERVE OR PROTECT THE 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IS THIS AMOUNT ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN YOUR LIVELIHOOD  
YES 1 
 NO 2 
AMOUNT RECEIVED IN RANDS R 
 
34a). WOULD YOU PHYSICALLY VOLUNTEER YOUR OWN LABOUR TO TAKE PART ON ANY CONSERVATION 
INITIATIVES IN THE COMMUNITY ON COMMUNAL LAND (IF YES, SKIP TO 35) □ YES □ NO  
 
b). IF NOT, STATE THE REASON 
TOO OLD  
NO TIME  
DO NOT OWN THE PROPERTY  












 35a). WOULD YOU PHYSICALLY VOLUNTEER YOUR OWN LABOUR TO TAKE PART ON ANY CONSERVATION 
INITIATIVES ON PUBLIC LAND (IF YES, SKIP TO 36) □ YES □ NO 
 
b). IF NOT, STATE THE REASON 
TOO OLD  
NO TIME  
IT IS NOT A COMMUNITY LAND   
OTHER, SPECIFY  
 
36a). WOULD YOU PHYSICALLY VOLUNTEER YOUR LABOUR TO TAKE PART ON ANY CONSERVATION INITIATIVES 
INSIDE THE PARK (IF YES, SKIP TO 37) □ YES □ NO 
 
b). IF NOT, STATE THE REASON 
TOO OLD  
NO TIME  
DO NOT OWN THE ENTIRE PARK  
OTHER, SPECIFY  
 
37. WOULD YOU COMPROMISE YOUR LIVING SITUATION TO CONSERVE OR PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT □ YES □ NO 
 
38. WOULD YOU COMPROMISE YOUR WORKING SITUATION TO CONSERVE OR PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT  
□ YES □ NO 
 
39. NEGATIVE CHANGES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT CAN COMPROMISE THE WAY I MAKE A LIVING 
TRUE 1 
 FALSE 2 
 
40. ARE YOU AWARE OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN 
THE KGALAGADI AREA DUE TO OVEREXPLOITATION OR EXCESSIVE HUNTING?                       
PERSON IS WELL INFORMED –KNOWS MORE THAN 3 OF 
THE IMPACTS LISTED BELOW 
1 
PERSON HAS PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE - KNOWS 1-3 OF THE 
IMPACTS LISTED BELOW  
2 
PERSON IS POORLY INFORMED – KNOWS 0 OF THE 



























FILL IN THE GAPS IN THE PERSON’S KNOWLEDGE – IMPACTS TO BE READ TO THE RESPONDENT 
1. FOOD INSECURITY 
 
2. LOSS OF INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES 
 
3. DISRUPTION OF THE SOCIAL FABRIC 
 
4. LAND DEGRADATION 
 
5. LOSS OF UNIQUE HABITATS  
 
6. CAN COMPROMISE MY HEALTH 
 
7. NO CHANGE 
 
FOR QUESTION 41 – 44, PLEASE NOTE: CONSERVATION OF BIODIVESITY GENERALLY HAS THE FOLLOWING 
IMPLICATIONS:    
 
 PROVIDES THE BENEFITS SUCH AS a) RAW MATERIALS THAT DIRECTLY ENTER THE ECONOMIC PROCESS 
AS INPUTS. b) OTHER RESOURCES SUCH AS FOOD (WILD FRUITS AND MEAT), WHICH ARE DIRECTLY 
CONSUMED. c) NON-FOOD RESOURCES SUCH AS MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING. d) TOURISM. e) 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES.  
E) CULTURAL DETERMINED SERVICES SUCH AS THE FULFILMENT OF DEMANDS FOR AESTHETIC 
SERVICES.  
 PROVIDES COSTS SUCH AS a) MAINTANENCE COSTS SUCH AS WAGES, RUNNING COSTS AND MONITORING 
AND POLICING COSTS. b) COSTS TO OTHER LIVERLIHOOD OPTIONS, SUCH AS CONDITIONAL HUNTING c) 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS IN THE FORM OF ALTERNATIVE LAND. 
 
NB: ALL FUNDING WOULD GO TOWARDS THE INTENDED PROGRAMME AND NOT ADMINISTRATIVE FEES. 
 41a). CONSIDERING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CONSERVATION PROJECT THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO YOUR 
HOUSEHOLD, HOW DO YOU THINK THE BENEFITS OF CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY COMPARE WITH THE ASSOCIATED 
COSTS IN A COMMUNAL LAND? 
 
i) BENEFITS > COSTS (GO TO QUESTION b) 

























b.) WHAT AMOUNT IN USER FEES PER YEAR ARE YOU WILLING-TO-PAY (WTP), SPECIFICALLY FOR A BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION PROJECT IN THE COMMUNAL LAND. IF ANSWER IS NOT ZERO, THEN SKIP TO 42. 
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND) PER YEAR    
0 0   
1 – 10 1   
11 - 20 2   
21 – 30 3   
31- 50 4   
51 – 100 5   
101 - 200 6   
201 – 500 7   
501 – 1000 8   
1001 – 2000 9   
2001 – 3000 10   
3001 – 4000 11   
4001 + (SPECIFY)  12   
    
c). WHAT AMOUNT IN USER FEES PER YEAR ARE YOU WTP, SPECIFICALLY TO PREVENT THE CONSERVATIVE 
INITIATIVE PROJECT IN THE COMMUNAL LAND. IF ANSWER IS NOT ZERO, THEN SKIP TO 42. 
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND) PER YEAR    
0 0   
1 – 10 1   
11 - 20 2   
21 – 30 3   
31- 50 4   
51 – 100 5   
101 - 200 6   
201 – 500 7   
501 – 1000 8   
1001 – 2000 9   
2001 – 3000 10   
3001 – 4000 11   
4001 + (SPECIFY)  12   
 
d). IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER b) OR c) ABOVE IS ZERO, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS (YOU MAY HAVE MORE THAN 
ONE) 
REASON   
CANNOT AFFORD THE FEES 1  
GET NO OR NEGLIGIBLE VALUE FROM THE FARMS/AREA 2  
ABUNDANCE OF OTHER AREA OPTIONS – NO SCARCITY, THEREFORE WHY 
PAY 
3  
LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN AGENCIES COLLECTING THE USE FEES  4  
PAYING ENOUGH TAXES, FEES ETC ALREADY 5  















42a). ARE YOU WTP THE SAME AMOUNT TO SUPPORT A SIMILAR CONSERVATION INITIATIVE INSIDE THE PARK AS IN 
THE COMMUNAL LAND. (IF OPTED FOR PREVENTING THE CONSERVATION PROJECT, SKIP TO b) 
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND) PER YEAR    
0 0   
1 – 10 1   
11 - 20 2   
21 – 30 3   
31- 50 4   
51 – 100 5   
101 - 200 6   
201 – 500 7   
501 – 1000 8   
1001 – 2000 9   
2001 – 3000 10   
3001 – 4000 11   
4001 + (SPECIFY)  12   
  
b) ARE YOU WTP THE SAME AMOUNT TO PREVENT A SIMILAR CONSERVATION INITIATIVE INSIDE THE PARK AS IN 
THE COMMUNAL LAND  
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND) PER YEAR    
0 0   
1 – 10 1   
11 - 20 2   
21 – 30 3   
31- 50 4   
51 – 100 5   
101 - 200 6   
201 – 500 7   
501 – 1000 8   
1001 – 2000 9   
2001 – 3000 10   
3001 – 4000 11   
4001 + (SPECIFY)  12   
 
c). IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER a) OR b) IS ZERO, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS (YOU MAY HAVE MORE THAN ONE) 
REASON   
CANNOT AFFORD THE FEES 1  
GET NO OR NEGLIGIBLE VALUE FROM THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER 
PARK 
2  
ABUNDANCE OF OTHER AREA OPTIONS – NO SCARCITY, THEREFORE WHY 
PAY 
3  
LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN AGENCIES COLLECTING THE USE FEES  4  
PAYING ENOUGH TAXES, FEES ETC ALREADY 5  
HAVE NEVER VISITED A PARK, SO WHY PAY   















d). IF YOU ARE WTP A DIFFERENT AMOUNT FOR EITHER a) OR b) INSIDE THE PARK, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS 
REASON  
FEEL THAT IT IS ALREADY ALLOCATED FUNDS BY THE GOVERNMENT, HENCE I AM WILLING-TO-PAY LESS 1 
WILLING-TO-PAY ALREADY FOR THE PROJECT ON THE COMMUNAL LAND, HENCE I AM WILLING-TO-PAY LESS 2 
I AM CURRENTLY GETTING LESS BENEFITS FROM THE PARK, HENCE PAY LESS 3 
OTHER REASONS (SPECIFY) 4 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
43a). IF YOU ARE WTP FOR A CONSERVATION INITIATIVE ON THE COMMUNAL LAND AND INSIDE THE PARK, ARE YOU 
WTP THE SAME AMOUNT TO SUPPORT A SIMILAR INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC LAND.  
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND) PER YEAR    
0 0   
1 – 10 1   
11 - 20 2   
21 – 30 3   
31- 50 4   
51 – 100 5   
101 - 200 6   
201 – 500 7   
501 – 1000 8   
1001 – 2000 9   
2001 – 3000 10   
3001 – 4000 11   
4001 + (SPECIFY)  12   
  
b). IF YOU ARE WTP TO PREVENT A CONSERVATION INITIATIVE ON THE COMMUNAL LAND, ARE YOU WTP THE SAME 
AMOUNT TO PREVENT A SIMILAR CONSERVATION INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC LAND  
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND) PER YEAR    
0 0   
1 – 10 1   
11 - 20 2   
21 – 30 3   
31- 50 4   
51 – 100 5   
101 - 200 6   
201 – 500 7   
501 – 1000 8   
1001 – 2000 9   
2001 – 3000 10   
3001 – 4000 11   


















c). IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER a) OR b) ABOVE IS ZERO, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS (YOU MAY HAVE MORE THAN 
ONE) 
REASON   
CANNOT AFFORD THE FEES 1  
GET NO OR NEGLIGIBLE VALUE FROM PUBLIC LAND 2  
ABUNDANCE OF OTHER AREA OPTIONS – NO SCARCITY, THEREFORE WHY 
PAY 
3  
LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN AGENCIES COLLECTING THE USE FEES  4  
PAYING ENOUGH TAXES, FEES ETC ALREADY 5  
OTHER REASONS (SPECIFY) 6  
 
d). IF YOU ARE WTP A DIFFERENT AMOUNT ON PUBLIC LAND, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS 
REASON  
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY, HENCE I AM WILLING-TO-PAY LESS 1 
WILLING-TO-PAY MORE ONLY WHERE THE COMMUNITY HAS LAND AND RESOURCE RIGHTS, HENCE I AM 
WILLING-TO-PAY LESS 
2 
I AM CURRENTLY GETTING LESS BENEFITS FROM PUBLIC LAND, HENCE PAY LESS 3 
OTHER REASONS (SPECIFY) 4 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
44. WHO IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSERVING THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
THE GOVERNMENT – WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC LAND  
SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL PARKS (PARKS & PROTECTED AREAS)  
THE COMMUNITY  
DONORS  
ALL STAKEHOLDERS (COMMUNITY, NGO’s, SANPARKS, GOVERNMENT)  
OTHER, SPECIFY  
 
45. WHAT STATEMENT DEFINES BEST YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IS AT THE SERVICE OF MAN  
MAN IS THE STEWARD/CARE TAKER OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT  
MAN AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT ARE INDEPENDENT OF EACH 
OTHER 
 
MAN AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS  
 
46. IF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE KGALAGADI AREA WAS TO DEGRADE SUBSTANTIALLY 
 I WOULD STILL LIVE IN THE AREA                 1       
 I WOULD RELOCATE TO ANOTHER AREAS INSTEAD                 2 
 



















Chapter 4: Conservation fees in the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park between 




This paper estimates the visitation demand function for Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) 
in order to determine the conservation fee to charge South African residents to maximise park 
revenue.  We conducted contingent behaviour experiments at KTP and three other national 
parks, which we assume are either substitutes or complements for visitors to KTP. Our 
random effects Tobit model shows that there is a wide variation in the own-price elasticities 
of demand between the parks but they are generally not elastic. The cross-price estimates 
indicate that there is limited substitutability in visitation demand among the four parks. The 
study uses the unitary elasticity rule to demonstrate that there is a possibility of raising 
conservation fees to revenue-maximising levels at KTP as well as the other parks, using 
methods such as a mandatory conservation fee increment or a community-bound voluntary 
donation above the regular conservation fee. Sharing conservation revenue with communities 
surrounding parks could demonstrate the link between ecotourism and local communities’ 
economic development, promote a positive view of land restitution involving national parks, 
help address South Africa’s heavily skewed distribution of income and act as an incentive for 
the local communities to participate in conservation even more. 
 
 









Note: An extract of this chapter has been submitted to the EfD (Environment for 













Charges for visiting protected areas in South Africa are set by statutory bodies. For example, 
(SANParks)
37
 sets the fees at all the national parks that they manage. Even though the 
primary mandate of SANParks is conservation, it also operates a tourism business. The 
organization’s tourism business is expected to generate revenue each year as part of the 
corporate budget, as national parks are only partly funded by the National Treasury through 
the Public Finance Management Act. According to SANParks (2010) conservation fees
38
 
account for approximately 23 percent of total revenue generated from tourism, retail, 
concession and other retail activities. It should be noted that SANParks utilizes per diem fees. 
Given how park pricing contributes to total revenue, it is vital that all parks are priced.  
 
Since 1994, remedial policy has been a key priority for the post-apartheid South African 
government. The most important remedial policy, particularly from the point of view of the 
national parks agency and indigenous communities, has been that relating to land restitution. 
According to Fay (2009), while the duties linked with land ownership under land restitution 
expand considerably, the land claimants’ land rights are quite limited as they do not usually 
include a share of tourism revenue and are merely limited to rental income in cases where 
contract parks are established. 
 
In our view, for the land restitution not to compromise conservation objectives, Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park (KTP) should contribute to improving the lives of surrounding 
communities who now have land rights inside the park. The core research question is 
therefore to find out whether, and how, KTP can serve as a driver in generating economic 
benefits to land restitution beneficiaries and contribute positively to their livelihoods. One 
way in which the local communities could benefit from KTP is through sharing of revenues 
from conservation fees.  
 
Because the park agency seems to be ploughing all conservation fees currently generated 
back into conservation (SANParks, 2010), it would need to be able to generate additional 
revenues for any benefit-sharing with local communities to be possible. In this spirit, the aim 
                                                          
37
 SANParks (formerly known as the National Parks Board prior to 1997) is the overarching government agency 
pertaining to national conservation in South Africa (Kruger Park Times, 2009). 
38
 The term ‘conservation fee’ was officially adopted effective 2 April 2003 in place of ‘admission/ entrance fee’ 












of this study is to estimate optimal
39
 conservation fees which should be charged at KTP to 
maximise revenue. This is done with the help of the contingent behaviour methodology. 
Therefore, this is a valuation study, asking those who come to the park what they would do 
with varying prices. According to Chase et al. (1998) developing countries have little 
experience with regard to designing the right levels of pricing for protected areas.  
 
More research on the right levels of conservation fees is required so that policy makers can be 
better advised, which may ultimately result in the optimal use of scarce natural resources. It is 
for this reason that an assessment of the possibility of increasing conservation fees in the case 
of South Africa is essential for the development and implementation of appropriate policies 
that could result in sustainable resource use and poverty reduction. Furthermore, charging 
appropriate conservation fees at national parks could mitigate the adverse effects of the 
dwindling tax-based government funding for conservation.  
 
Once it is shown that there is scope for generating more revenue, park pricing policy can be 
crafted to achieve a number of different objectives, which might include generating 
additional revenue for sharing with the local communities. Co-ownership of the park by local 
communities and the park agency, and the need for the park to contribute towards local 
communities’ livelihoods, are the main reasons this paper promotes revenue maximization as 
the primary park pricing policy goal at the KTP. Of course, park pricing policy can also be 





To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies on optimal park pricing for national parks 
have been carried out in South Africa. Thus this paper contributes immensely to empirical 
work on optimal park pricing by expanding on this scant literature. Most importantly, in light 
of “massive” restitution of land to the original owners, particularly given that the restituted 
                                                          
39
 In the discussions of other monopolistic behaviour we normally assume that the socially optimal price, at least 
for domestic consumers, is one where the price is equal to the marginal cost. In the literature on park fees, 
revenue (or rather profit) maximization is seen as a goal for fees facing international tourists, but usually not the 
domestic tourists. 
40
 This paper promotes revenue maximization as a basis for estimating optimal conservation fees because of the 
perceived need to generate benefits to share with the local communities. Obviously, such a narrow objective 
might ignore concerns about the ecological carrying capacity or congestion at the park that could be generated 
from the resultant conservation fee levels. Although environmental degradation is generally a serious challenge 












land impinges on the quality of the remaining park, our study could aid policy makers with 
regard to developing effective pricing policies. Given the restitution, the fundamental 
question is how the co-ownership can be managed efficiently. The paper attempts to 
contribute to a topical and policy relevant question in South Africa. The results from the 
analysis can provide very useful input into the process of setting and reviewing conservation 
fees, particularly in Southern Africa, where historical imbalances with regard to land 
ownership make the issue of land rights and access to benefits from use of land a pertinent 
policy issue. There is a strong and rising concern about the expropriation of land for national 
parks use, not only in South Africa, but also in the United States of America (see Jones, 
1981) and elsewhere (see MacEachern, 2001; McNamee, 2010), i.e. native claims. Thus, this 
paper potentially fills an important research gap. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 give a background on the structure of 
the South African park system and KTP. Section 3 briefly reviews literature on pricing in 
national parks. Section 4 outlines the methodology used in the study. Section 5 presents the 
research findings and discussion while Section 6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Background on the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park  
4.2.1. Structure of the South African parks system  
For nature-based tourism in South Africa, there is a choice between national parks
41
 managed 
by SANParks with reasonable charges (low prices), nature reserves managed by provincial 
conservation agencies, and private game reserves which are often luxurious and offer 
exclusive game viewing.
42
 National parks, provincial nature reserves and private game 
reserves co-exist within the same broad system, and are substitutes in a sense. The 
fundamental difference is not in conservation but rather in the tourist services they provide. 
This study’s general focus is on national parks for a variety of reasons: they manage the 
majority of protected areas and get the most visitors; they get government funding, hence 
have social responsibilities; and they are largely the ones affected by land claims.  
 
                                                          
41
 The National Environmental Management Act (Act No. 107 of 1998) defines a national park as a protected 
area of national or international importance, a viable representative sample of South Africa’s natural system or 
scenic areas, or the ecological integrity of one or more ecosystems. 
42
 The latter are expensive relative to national parks and nature reserves, and therefore mainly target 












South Africa has experienced a significant increase in domestic and international visitors over 
the years, due in large part to the uniqueness and attractiveness of its national parks. This was 
achieved despite incremental increases in conservation fees over the years. Unlike many 
other African countries that boast of a relatively more significant international tourism 
market, South Africa has a relatively larger domestic market. As such, the domestic tourism 
market is SANParks’ core market. South African residents account for approximately 80 
percent of total number of visitors to national parks, with international visitors making-up the 
remaining portion (SANParks, 2010). Though small, the South African international tourism 
market is mature, and accounts for a disproportionately large share of net revenue. According 
to Stevens (2013), a breakdown of the SANParks 2009/10 total conservation fee net revenue 
indicates that conservation fees generated from domestic tourists accounted for around 53.82 
percent of the total R168 092 459. Revenue generated from SADC and international tourists 
conservation fees accounted for 0.42 percent and 36.49 percent respectfully. The remaining 
6.98 percent and 2.28 percent was income generated from the Wild Card Programme and 
entrance fee respectfully. 
 
The imposition of conservation fees at national parks was introduced when the first national 
park, Kruger National Park, was proclaimed in 1926.
43
 Although conservation fees were 
introduced that long ago, it is only as recent as 2 April 2003 that SANParks adopted a new 
pricing structure (Pienaar, 1990). The recommendations of business consultants, McKinsey & 
Company, were adopted to implementing a new system of differential pricing for entry into 
all parks (McKinsey & Company, 2005).  
 
SANParks have in principle adopted a pricing policy that seeks to strike a balance between 
various pricing objectives, with effect from when it revised its pricing strategy in 2003. 
Following the implementation of the revised pricing policy, conservation fees now 
distinguish between South African residents, SADC residents and residents of the rest of the 
world; and vary between parks. One of the motivations for a nationality-based price 
discriminatory strategy in favour of domestic nationals was that domestic residents contribute 
towards taxes from which SANParks receives state funding. With the revised pricing policy, 
price is no longer only a function of the preferences of these tourists for the park itself, but 
                                                          
43
 The records from the park show that the three cars that visited the park in 1927 were the first to be charged 












also a function of prices for other parks. The variation in fees between parks seems to have 
been rationalised mostly by appealing to a combination of both differences in their physical 
size and popularity.  
 
On the one hand, physical size of a park could be a proxy for the running costs required to 
manage it as bigger parks are likely to incur higher costs compared to smaller parks. On the 
other hand, physical size could be a proxy of the level of biodiversity and tourist facilities as 
more facilities are likely to be required to enhance visitor experience at bigger parks 
compared to smaller parks. Furthermore, conservation fees are now payable daily even 
though, for easier administration, they are actually paid for every night spent inside the park. 
Nonetheless, it is unclear what criterion is used to determine conservation fees. Despite a few 
price increases at South African national parks, there seem to be few or no formal criteria 
with regard to determination of conservation fees.  
 
4.2.2. The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park 
The Botswana and South African governments signed a bilateral agreement on 7 April 1999 
to merge the Gemsbok National Park in Botswana with the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park 
in South Africa into a single ecological area now called KTP. This merger made it possible 
for wildlife to move freely between the two countries. KTP is located in the Kgalagadi 
District on the south-western border of Botswana and the Northern-Cape border of South 
Africa. It can be accessed through five gates in three different countries, namely South 
Africa, Botswana and Namibia (SANParks, 2010). The park boasts an area of 3.8 million 
hectares and this makes it one of the biggest conservation areas in the world (SANParks, 
2006). KTP is classified as a category 2 park according to the IUCN classification of 
protected areas (IUCN, 1994a; Sandwith et al., 2001).  
 
KTP encompasses part of the ancestral site of the Khomani San “bushmen” community. As 
part of South Africa’s land restitution programme, the Khomani San community, together 
with the adjacent Mier community, was awarded land inside and outside KTP in May 2002. 
The government transferred ownership of land on the South African side of KTP for heritage 
purposes to the Khomani San community (28 000 hectares) and the Mier community (30 000 












inside the park on behalf of the local communities as contractual parks. Figure 4.1 shows the 
map of KTP indicating the different uses and areas of jurisdiction
44
 after the restitution. 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park 
 
Source: Hirshveld, 2009. 
                                                          
44 The Khomani San people were awarded exclusive rights in the remainder of the park because they lost more 
land in comparison to the Mier community during the establishment of the Park. The special rights include 
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The brown area is the Khomani San contractual park; the yellow area is the Mier contractual 
park; the pink area is the Venture-zone (where the Khomani San have rights for preferential 
commercial joint ventures with SANParks); the olive area is the Symbolic-zone (where the 
Khomani San have rights for exercising their symbolic and cultural rites); and the white area 
is the rest of the park including the Botswana side.  
 
The household income for the Khomani San is very low, with high unemployment rates. 
They have not really benefitted from the land restitution (Dikgang and Muchapondwa, 2013) 
and are heavily dependent on natural resources (Dikgang and Muchapondwa, 2012). 
Therefore they can become a threat to conservation in their area by overexploitation of 
natural resources. To discourage overexploitation, the park agency urgently needs to generate 
benefits to share with the Khomani San.  
 
Despite KTP being one of the three renowned national parks in South Africa, it accounts for a 
small proportion of total visits than 1 percent (SANParks, 2010). The visitation rate should be 
understood in the context of the park’s remote location.  
 
The land ownership structure in the Kgalagadi area has changed drastically as local 
communities are now co-owners of international parkland. The main challenge faced under 
these arrangements is how to achieve both conservation and development, particularly as the 
Khomani San are indigenous people who rely heavily on natural resource extraction and use. 
The primary goal is to find the optimal share. Thus, the key challenge facing the Kgalagadi 
area, particularly the KTP, is how to balance the integrity of conservation and beneficiaries’ 
rights to benefit from land and natural resources. SANParks are concerned about challenges 
at the post-restitution phase, and want to know how to move forward. It is clear that KTP 
should contribute to improving the lives of surrounding communities who now have land 
rights inside the park. Barring actual resource extraction and use inside the park, one way in 
which the local communities could benefit from KTP is through sharing of revenues from 
conservation fees. However SANParks would have to generate new revenues for any benefit-
sharing with local communities to be possible. In addition, charging appropriate conservation 
fees at KTP could mitigate the adverse effects of the dwindling tax-based government 













Furthermore, appropriate park pricing takes into account the correct economic value of park 
visitation because conservation fees are a proxy of the valuation placed on recreation by park 
visitors (Lee and Han, 2002).  
 
We implicitly assume that revenue maximizing fee level is the optimal one. We are aware 
that in discussions of other monopolistic behaviour we normally assume that the socially 
optimal price, at least for domestic consumers, is one where the price is equal to the marginal 
cost. In the literature on park fees, revenue (or rather profit) maximization is seen as a goal 
for fees facing international tourists, but usually not the domestic tourists. We are aware that 
increasing conservation fees for domestic residents may generate political resistance given 
the high level of poverty in South Africa.
45
 This suggests that optimal fees are likely to 
impact on equity, inter alia. However, it should be noted that park visitors to remote sites like 
KTP do not ordinarily constitute poor people but middle to high-income earners. In fact, the 
main reason poor domestic households do not visit remote parks such as KTP is not high 
conservation fees but excessive travel and accommodation costs.  
 
The profile of park visitors at remote parks is likely to remain the same until there is a 
significant reduction in travel and accommodation costs, which are barriers to the ability of 
poor people to access such recreational sites. Failure to implement an optimal fee strategy 
would theoretically imply that poorer domestic households would continue subsidizing those 
who are able and willing to pay, as poor households pay taxes which partly fund national 
parks that they themselves do not utilize. Thus we argue that as long as the current travel and 
accommodation costs remain high then domestic visitors who use the park should be charged 
optimal fees. Higher optimal fees are not a concern for the Khomani San in the Kgalagadi 
area because they do not have to pay conservation fees to get inside the park as they have 
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 South African national poverty stood at 54 percent while rural poverty stood at 77 percent in 2010 
(Leibbrandt et al., 2010). 
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 Even though the Mier people are also co-owners of KTP, the same privileges are not extended to them, and 
they are required to pay conservation fees to enter the park as tourists. Perhaps the same privileges should be 
extended to the Mier community as well so that any imposition of optimal fees would not impact negatively on 
their ability to access the park. If the Mier were also given free entry into the park by virtue of being co-owners, 












4.3. Literature review 
A significant number of tourist destinations face budget constraints for their maintenance and 
management. The budget constraints bind even more during periods characterised by sharp 
rises in tourist numbers (Eagles et al., 2002). This is mainly because the tourist charges are 
usually kept quite low, leaving park agencies scrambling for more financial resources from 
governments to breakeven. There is a growing volume of literature that emphasizes the role 
of charging conservation fees in the management of national parks (Chase et al., 1998). A 
general consensus among economists regarding how to address the significant increase in 
demand for recreation is to adopt appropriate pricing (Baumol and Oates, 1975; Rosenthal et 
al., 1984; Cullen, 1985). However, determining the appropriate pricing for park visitation is 
complicated because demand elasticities are often not readily available. Nevertheless, pricing 
is considered efficient relative to other rationing concepts such as lottery and queuing (see 
Fractor (1982) for a detailed discussion).  
 
There are generally four pricing objectives that are evident in protected areas such as national 
parks. Charging at parks aims to impute value to visitation, manage parks at economically 
efficient levels, operate within ecological carrying capacity limits and achieve social equity. 
According to Laarman and Gradersen (1996), national parks are valued for their existence 
and their use. The demand for preservation is captured by the existence values, while the 
demand for visiting a recreational site is explained by the use values. The choice of whether 
or not to visit a recreational site is influenced by an individual’s willingness to pay for it, 
bearing in mind the competing uses of a visitor’s income. 
 
Should a market exist for the good in question, then it is possible to assess the value attached 
to the site in monetary units (Bull, 1995). According to Hanley et al. (1997), to achieve a 
monetary value in the absence of a market, the consumers’ willingness to pay for the site 
should be measured. As in a market situation, the principle behind the willingness to pay for 
such non-market goods and services is based on the same principles of rational choice and 
utility maximisation.  
 
To emphasise this point, if a person is of the view that a change in a non-market good (for 
example, due to environmental improvements or co-ownership of the park) will  make him 












higher amounts in order to secure this change or to reflect his endorsement of the change, and 
so his willingness to pay would be a reflection of his economic valuation of the good in 
question (Hanley et al., 1997).  
 
Most of the studies that have being undertaken with regard to setting park fees reveal that the 
actual conservation fees that are currently being charged to park visitors are significantly 
below what visitors are willing to pay, as well as what is required to cover operational costs 
(e.g. Laarman and Gragersen, 1996; Schultz et al., 1998; Scarpa et al., 2000; Naidoo and 
Adamowicz, 2005). This implies that most parks visits are under-priced. Such a perverse 
outcome suggests that relatively poor countries are subsidizing visits of people from 
developed nations, who make up for the majority of visitors at national parks in most 
developing countries.  
 
Although many studies have been undertaken on visitors’ preferences for national parks, 
most have focused on estimating visitors’ willingness to pay for the recreational experience 
in an attempt to measure the value assigned to national parks. However, in order to determine 
the “optimal” conservation fees to be charged at any national park, one needs to know the 
preferences of the visitors to that park and other substitute and complementary parks. This 
information can be extracted from the visitation demand functions of national parks. 
Visitation demand functions can be estimated based on historical or experimental data.  
 
Historical data would be appropriate where the preferences of tourists are stable over time. 
However, the usability of historical data depends on the satisfaction of stringent conditions. 
The park agencies would have needed to collect the data for a sufficiently long period of 
time, there would have to be sufficient variation in the prices charged over that period of 
time, and the researcher would also need to know the income of visitors. Given such 
demands, it is no wonder that there have not been many studies using historical data to 
estimate visitation demands functions. To the best of our knowledge, it is only the study by 
Alpizar (2006) that used historical data to compute the “optimal” entrance fees, for national 
parks in Costa Rica. Alpizar (2006) found that price discrimination between residents and 













Similarly, there have not been many studies attempting to estimate optimal conservation fees 
using experimental data (see Chase et al., 1998; Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2005). The Travel 
Cost Method (TCM) and the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) are the primary 
techniques which have been used in these kinds of studies. While the TCM studies could 
provide useful information pertaining to the value placed on ecotourism in protected areas, 
they have mostly focused on estimating consumer surplus rather than estimating optimal 
conservation fees (Chase et al., 1998). TCM estimates a demand function when done 
correctly.  
 
In comparison, the CVM technique is more flexible relative to the TCM as it allows for 
different values to be generated under varying scenarios. Most importantly, the CVM allows 
for both use and non-use values to be incorporated into the estimated value of a recreational 
good as a whole. While these conventional approaches can provide useful information for 
estimating willingness to pay, a study on Costa Rican parks by Schultz et al. (1998) noted 
constraints including limitations with sampling methods and locations, biases associated with 
variations in cultural backgrounds and the frequent lack of specific information usually 
provided in hypothetical questions. 
 
An alternative approach widely seen as addressing some of the limitations associated with 
framing in the conventional CVM approaches is the Contingent Behaviour (CB) approach. 
Grijalva et al. (2002) state that there is a growing number of studies in recreational demand 
models that use the CB trip data for predicting quantity under hypothetical scenarios. While 
potentially avoiding some criticisms levelled against CVM and measurement of non-use 





A CB method asks those who come to the park what they would do under hypothetical 
circumstances (with varying prices). According to Alberini and Longo (2006), CB questions 
can be used alone or combined with observed behaviours within the TCM, to assist in placing 
a value on specified (non-market) public goods. In our case, we use CB questions alone to 
help estimate value at South African national parks. 
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 One can test the validity of CB data by making use of generalized Negative Binomial and Poisson regression 













The CB approach is commonly applied to evaluate quality or price changes at recreational 
sites. Implementation of such a technique entails respondents being asked to reveal their 
intended behaviour to a site (e.g. visitation) given the proposed change in site (e.g. quality, 
access or price). In contrast to conventional CVM which elicits a statement of value, the CB 
approach elicits changes in behaviour or levels of use for a nonmarket good (Grijalva et al., 
2002). The technique makes it possible to generate variation in conservation fees by asking 
respondents, park visitors in our case, how they would vary their visitation rates (e.g. the 
number of days spent visiting a specific park in a year) if the conservation fees were to be 
increased by any specified amount at this or another park.  
 
Chase et al. (1998) used the CB approach to investigate the optimal entrance fees at the time 
Costa Rican national parks had introduced differentiated fees. Using a similar approach, a 
study by Naidoo and Adamowicz (2005) simulated fee increases and estimated entrance fees 
that maximized tourism revenue to Mabira Forest Reserve in Uganda. Determination of 
optimal fees using experimental data adds value to research on park pricing as it can be 
designed to mimic the real market. Furthermore, introducing substitutes embraces micro 
theory in a richer fashion.  
 
Price discrimination has the potential to increase revenue as compared to imposing a single 
conservation fee, in addition to satisfying equity issues from the social point of view, and 
bringing about local community stability. Price discrimination among users can enable 
resource use in different sites, among different time periods and among different user profiles 
(South African residents and non-residents).  
 
Discriminatory pricing as applied by SANParks, is based on the fundamental principle 
described in detail in the context of ecotourism applications by Baldares and Laarman (1990) 
and Lindberg (1991). The rationale for charging different fees is based on the fact that parks 
are unique and have different degrees of appeal to users. This uniqueness is reflected by the 
visitor’s preferences for some parks over others; hence some parks are more popular than 
others.  
 
These differences are reflected by the difference in individual visitors’ visitation demand 












national park pricing policy. Optimal park pricing is dependent on the reliability of the 
demand elasticities (Chase et al., 1998). The park agency is able to engage in price 
discrimination because the market can fairly easily be segmented – which enables visitors 
with varying elasticities of demand to be identified and subsequently treated differently.  
 
The potential benefits of charging optimal fees to access national parks are significant. 
According to Mendes (2003), transferring some conservation fee revenue to local 
communities is an incentive for them to accept and truly adhere to conservation practices, as 
the transfer of fees would demonstrate that protected areas such as national parks may be 
synonymous with wealth rather than with lost developmental opportunities. The estimation of 
optimal conservation fees at the KTP is important as it may contribute toward developing 
effective pricing strategies in the context of South Africa’s national park system. It is for this 
reason that this study is critical as it unravels ways in which conservation fees can be set at 
optimal levels to the benefit of the local communities surrounding parks, who often incur the 
highest cost of conservation and yet experience the least benefit.  
 
4.4. Methodology  
4.4.1. The Contingent Behaviour Method  
The available historical data for South African national parks are not suitable to characterise 
recreational demand due to lack of sufficient variation in conservation fees over the years. 
Furthermore, cross-price elasticities cannot be estimated because many parks always have the 
same fees and fee changes in all parks are generally linearly related. This is a most common 
situation with parks in Africa. Accordingly, non-market valuation methods should be used to 
better understand the fees that park visitors should be charged to enter parks. For the purposes 
of this study, the CB approach is considered to be the most appropriate method due to its 
ability to take substitution effects into consideration when generating experimental data for 
estimating visitation demand functions. This paper adopts the CB formulation by Chase et al. 
(1998) to estimate the optimal conservation fees at KTP as well as three other parks within a 
South African park system framework.  
 
In a CB setting, the park visitor is assumed to maximize a utility function u=U(X,Q), subject 
to   X+  Q=M where X is an n-vector of private goods, Q are the recreational goods (i.e. 












prices of recreational goods (i.e. conservation fees), and M is the individual’s disposable 
income (for example, see Freeman (1993)). In this formulation, different parks are assumed 
to have different degrees of appeal to users and some parks might be considered as 
substitutes. Solving the maximization problem gives a set of Marshallian demand functions 
and aggregation of these demand functions yields a market demand function for Q: 
Q=Q(M,   ,   ). Based on previous studies,
48
 aggregate demand at parks is expected to be a 
function of each park’s conservation fee as well as fees at other substitute and complementary 
parks, income, socio-economic characteristics and trip related expenditure.
49
 The symmetrical 
demand functions for each of the, say, four parks can be written as follows: 
 
                                                        i=1,.., 4 parks                                             (4.1) 
                                                                     
Where    is the park visitation rate (e.g. days per year) by all tourists at park i;    is the 
conservation fee at park i;   is the visitors’ disposable income and   captures the socio-
economic and trip-related characteristics (Chase et al., 1998).
50
 The visitation demand 
functions for the parks will be estimated using experimental data generated from the CB 
survey conducted on visitors at KTP as well as Kruger, Augrabies Fall and Pilanesberg 
national parks which were considered to be substitutes and/or complements for KTP.  
 
KTP only has two of the ‘big five’ large animals – dessert lions and leopards. However, it is 
well known for its huge population of gemsbok and arid biodiversity. Kruger has all of these 
animals, has the biggest accommodation facilities, tarred roads and an international airport. 
The Kruger national park is the flagship of SANParks managed parks and by-far the largest 
park in South Africa. A visitor intercepted at Kruger is 1 500 km from KTP. The park has a 
wide variety of attractions comparable only with the best in Africa.  
 
The close proximity of Augrabies Fall national park to the KTP is the reason its visitation is 
also of interest in this study. The main attraction is the 56 metre high Augrabies Falls, 
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 The main approach that is applied for estimating the demand for public goods such as many environmental 
amenities is survey-based and was first implemented by Bergstrom et al. (1982), who estimated elasticities of 
demand for public schools in the United States (Khan, 2007). 
49
 However, given that KTP is in a remote arid location, income is not expected to be a significant factor as 
visitors already incur high travel costs to visit the park. 
50
 The demand function represented by equation (1) assumes that individuals allocate their disposable income 












considered to be one of the most impressive falls in South Africa. SANParks managed parks 
offer a variety of lodging types, ranging from camping, huts, safari tents, bungalows, 
cottages, and guest houses to luxury lodges. Although Pilanesberg Game Reserve is managed 
by the North West Parks and Tourism Board (NWPTB), it is of interest in this study given its 
popularity, status, similarity and location. We will refer to it as Pilanesberg National Park. 
The park is located in the crater of a long extinct volcano, and is the fourth biggest park in 
South Africa. It is also home to the ‘big five’, has world class accommodation, tarred roads 
and an airport nearby. The visitor usually sees all the parks in a few years’ time. 
 
Table 4.1 shows a chart similar to the one used to capture data regarding visitors’ responses 
to actual and hypothetical own-price and cross-price scenarios at the parks.  
 
Table 4.1: Sample of contingent behaviour chart visitation questions posed to respondents  






Days Fee  Days Fee  Days Fee Days Fee Days 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park R45  R56  R45  R45  R45  
Kruger National Park R45  R45  R56  R45  R45  
Augrabies Fall National Park R25  R25  R25  R31  R25  
Pilanesberg
53
 Game Reserve R45  R45  R45  R45  R56  
 
The respondents were shown the chart, with a blank piece of paper covering all but the first 
block of three columns. The respondents were asked, "During your current trip, for how 
many days will you visit KTP at the current daily entrance fee of R45 per person per day?" 
The question was repeated for Kruger National Park, Augrabies National Park, and 
Pilanesberg National Park.  
 
After filling out the relevant column with the appropriate number of “days visited” for each 
park, the interviewer explained that there would be a set of hypothetical questions next, in 
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 We did not use the same range for fee increases range for all respondents (25percent - 125 percent increase, 
25 percent intervals). These were then divided to give five blocks, allocation of respondents to a particular block 
were randomized.  
52
 US$ 1 = South African Rand (R) 7.85 at the time the paper was written.  
53












which the fee would be raised at only one park. The first hypothetical question raises the 
entrance fee at KTP only. The interviewer therefore asked, "If the fee were increased to Rwj 
only at KTP, how would that affect your plans to visit KTP and the other parks (Kruger, 
Augrabies and Pilanesberg)?" The second hypothetical question raises the entrance fee at 
Kruger National Park only. The interviewer therefore asked, "If the fee were instead 
increased to Rxj only at Kruger, how would that affect your plans to visit Kruger and the 
other parks (KTP, Augrabies and Pilanesberg)?" The third hypothetical question raises the 
entrance fee at Augrabies National Park only.  
 
The interviewer therefore asked, "If the fee were instead increased to Ryj only at Augrabies, 
how would that affect your plans to visit Augrabies and the other parks (KTP, Kruger and 
Pilanesberg)?" The fourth hypothetical question raises the entrance fee at Pilanesberg 
National Park only. The interviewer therefore asks, "If the fee were instead increased to Rzj 
only at Pilanesberg, how would that affect your plans to visit Pilanesberg and the other parks 
(KTP, Kruger and Augrabies)?" Even though each respondent answers visitation questions 
about five entrance fee plans (actual fee, hypothetical fee 1, hypothetical fee 2, hypothetical 
fee 3, hypothetical fee 4), there would have to be a variation in the hypothetical price plans 
across respondents in order to generate sufficient variability for estimable demand functions 
i.e. k groups of the respondents should answer hypothetical price plan questions about the k 
fee levels (wj,xj,yj,zj; j=1,…,k).  
 
4.4.2. Data Collection  
A face-to-face questionnaire survey was conducted with randomly picked park visitors (only 
park goers, and those who already paid to get to the park) at the four parks. The survey was 
conducted during the week and over weekends during the months of March and April in 
2011. Due to the vast size of the four parks, the surveys were mainly carried out at the gates, 
accommodation facilities and designated resting sites inside the park. A total of 385 domestic 
overnight visitors and 78 international overnight visitors were surveyed.
54
 Our sample 
composition is in line with the visitor profile at national parks in South Africa, where 
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 Although SANParks distinguishes between three categories of visitors, our sample only consists of domestic 
(i.e. South African) and international visitors. We did not get any respondents from the SADC region. This is 
expected since visits from SADC residents make up a very small proportion of total visits. Furthermore, South 
African national parks cater to both day and overnight visitors, and charge the same conservation fees for both 












domestic visitors account for an overwhelming majority. The data gathered from the CB 
approach consists of five observations for each of the respondents. This corresponds to the 
visitation versus fee answer pairs from questions that were posed about the five entrance fee 
plans (i.e. actual fee, hypothetical fee 1, hypothetical fee 2, hypothetical fee 3, and 
hypothetical fee 4). 
 
In addition to data from the CB approach, the survey collected data on visitor demographics, 
trip expenditure and duration at the park. Furthermore, data on visitors’ willingness to pay 
either additional fees or voluntary donations over and above the current actual fees was 
collected.
55
 On this question, respondents were informed that fee increments or voluntary 
donations would be a way in which the park could fulfil its social responsibility of uplifting 
the local communities so they could continue supporting conservation. Therefore, additional 
revenues from visitors were one way to facilitate the park’s effort to capture and share 
ecotourism benefits with the local communities.
56
 In this question, respondents were also 
asked about their willingness to pay under two different management scenarios: one, the 
proceeds from a fee increment would be managed by SANParks/NWPTB on behalf of the 
local surrounding communities; two, the proceeds from a voluntary donation would be 
managed by an independent organisation which would ensure that it is channelled towards 
development needs of the communities surrounding parks. This question was presented after 
the CB questions to prevent an embedding effect on the CB approach. Finally, visitor’s 




One of the criticisms levelled against a CB survey format such as the one in table 1 is that 
respondents might not know much about their intended visitation especially when they do not 
know anything about the alternative parks (Cicchetti and Peck, 1989). This difficulty was not 
encountered in this study as a significant number of respondents were either regular visitors 
and/or familiar with the four parks. The interviewers also described the parks in detail to 
respondents who did not know other parks besides the one they were interviewed at. Thus, 
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 The survey used the payment card method to elicit the visitor’s willingness to pay a fee increment.  
56
 Assurances associated with revenue management were made to respondents to minimize protest against fee 
increases.  
57
 Although what constitutes a ‘fair’ conservation fee is a political decision, it is still important that the views of 
visitors in this regard are known. Despite the facts that politically driven rather than economically driven 
decisions are often adopted, studies such as the one we have undertaken may provide policy makers with 
alternative strategies. It is hoped that by providing such useful information, we can let decision makers know 












respondents had little difficulty in revealing their intended visitation. The fact that SANParks 
fee structure does not distinguish between peak and off-peak period’s means that seasonal 
bias due to the timing of our survey might not be a huge problem. Furthermore, most visitors 
visited the parks during both summer and winter.  
 
4.4.3. Descriptive Statistics  
The study focuses on domestic overnight visitors as we could not get significant numbers of 




































Table 4.2: A selection of descriptive statistics of the 385 domestic overnight visitors 
interviewed  
Variable Kgalagadi Park Kruger Park Augrabies Park Pilanesberg Park 
Annual Visitation Frequency to Park  2.48  (1.86) 2.65  (1.85) 2.69  (1.94) 2.58  (1.91) 
























Household Size 3.40  (1.70) 3.31  (1.74) 3.16  (1.15) 4.03  (1.89) 
Conservation Fee Paid at this Park R45.00 R45.00 R25.00 R45.00 






















































R 1 711.12 
(R1 850.69) 






R 3 852.76 
(R4 419.33) 








Actual Number of Nights Spent at this Park 7.76   (9.63) 10.28   (11.12) 1.96  (1.28) 5.47   (3.79) 
Number of Nights Desired at Zero Park Fee 8.39  (10.01) 11.06  (11.62) 2.94  (3.07) 6.51   (5.02) 
Number of Nights at Increased Fee60  7.83   (9.85) 9.57  (10.85) 1.93  (1.27) 5.44  (4.09) 
Age of Respondent (in years) 49.28  (12.45 49.70  (14.70) 50.53  (13.46) 44.48  (14.65) 
Respondent is Male 62.50% 67.24% 59.18% 67.24% 
Respondent is Black 0.97% 7.76% 0% 1.72% 
Respondent is White 97.09% 92.24% 100% 98.28% 
Respondent is Coloured 1.94% 0% 0% 0% 
Respondent is Indian/Asian 0% 0% 0% 0% 
No. of Obs. 104 116 49 116 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
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 All visitors ordinarily pay conservation fees. However, some within the group visiting together had “wild 
cards” offering discounted fees and others paid old citizens’ rates. As such, daily household fees will not 
necessarily be Conservation Fees x Household Size. 
59
 None of the 3 WTP prices (fair price, raised prices and voluntary donation) are included in our model. 
60
 The hypothetical increased fee is what we finally account for in our model. The number of nights 












The data indicate that the majority of visitors to national parks do not make use of travel 
agency services. This is not surprising as the majority are domestic visitors who are more 
familiar with the local recreational services.  
 
The average visitor who enjoys national parks around South Africa is approximately 50 years 
old, has at least a University degree and has an average household size of about 3.24. Given 
the average household size, the fact that an average of 2.94 of household members were on 
the trip during the time of the survey indicates that parks offer a great opportunity for a 
family vacation.  
 
A median South African traveller spends between R3 852.76 to R7 565.51 on total trip costs 
at Pilanesberg and Kgalagadi respectively. Pilanesberg’s lowest total trip costs is attributed to 
the fact that an overwhelming majority of respondents are from nearby cities, Johannesburg 
and Pretoria - which are an hour’s drive away from the park. Augrabies’s second lowest trip 
costs are due to the limited recreational activities at the park which contributes to visitors 
staying for short periods of time. The trip costs at the two parks are significantly less than at 
the much physically bigger Kgalagadi and Kruger parks, which are further away and also 
offer a wide variety of recreational activities. A significant portion of the total trip cost goes 
towards accommodation inside the parks. Domestic visitors are spending between R217.41 to 
R1 008.41 on conservation fees during their visits, which account for 5.6 percent and 13 
percent of total trip costs at Pilanesberg and Kruger respectively. 
 
Although the conservation fees are fixed for each park, the variability in household size 
enables us to estimate the actual total daily fees incurred by each visiting household. The total 
amount spent during the trip on conservation fees accounts for around 10.59 percent of the 
domestic visitors’ total trip costs. The constant terms absorb the expenses held constant, such 
as like lodging and travel. 
 
Domestic visitors at the Kgalagadi Park earn significantly more than visitors at other parks. 
This can be attributed partly to the fact that it’s the most remote park in the country and is 













The willingness to pay additional money for entering the park is significantly higher in the 
presence of proposed benefit-sharing with local communities than what the park visitors 
deem to be a fair conservation fee level. It also seems that park visitors feel strongly about the 
institution that manages the revenues on behalf of local communities with visitors showing 
trust and willingness to contribute more when independent organisations administer the 
funds. A comparison of the means from the two ways of generating revenues for the local 
communities suggests that visitors prefer community-bound conservation revenues to be 




Although the variable representing race is not ordinarily expected to influence demand 
visitation, it is of great importance in South Africa which still has baggage from the apartheid 
era. The white market is considered to be mature in South Africa, hence other race groups are 
seen as crucial for achieving growth in the domestic market. The descriptive statistics indeed 
show that more needs to be done to grow these particular segments of the domestic market 
given that they account for approximately 91 percent of the South African population. The 
fact that SANParks has a consolidated marketing strategy targeting black, coloured and 
Indian races is testimony to this. 
 
The data indicate that 96 percent of the respondents are white. The population income 
statistics indicate that 53 percent of white visitors earn more than R300 000 per annum. A 
look at the black, coloured or Indian races reveal that a mere 36 percent earn more than 
R300 000 per annum. Given the income distribution of park goers, and the income 
distribution of blacks, coloureds and Indians, we would expect an increase in the latter 
groups’ visitation. According to SANParks (2010), there was a significant increase of 17.5 
percent in black, coloured and Indian races compared to the previous period (2008/2009 
financial year). This suggests that income alone does not account for the whiteness of the 
parks. 
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 We carried out two-tailed tests assuming unequal variances and a 5 percent significance level to formally 
assess whether magnitudes of the stated mean willingness to pay differ between the two payment vehicles. We 
conclude that the difference between “fee increment” and “voluntary donation” WTP is statistically significant 












4.4.4. Estimation Technique  
This section discusses the appropriate estimation technique given the nature of the data 
collected. Many statistical analyses involving individual data have a censored dependent 
variable (Greene, 2008). In a case where the dependent variable is censored for a significant 
proportion of the observations, parameter estimates obtained through conventional regression 
techniques such as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are biased. In that case, the technique 
proposed by Tobin (1958) yields consistent estimates. In the generalised censored regression 
model, the dependent variable can be either left-censored, right-censored, or both left-
censored and right-censored, where the lower and/or upper limit of the former variable could 
take any value (Henningsen, 2010): 
 
                                       
    
             ; h=1,.., N                                                  (4.2) 
 
                                        {
      
   
  
          
   
       
   
                                                         (4.3) 
 
Where   indicates the lower limit and   the upper limit of the regressed variable,   refers to 
the observations,   
  is an unobserved variable,    is a vector of independent variables,   is a 




Tobit models are commonly used in the context of cross sectional or panel data. Thus, 
autocorrelation in a Tobit model is less likely to be an issue in a case of panel data than in a 
univariate time series. With panel data, the model should ideally allow for individual 
observations that define a cross-sectional unit of data to differ systematically in the value of 
the dependent variable for reasons unobserved to the econometrician. In the case of the Tobit 
model, such individual specific observation, time-variant effects are modelled as a random 
effect (Wooldridge, 2002). A fixed effects model is not desirable due to problems in getting a 
good estimate of levels rather than changes (because you can’t accurately estimate the fixed 
effects themselves), hence it’s better to use random effects.  
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The random effects model using the full data set is preferred because it uses all the available 
information
63
 (see Chase et al., 1998). According to Hsiao (1986) and Greene (1993), the 
random effects model makes it possible to draw inferences about the demand preferences of 
the population given the observed behaviour of the sample to be made. According to Chase et 
al. (1998), the random effects specification estimates the correlation between the multiple 
observations for an individual, and thereafter uses that output to generate more efficient 
coefficient estimates. An assumption made in this model is that the unobserved person-
specific effect is uncorrelated with the included regressors.  
 
The random effects Tobit model is therefore used to estimate visitation demand at the four 
parks. In a case where the sample data is clustered over a narrow price (and visitation 
demand) range, a log-linear demand may be better choice than a linear model (Thomas and 
Maurice, 2008). This is indeed the case with our survey data; hence the log-linear model is 
preferred. Thus, we specify the functional form for the CB data in a double log-functional 
form as follows:  
 
                                                                      (4.4) 
 
Where    is the visitation demand at park i,    is the conservation fee at park i, and   is the 
individual’s disposable income, including other socio-economic characteristics. The model 
depicts the duration of stay during the year at each of the four parks as a function of the 
park’s own-price, prices at other parks and income, including other socio-economic 
characteristics. When the visitation demand at national parks is log-linear, the coefficient 
terms are simply the elasticities. The above model is therefore subsequently used to estimate 
own-price and cross-price elasticities of visitation demand of the four parks which will form 
inputs into the computation of the optimal conservation fees that each park should charge to 
maximise revenue.  
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 Alternatively, a randomly selected observation per person could be used. While this alternative approach 
ensures independence of observations, it does not use all the available data. This implies that the random effects 












4.5. Results  
4.5.1. Random effects Tobit model for park visitation demand by South African residents 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the random effects Tobit model analysing factors
64
 
determining visitation demand at four South African parks by residents, based on the 
experimental data generated from the CB approach. The random effects Tobit model proved 
to be the best fit for our data. Given that we are running a random effects Tobit with double 
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 Our analyses confirm that the attitudinal variables do not add significant explanatory power, hence these are 
excluded from the contingent behaviour model.  
65
 Our attempts to find out if logs are driving the results using box-cox transformations did not work because the 








































































































Constant 3.574  *** 
(1.178) 






Log-Likelihood -2437.559 -2389.528 -2309.171 -2622.733 
Wald chi2(10) 316.53 206.48 106.33 87.91 
No. Of. Observations 1890 1890 1890 1890 
         Source: Field Survey, 2011 
legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE in parenthesis 
 
The model yields expected signs at the four parks (KTP, Kruger, Augrabies and Pilanesberg). 
In particular, own-price coefficients are negative and significant at all the parks but generally 
                                                          
66 Economic theory requires that the cross price elasticities be the same. Two of our results are not because one 
of them is insignificantly not different from 0 while the other one is statistically significant in the two cases. 
Bonfrer et al. (2006) investigate the theoretical possibility and empirical regularity of these troublesome 
anomalies (negatively signed cross-elasticities, and sign asymmetries in pairs of cross elasticities). They found 
that the presence of negative cross-elasticities is theoretically possible and can be explained by the relative 
magnitudes of the share-weighted income elasticity, the unobserved Hicksian compensated rate of substitution, 
and the category demand effects. This implies that it is possible for parks to be simultaneously a substitute and a 












not elastic. However, this implies that an increase in conservation fees would result in a 
decline in visitation. In the visitation demand function for KTP, the cross-price elasticity is 
positive and significant with respect to Pilanesberg, indicating that it is a substitute, albeit 
weak, for KTP. Interestingly, conservation fees at Kgalagadi have no bearing on visitation at 
Pilanesberg. While some visitors to KTP might contemplate visiting Pilanesberg instead, 
most visitors to Pilanesberg find it unique enough not to be substitutable by KTP. This would 
be rational for visitors who package Pilanesberg with the adjacent Sun City tourist resort. 
  
In the visitation demand function for Kruger, it is only own-price which is significant. The 
insensitivity of visitation demand to conservation fees at the other parks confirms its 
uniqueness. Indeed, Kruger is by far the most visited park in South Africa, if not in Africa. It 
receives more than 25 times more visitors per annum than any other park in the country.  
 
In the visitation demand function for Augrabies, all the price coefficients are significant. The 
responsiveness of visitation demand at Augrabies to conservation fee changes at all the other 
three parks is expected given the limited size and attractions at the former. Augrabies is the 
only park in this set where the main attraction is a waterfall. Moreover, it does not have the 
“Big Five”. Therefore, the positive and significant cross-price estimates imply that an 
increase in fees at the other three parks will result in increased visitation at Augrabies. 
However, changes in conservation fees at Augrabies will not affect visitation at the other 
three parks.  
 
In the visitation demand function for Pilanesberg, although there appears to be insensitivity of 
visitation demand to conservation fee changes at the other parks, household size positively 
influences visitation demand at that park. Multi-trip arrangements and respondent’s age 
negatively influence visitation demand at Augrabies. Income positively influences visitation 
demand at KTP, which is perhaps not surprising given that this is the least accessible park 
given its remote location and aridness. 
 
4.5.2. Optimal conservation fees for domestic visitors at KTP  
The main policy objective of this paper is to estimate the optimal conservation fees necessary 
to maximize park revenue at KTP. Given the low magnitudes of price and cross-price 












visitors to the park. It is plausible to apply such a park pricing regime to domestic visitors 
because South African residents make up the bulk of visitors to local national parks. 
Furthermore, South Africans constitute a significant portion of international visitors in 
neighbouring countries, where they are charged much higher fees than currently in place in 
the country. Given the unique profile of South African park visitors (including their high 
income levels), we argue that this warrants charging them “monopoly” prices at KTP as well 
as popular parks. 
 
The Marshallian theory of price elasticity of demand can be used to determine the price-
quantity points at which revenue is maximized. The standard result from economic theory is 
that the park agency can maximize revenue by setting the conservation fee at that point where 
the park visitation demand has unitary elasticity. Using the elasticities estimated in the 
random effects Tobit model, we solved for the revenue-maximizing daily conservation fees 
reported in Table 4.4 (see Owen (2012) for a fuller exposition of the computations).  
 












Revenue-Maximising Fee (ZAR) 









Current Conservation Fee (ZAR) 









Choke Conservation Fees (ZAR) 









Source: Field survey (2011) & own computation 
 
The estimates shown in Table 4.4 indicate that the optimal fees could be increased at KTP as 
well as other parks. The conservation fees at KTP can increase by as much as 115 percent, 
thereby almost doubling current revenue after accounting for the drop in visitation which will 
be triggered by the increase. It should be noted that this fee increase will not drastically 
reduce visitation as it is not very high. For comparison with the ultimate tolerance level of 












increase at, say, Pilanesberg, which has a low own and high cross elasticity, will result in an 
increase in revenues. 
 
The computations reported in Table 4.4 suggest that there is a need to reform the current 
pricing strategy at KTP. This paper argues that two possibilities can be pursued to reform 
conservation tariffs to help communities extract more benefits for their participation in 
conservation. One way of doing this is for SANParks to revise the conservation fees to the 
revenue-maximising level and share the additional revenue with the communities. Of course, 
a critical concern has to do with what guarantee there is that the increased revenue following 
the fee increase will actually reach and benefit the adjacent communities. Alternatively, the 
required increase could be designed as a community-bound voluntary donation. Our results 
show that visitors would voluntarily give donations above the current conservation fee if they 
knew it would go to the local communities as compensation for their role in conservation.  
 
Indeed, demonstrating that conservation fees can be designed to maximize revenue from 
domestic visitors without necessarily preventing lower income people from accessing the 
parks is important in political debates about land use. Implementation of voluntary donations 
is one way to over-come any potential adverse effect that optimal fees may have either on the 
poor or on park visitation demand. 
 
The sharing of conservation revenue with local communities surrounding national parks is 
one way to demonstrate the link between ecotourism and local communities’ economic 
development. Given that the Kgalagadi had approximately 21 985 domestic visits (which 
excludes 6 054 Wild Card Free Guests), our proposed scheme would raise R1 135 305.40 
(R51.64 per visit). This is a substantial amount of money compared to the San total income. 
The San do not earn enough money from the tourist spend. Furthermore, the income received 
from their !Xaus  lodge joint-venture is insufficient in comparison to the potential money that 
could be raised by our scheme. The current arrangement is that SANParks keeps all the 
revenue generated through conservation fees and yet they receive an equal share of revenues 
generated from the !Xaus lodge joint-ventures with the communities (Khomani San and 
Mier). For instance, from its opening in 2007 to March 2010, the !Xaus lodge with just 24 













Introduction of such schemes which directly benefit poor local communities in South Africa 
is the best way to help land restitution involving national parks to be viewed positively. 
Clearly distinguishing the part of visitors’ payments going to local communities will help 
visitors connect with co-owners and co-providers of ecosystem services inside national parks. 
A gesture of this nature could act as an incentive for the local communities to participate in 
conservation even more than they already do. In fact, the need to share tourism revenue with 
local communities surrounding parks has recently been embraced by SANParks, as evidenced 
by their announcement that a 1 percent levy for these purposes will be added to 
accommodation and activity bookings, effective 1 June 2012 (Mlongo, 2011).  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
Now that some of the resource rights inside the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park have been 
vested in the surrounding communities, the park should contribute toward improving the lives 
of these communities so that land restitution will not compromise conservation objectives. 
Given that the park has well-established infrastructure to help communities extract more 
benefits for their participation in conservation, this study argues that it is important to 
establish the possibility of generating more revenue from conservation fees for sharing with 
the new but poor co-owners of international parklands. If such opportunities exist, then the 
modes of making tourists pay more can vary from a mandatory conservation fee increment to 
a voluntary community-bound donation above the regular conservation fee.  
 
In this spirit, the aim of this study was to estimate optimal conservation fees which should be 
charged at KTP to maximise revenue. This was done with the help of the contingent 
behaviour methodology. Our analysis, which focused on South African residents, shows that 
there is a wide variation in the elasticities of demand between the four national parks. The 
cross-price estimates indicate limited substitutability in visitation demand among the four 
parks. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that there is sheer underselling of the recreational services offered 
by the South African park systems, which implies that there is room for improvement in the 
use of the conservation fee policy. Revenue could be maximized by increasing conservation 
fees for domestic tourists at Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park as well as the other parks without 












possibilities: revenue sharing with local communities and more sustainable park 
management. Our results are consistent with other empirical studies on nature-based 
ecotourism which estimate higher visitors’ willingness to pay for the recreational services of 
parks. The policy implication is that the park agencies (SANParks & NWPTB) should 
consider instituting mechanisms for capturing more revenues. 
 
Moreover, our results show that revising conservation fees to optimal levels could play a 
positive role in redistribution of ecotourism revenue to local communities surrounding 
national parks. The sharing of fee revenue could address South Africa’s heavily skewed 
distribution of income. Clearly distinguishing the part of visitors’ payments going to local 
communities will help visitors connect with co-owners and co-providers of ecosystem 
services inside national parks. A gesture of this nature could act as an incentive for the local 




Alberini, A., Longo, A., 2006. Combining the travel cost and contingent behaviour methods 
to value cultural heritage sites: evidence from Armenia. Journal of Cultural Economics 
30 (4): 287-304. 
Alpizar, F., 2006. The pricing of protected areas in nature-based tourism: A local perspective. 
Ecological Economics 56: 294-307. 
Baldares, M. J., Laarman, J. G.., 1990. De-rechos de Entrada a las Areas Protegidas de Costa 
Rica. Ciencias Economicas 10: 63-76. 
Baumol, W. J., Oates, W.E., 1975. The Theory of Environmental Policy: Externalities, Public 
Outlays and the Quality of Life. Prentice-Hall, Inc: New Jersey. 
Bergstrom, T.C., Rubinfeld, D.L., Shapiro, P., 1982. Micro-based estimates of demand 
functions for local school expenditures. Econometrica 50: 1183–1205. 
Bonfrer, A., Berndt, E.R.., Silk, A., 2006. Anomalies in estimates of cross-price elasticities 
for marketing mix models: theory and empirical test. Working paper 12756. 














Bosch, D., Hirschfeld, E. 2002. The !Ae!Hai Heritage Park bundle - including the agreement 
whereby the land claims of the Khomani San community and the Mier community are 
finalized and associated documents. Pretoria, Commission on the Restitution of Land 
Rights. 
Bull, A., 1995. The economics of travel and tourism (2nd ed.), Longman, Melbourne. 
Chase, C., Lee, D.R., Schulze, W.D., Anderson, D.J., 1998. Ecotourism Demand and 
Differential Pricing of National Park Access in Costa Rica. Land Economics 74 (4): 
466 - 482. 
Cicchetti, R.T., Peck, N., 1989. Assessing natural resources damages: The case against 
contingent value survey methods. Natural Resource and Environment 4: 6. 
Cullen, R., 1985. Rationing Recreation Use of Public Land. Journal of Environmental 
Management 21: 213-24. 
Dikgang, J., Muchapondwa, E., 2012. The valuation of biodiversity conservation by the 
South African Khomani San “bushmen” community. Ecological Economics 84: 7 – 14. 
Dikgang, J., Muchapondwa, E., “The effect of land restitution on poverty reduction among 
the Khomani San “bushmen” in South Africa, ERSA working paper 352, June 2013, 
South Africa.  
Eagles, P.F.J., McCool, S.F., Haynes, C., 2002. Sustainable tourism in protected areas: 
guidelines for planning and management. Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines #8, 
UICN. 
Fay, D., 2009. Property, Subjection and Protected areas: The ‘Restitution’ of Dwesa-Cwebe 
Nature Reserve, South Africa. 
Fractor, D.T., 1982. Evaluating Alternative Methods for Rationing Wilderness Use. Journal 
of Leisure Research 14: 341-349. 
Freeman III, A. M., 1993. The measurement of environmental and resource values: Theory 
and methods. Washington DC: Resources for the Future. 
Greene, W., 2008. Econometric Analysis. 6 edition. Prentice Hall. 
Grijalva, T.C., Berrens, R.P., Bohara, A.K., Shaw, W.D., 2002. Testing the validity of 
Contingent Behavior trip responses. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84: 
401 – 414. 













Henningsen, A., 2010. Estimating Censored Regression Models in R using the censReg 
Package. 
Hirshveld, E., 2009. Adjusted Map. 
Hsiao, C., 1986. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature), 1994a. Guidelines for protected area 
management categories. CNPPA with the assistance of WCMC. IUCN. Gland, 
Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. 
Jones, R.S., 1981. Laska native claims settlement act of 1971 (public law 92-203): history 
and analysis together with subsequent amendments. Report No. 81-127 Gov. American 
National Government, Alaska. 
Khan, H., 2007. Willingness to pay and demand elasticities for two national parks: empirical 
evidence from two surveys in Pakistan. Environment, Development and Sustainability: 
1-13. 
Laarman, J.G., Gragersen, H.M., 1996. Pricing Policy in Nature-Based Tourism. Tourism 
Management 17 (4): 247 – 254. 
Lee, C., Han, S., 2002. Estimating the use and preservation values of national parks' tourism 
resources using a contingent valuation method. Tourism Management 23: 531–540. 
Leibbrandt, M., Finn, A., Argent, J., Woolard, I. 2010. Changes in Income Poverty over the 
Post-Apartheid Period: An Analysis Based on Data from the 1993 Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development and the 2008 Base Wave of the 
National Income Dynamics Study. Journal of Studies in Economics & Econometrics 
34(3): 25 - 43. 
Lindberg, K., 1991. Policies for Maximizing Nature Tourism's Ecological and Economic 
Benefits. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 
MacEachern, A. 2001. Natural Selections: National Parks in Atlantic Canada, 1935-1970. 
Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Mckinsey Pricing Policy., 2005. Revised Pricing Structure Announced on 2 April 2003. 
SANParks Policy Document. 
McNamee, K., 2010. Filling in the gaps: establishing new National Parks. The George Wright 
Forum 27 (2): 142–150. 
Mendes, I., 2003. Pricing Recreation Use of National Parks for More Efficient Nature 
Conservation: An Application to the Portuguese Case. European Environment 13: 288 












Mlongo, E., 2011. News Release: SANParks reaches out to communities with a dedicated 
levy. http://celtis.sanparks.org/about/news/default.php?id=1682. (11 July 2011). 
Naidoo, R., Adamowicz, W.L., 2005. Economic benefits of biodiversity exceed costs of 
conservation at an African rainforest reserve. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 102: 16712 – 16716. 
Owen, G.W., 2012. Applying Point Elasticity of Demand Principles to Optimal Pricing in 
Management Accounting. The International Journal of Applied Economics and 
Finance 6 (3): 89 - 99. 
Peacock, L., 2009. South African safari guide. http://www.smarttravelasia.com/africa.htm. 
(20 June 2009). 
Pienaar, U de V., “Neem uit die Verlede”, Published by South African National Parks (then 
National Parks Board) in 1990. 
http://www.sanparks.org/parks/kruger/tourism/history.php. (30 June 2010). 
Rosenthal D.H., Loomis, J.B., Peterson, G.L., 1984. Pricing for Efficiency and Revenue in 
Public Recreation Areas. Journal of Leisure Research 16: 195-207. 
Sandwith, T., Shine, C., Hamilton, L., Sheppard, D., 2001. Transboundary Protected Areas 
for Peace and Co-operation. In World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA), Best 
Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No 7, Edited by A. Philips. Based on the 
Proceedings of workshops held in Bormio (1998) and Gland (2000). 
SANParks., 2006. Developing a system for sustainable resource use by the Khomani San in 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and environs: potential project themes. South African 
National Parks. 
SANParks., 2010. South African National Parks Conservation fees. 
http://www.places.co.za/html/parks_conservation_fees.html. (5 May, 2010). 
Scarpa, R., Chilton, S.M., Hutchinson, W.G., Buongiorno, J., 2000. Valuing the recreational 
benefits from the creation of nature reserves in Irish forests. Ecological Economics 33: 
237 – 250. 
Schultz, S., Pinazzo, J., Cifuentes, M., 1998. Opportunities and limitations of contingent 
valuation surveys to determine national park entrance fees: evidence from Costa Rica. 
Environment and Development Economics 3: 131 – 149. 
Stevens, J., 2013. Personal communication with the General Manager, Strategic Tourism 












Thomas, C.R., Maurice, S.C., 2008. Managerial Economics. 9
th
 edition, McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education.  
Tobin, J., 1958. Estimation of relationship for limited dependent variables. Econometrica 26: 
24 - 36. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 





















Introduce yourself to the respondent: "I am conducting a tourist survey on behalf of the Environmental-
Economics Policy Research Unit, at the University of Cape Town. “The aim of our research is to estimate 
optimal gate fees at four South African national parks. Charging of optimal gate fees at recreational sites in 
particular could be a potential source that may be used to generate additional revenue by the park agency to 
offset the dwindling tax-based government funding. This implies that determination of optimal gate fees at parks 
could be the source of additional revenue that parks require so they can substantially contribute towards 
uplifting local communities’ developmental state and demonstrate that conservation and ecotourism can indeed 
lead to tangible benefits accruing to local communities surrounding parks”. Your opinion and the information 
provided by you is important as it may contribute towards developing effective pricing strategies in the context 
of South Africa’s national park system. Your honest response would be appreciated for the success of this 
research project.   
 
1. VISITOR’S RECREATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
1. HOW OFTEN DO YOU VISIT NATIONAL PARKS (NOT RESTRICTED TO SANPARKS MANAGED PARKS OR SOUTH 
AFRICAN PROVINCIAL PARKS)?                                  
 FREQUENCY    
ONCE A YEAR 1  
ONCE EVERY TWO YEARS 2  
ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS 3  
ONCE EVERY TEN YEARS 4  
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5  
   
THREE MOST VISITED NATIONAL PARKS  ENTRANCE FEE  STRUCTURE OF FEE 
(DAILY FEE, ONCE-
OFF, ETC) 
   
 
2. IS THIS YOUR FIRST VISIT TO THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK / KRUGER NATIONAL PARK / AUGRABIES 
FALL NATIONAL PARK / PILANESBERG GAME RESERVE 
YES   NO   
 
3. ARE YOU USING A TRAVEL AGENT DURING THIS VISIT  















4. ARE YOU A DAY OR AN OVERNIGHT VISITOR ENTERING AT THE GATE?  
TYPE OF VISITOR TICK APPROPRIATE CHOICE 
DAY VISITOR  
OVERNIGHT VISITOR  
 
5. HOW MANY MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOULD HAVE ACCOMPANIED YOU ON YOUR CURRENT TRIP TO THE 
CURRENT PARK?............................................................... AND HOW MUCH DO YOU SPEND PER DAY ON ENTRY FEES AT THE 
CURRENT PARK: R______________________ 
 
6. WHAT IS YOUR APPROXIMATE TOTAL COST OF ACCOMODATION AT THE CURRENT PARK (WHOLE PERIOD): 
R______________________ 
 
7. HOW MUCH DO YOU SPEND IN TOTAL ON YOUR TRIP TO THE CURRENT PARK: R______________________  
 
8. WHAT IS YOUR MAIN REASON FOR VISITING THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK / KRUGER NATIONAL PARK / 
AUGRABIES FALL NATIONAL PARK / PILANESBERG GAME RESERVE 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
9. WHAT ACTIVITIES DO YOU PARTICIPATE IN WHILE AT THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER / KRUGER NATIONAL 
PARKS / AUGRABIES FALL NATIONAL PARKS / PILANESBERG GAME RESERVE 
ACTIVITY TICK THE APPLICABLE OPTION 
NONE  
GAME DRIVEACTVITIES  
SELF GUIDED DRIVES  
BIRD WATCHING  
WILDLIFE VIEWING  
DAY WALK ACTIVITIES  
HIKING TRAILS  
WATER FALLS   
OTHER  
PLEASE SPECIFY OTHERS 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
10. ARE YOU VISITING OTHER DESTINATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA OR IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES (INCLUDING 
OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL PARKS) DURING YOUR CURRENT HOLIDAY TRIP 
YES   NO   
 
11. IF YES, HOW LONG DO YOU PLAN TO SPEND ON AVERAGE IN OTHER PARKS? 
NAME OF PARK TIME SPENT IN PARK ENTRY FEES PER DAY 
   
 
2. VISITOR OPTIMAL CONSERVATION FEES  
12. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW YOUR VISITATION WOULD BE AFFECTED IF SANPARKS WERE TO DECIDE TO 
INCREASE ENTRANCE FEES67? PLEASE ASSUME THAT THE FEE CHANGES ONLY AT A SINGLE PARK– NOT AT OTHER 
PARKS. HOW MANY DAYS IN A YEAR ARE YOU PLANNING TO VISIT THIS YEAR OVER NUMBER OF VISITS AT THE 
DAILY ENTRY FEES SHOWN IN THE CHART BELOW? 
                                                          
67 PLEASE NOTE THAT THE ACCOMMODATION RATES, ETC ARE NOT CHANGING I.E. THE ONLY 












SOUTH AFRICAN RESIDENTS 
Name of Park Actual Hypothetical Increases 




R45  R56.25  R45  R45  R45  
Kruger National 
Park 
R45  R45  R56.25  R45  R45  
Augrabies Fall 
National Park 
R25  R25  R25  R31.25  R25  
Pilanesberg68 
Game Reserve 
R45  R45  R45  R45  R56.25  
 
SADC 
Name of Park Actual Hypothetical Increases 




R90  R112.50  R90  R90  R90  
Kruger National 
Park 
R90  R90  R112.50  R90  R90  
Augrabies Fall 
National Park 
R50  R50  R50  R62.50  R50  
Pilanesberg69 
Game Reserve 
R45  R45  R45  R45  R56.25  
 
INTERNATIONAL VISITORS (OUTSIDE SOUTHERN AFRICA) 
Name of Park Actual 
 
Hypothetical Increases 




R180  R225  R180  R180  R180  
Kruger National 
Park 
R180  R180  R225  R180  R180  
Augrabies Fall 
National Park 
R100  R100  R100  R125  R100  
Pilanesberg70 
Game Reserve 
R45  R45  R45  R45  R56.25  
 
                                                          
68
 IN ADDITION TO THE GATE FEE SHOWN ABOVE, PILANESBERG CHARGES R20 FOR EACH CAR 
THAT GOES INSIDE THE RESERVE.  
69
 IN ADDITION TO THE GATE FEE SHOWN ABOVE, PILANESBERG CHARGES R20 FOR EACH CAR 
THAT GOES INSIDE THE RESERVE.  
70
 IN ADDITION TO THE GATE FEE SHOWN ABOVE, PILANESBERG CHARGES R20 FOR EACH CAR 












13. THE CURRENT ENTRANCE FEE FOR KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK / KRUGER / AUGRABIES FALL / 
PILANESBERG GAME RESERVE IS RXXXX. IF THE FEE WAS INCREASED, PLEASE INDICATE AT WHAT POINT (FEE) 
WOULD YOU DECIDE TO THEN RATHER VISIT ANOTHER PARKS INSTEAD? IN ADDITION, CAN YOU PLEASE STATE 
HOW YOUR VISITATION WOULD BE AFFECTED IF THE ENTRY FEE71 CHANGED ONLY AT ONE PARK (ITS PART OF 
EXPERIMENT) 
INDICATE THE FEE AT WHICH YOU WOULD VISIT OTHER PARKS INSTEAD  
R 





















   UNCHANGED  UNCHANGED  25%  
   UNCHANGED  25%  UNCHANGED  
KGALAGADI  
/ KRUGER  
/ AUGRABIES / 
PILANESBERG72 
GAME RESERVE 
UNCHANGED   25%  UNCHANGED  UNCHANGED  
 
14. IN YOUR VIEW, WHAT ENTRANCE FEE LEVELS PER PERSON DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE “APPROPRIATE” FOR THE 
FOLLOWING PARKS? 
Name of Park Appropriate Fee 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park  
Kruger National Park  
Augrabies Fall National Park  
Pilanesberg Game Reserve  
 
15. HOW MANY DAYS WOULD YOU VISIT THE PARK DURING A VISIT IF THERE WERE NO DAILY ENTRY FEES. 
Name of Park No Fees Days 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park R0.00  
Kruger National Park R0.00  
Augrabies Fall National Park R0.00  











                                                          
71 PLEASE NOTE THAT THE ACCOMMODATION RATES, ETC ARE NOT CHANGING I.E. THE ONLY 
THING CHANGING IS ONE OF THE PARKS' ENTRANCE FEES. 
72
 IN ADDITION TO THE GATE FEE SHOWN ABOVE, PILANESBERG CHARGES R20 FOR EACH CAR 












16. FOLLOWING LAND RESTITUTION WITHIN PROTECTED AREAS, SANPARKS ARE CO-MANAGING SOME PARKS TOGETHER 
WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES (EG. CO-MANAGEMENT OF THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK WITH THE KHOMANI SAN 
AND MIER COMMUNITY). ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THESE CO-MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS IS TO ENSURE 
TANGIBLE BENEFITS ARE ACCRUED BY THESE LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY 
TOWARDS THEIR WELLBEING. THIS RESEARCH AIMS TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THIS GOAL, THROUGH COLLECTING 
DATA ON WHAT TOURISTS WOULD BE WILLING TO PAY TOWARDS THIS OBJECTIVE.  
 
PLEASE INDICATE IF YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO PAY MORE THAN YOU ARE CURRENTLY PAYING AS AN ENTRANCE 
FEE73, TOWARDS EITHER A HIGHER FEE OR A VOLUNTARY-COMMUNITY BOUND DONATION THAT WOULD 
CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES SURROUNDING NATIONAL PARKS?  
YES  NO  
 
IF YES, HOW MUCH ARE YOU WILLING-TO-PAY AS THE MAXIMUM ENTRANCE FEE IN THE FORM OF A REVISED 
ENTRY FEE BEARING IN MIND YOUR BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, VISIT EXPERIENCE AND ENTRY FEES AT OTHER PARKS 
(INCLUDING PRIVATE RESERVES AND PARKS IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES)? 
 
EXTRA AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND) PER PERSON OVER 
AND ABOVE THE EXISTING FEE  
   
0 0   
1 – 50 1   
51 - 100 2   
101 – 200 3   
201- 300 4   
301 – 400 5   
401 - 500 6   
501 + (SPECIFY)  7 SPECIFY  
 
OR ALTERNATIVELY, HOW MUCH ARE YOU WILLING-TO-PAY IN ADDITION TO WHAT YOU ALREADY PAY IN 
ENTRANCE FEES TOWARDS THE PROPOSEDVOLUNTARY DONATION, BEARING IN MIND YOUR BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, 
VISIT EXPERIENCE AND ENTRY FEES AT OTHER PARKS (INCLUDING PRIVATE RESERVES AND PARKS IN 
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES)? 
 
EXTRA AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND) PER PERSON OVER 
AND ABOVE THE EXISTING FEE  
   
0 0   
1 – 50 1   
51 - 100 2   
101 – 200 3   
201- 300 4   
301 – 400 5   
401 - 500 6   
501 + (SPECIFY)  7 SPECIFY  
 
17. IF ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS ZERO OR YOU NOT WILLING-TO-PAY ADDITIONAL FEES ALTOGETHER, 
WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS (YOU MAY HAVE MORE THAN ONE)? 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
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3. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE VISITOR 
18. GENDER OF RESPONDENT                        
 MALE 1 
 FEMALE 2 
 
19. VISITOR OR RESIDENT                                    





21. DATE OF BIRTH OR AGE.................................................................. 
 
22. NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN THE HOUSEHOLD: _______ PEOPLE 
 
23. WHAT IS YOUR EDUCATION LEVEL 
EDUCATION LEVEL TICK THE 
APPROPRIATE 
SPECIFY THE HIGHEST 
GRADE COMPLETED 
NEVER ATTENDED SCHOOL   
PRIMARY SCHOOL    
HIGH SCHOOL    
CERTIFICATE   
DIPLOMA   
DEGREE   
POSTGRADUATE    
ANY OTHER FORMAL TRAINING RECEIVED   
 
24. OCCUPATION           
FORMAL EMPLOYMENT 1 































25. LAST YEARS HOUSEHOLD INCOME BEFORE TAXES       
PLEASE TICK APPROPRIATE CURRENCY: RAND, PULA, US DOLLAR, EURO, BRITISH POUND OR 
OTHER................................................................................................         
PRE TAX INCOME ( )  
0 – 10 000 1 
10 001- 30 000 2 
30 001 –50 000 3 
50 001 – 100 000 4 
100 001 – 150 000 5 
150 001 – 200 000 6 
200 001 – 250 000 7 
250 001 – 350 000 8 
350 001 – 500 000 9 
500 001+  10 
 
26. RACE OF RESPONDENT (THIS QUESTION IS OPTIONAL, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION IF YOU 













































































Table A2.1: A selection of descriptive statistics of the 78 international overnight visitors 
interviewed 
















































    (0.76) 








Daily Fees (Excluding Wild Card)  R753.95   
(R768.90) 
R682.97     
(R667.82) 
R580.24     
(R802.49) 
R50.37     
(R32.52) 
















WTP Over and Above Actual Fee Paid:     
Raised Fee R88.16    
(R112.51) 
R81.25    
(R147.57) 
R45.24    
 (R44.28) 
R60     
(R97.63) 
Voluntary Donation R76.32    
(R101.35) 
R89.84    
(R153.68) 
R41.67     
(R46.73) 
R35     
(R34.61) 














R 2 774.33 
(R3 009.46) 






R 10 056.67 
(R9 738.09) 




























































On average, respondents interviewed visit national parks about 1.67 times. Our data show 
that majority of international respondents (59.44 percent) are first-time tourists. The data 
indicate that majority of international visitors to national parks do not make use of travel 
agency services, with the exception of visitors at Pilanesberg national park. A slight majority, 
about 51.1 percent, of international visitors were visiting other recreational sites during their 
holiday trip.  
 
International visitors earned an average annual income of around R271 633.58, with total trip 
costs accounting for 5.63 percent of their disposable income. This was expected for two 
reasons, firstly they incur high travel costs, and secondly in our case given their lower income 
levels relative to domestic visitors. Given their already higher conservation fees, it is not 
surprising that international visitor’s total daily conservation fees are much higher at R515.54 
(which includes 40 wildcard members). The total daily fee expenditure excluding wildcard 
holders is significantly lower at R325.29. International visitors’ total expenditure on 
conservation fees accounted for 8.26 percent of their total trip costs. The constant terms 
absorb the things held the same like lodging and travel.  
 
It seems that park visitors feel strongly about the institution that manage the revenues with 
international visitors of the view that the park agency is well placed to manage this scheme 
better with raised fee mechanism being their favoured mechanism, with the exception of 
visitors to Kruger Park. On average, domestic visitors stayed longer at the parks (6.37 nights) 
compared to 4.22 nights by international visitors. The average international visitor who 
enjoys national parks around South Africa is approximately 51 years old and has an average 
household size of about 2.93. About 63.91 percent of the respondents are male and 36.09 
percent are female. 
 
Furthermore, we carried out statistical two-tailed tests assuming unequal variances and a 5 
percent significance level to assess the magnitudes of the stated mean WTP preferences 
between the two hypothetical scenarios. We conclude from these tests that the difference 
between “raised fee” and “voluntary donation” WTP is statistically significant only for local 













A2.2. Empirical results  
The data gathered on park demand preferences resulted in a dataset consisting of five 
observations for each of the 78 respondents. The international visitor’s estimates make use of 
random effects Tobit regression with a log-linear model. Table A4.2 presents the results of 
the random effects Tobit model estimation to analyse factors
74
 that determine visitation 
demand by international tourists, based on the CB generated experimental data at the four 
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 Our analyses confirm that the attitudinal variables do not add significant explanatory power, hence there are 


























Price – Kgalagadi 
(R/night) -.568 ***  (.186)  -.332   (.223)    -.113  (.141) -.155   (.132) 
Price – Kruger (R/night) .711 *** (.127) -.217  (.152)  -.636 ***  (.097) -.022  (.091) 
Price – Augrabies 
(R/night) .218   (.184)  -1.566 *** (.220) -.043   (.140)  .029   (.130) 
Price – Pilanesberg 
(R/night) .235   (.166) -.092  (.199)  -.123   (.126) -.348 *** (.118) 
Income (R) -.076  (.089)  .111  (.096)   .024   (.095)  .163    (.162) 
Age (years)  -.236   (.330) -.023   (.354) -.496   (.352) -.670   (.598) 
No of H/H members on 
trip -.221   (.187) -.111   (.200) -.202  (.199)  .372   (.339) 
Multi-trip -.716 *** (.218)  -.181   (.234)  -.871 ***  (.232) -.183    (.395) 
Male dummy -.211   (.202) -.435 ** (.217) -.113  (.215)  .042   (.367) 
Education (years) .165 ** (.083) -.064   (.089) .135   (.088) .219  (.150) 
Asia .335   (.261) .175   (.280) .171    (.278) -.025   (.474) 
American -.182  (.323) -.179   (.347) -.271  (.345)  -.180   (.587) 
Oceania -.110   (.353)  -.612   (.379) .1304  (.376) -.261   (.639) 
Constant 
.204   (3.054) 
12.110 ***  
(3.508) 6.35 **  (2.717) 1.819   (3.820) 
Log-Likelihood -506.555 -569.557 -424.955 -443.914 
Wald chi2(10) 84.85 68.58 71.19 25.13 
No. Of. Observations 390 390 390 390 
        Source: Field Survey, 2011 
legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE in parenthesis 
 
Economic theory (law of demand) predicts that there is an inverse relationship between price 
and quantity demanded; this is indeed the case as the own-price estimates at all the four parks 
are negatively signed. However, the own-price estimate in Kruger and Augrabies are not 
statistically significant. The visitation demand at the Kgalagadi is sensitive to fee changes in 
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 It is not surprising that for international visitor’s random effects tobit model that dummy variables of regions 
are not significant because of too few observations. Thus, we should be cautious in interpreting these results 












Kruger. The positive Kruger coefficient implies that it is a substitute. It is perhaps not 
surprising given that international visitors have already incurred high travel expenses that 
income levels do not influence visitation demand at any of the four parks.  
 
A closer look at socio-economic characteristics shows that the multi-trip variable is both 
negative and significant at Kgalagadi and Augrabies. The fact the latter is the closest park to 
the former makes this result logical. The education coefficient is positive and significant only 
at the Kgalagadi. Gender (male dummy) is negative and significant only at the KNP. Neither 
of the regions that the tourists are from is of any importance in influencing visitation demand 
in any of the parks. This is perhaps not surprising given the popularity of South African 
national parks internationally.  
 
Using the elasticities estimated in the random effects Tobit model, we solved for the revenue-
maximizing daily conservation fees reported in Table A4.3 (see Owen (2012) for a fuller 
exposition of the computations).  
 



























































The results above indicate that the fees would have to be hiked
76
 at the four parks. Our 
optimal fee estimates are significantly more than the current fees charged to international 
visitors at these four parks. Given that the Kgalagadi had 5 496 international visits (which 
excludes 1 514 Wild Card Free Guests), our proposed scheme would raise R5 231 862.24 
(R951.94 per visit). This is significantly higher than the San total income.  
 
A conversion of our estimates to US Dollar’s as an international currency would appear to 
yield reasonable conservation fees which are comparable to those of similar recreational sites 
in Africa. For example, international visitors pay up to US$50 per night at some recreational 
sites in Botswana and Zimbabwe.  
 
A2.3. Conclusion 
Our analysis regarding international visitors shows that there is a wide variation in the 
elasticities of demand among the four national parks. Interestingly, our results suggest that 
revenue could be maximized by increasing conservation fees for domestic tourist’s at all four 
parks. Furthermore, our findings imply that the conservation fees charged to international 
visitors are significantly lower than optimal. As expected, the optimal fees for international 
visitors are significantly higher than for local visitors. This indicates that both local and 
international park fees could be raised.  
 
Given that international visitors a e likely to be accustomed to contributing donations in their 
respective countries at recreational sites (such as museums), the introduction of voluntary 
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 A point to note is that Pilanesberg charges a weekly rate; hence our estimate reflects the optimal weekly fee. 












Chapter 5: The economic valuation of dryland ecosystem services in the 





The economic importance of the dryland ecosystem services in the Kgalagadi area is 
generally unknown, as is the distribution of benefits from use of the ecosystem services. This 
study seeks to value ecosystem services in the Kgalagadi area by applying the Choice 
Experiment technique and thereafter assess the potential for ecosystem services to contribute 
to the Khomani San livelihoods through a payment for ecosystem services (PES) scheme. 
The values placed on dryland ecosystem services by both tourists and indigenous 
communities are estimated using a Conditional Logit model, Random Parameter Logit model, 
a Random Parameter Logit model with interactions and a Latent Class Model to account for 
heterogeneity in tastes. The results show that local communities would prefer getting 
increased grazing, firewood collection, hunting opportunities and harvesting of medicinal 
plants. The park visitors prefer getting more pristine recreational opportunities, increased 
chances of seeing predators and show disapproval of granting more access inside the 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park to local communities. This scenario shows that there is a 
possibility to craft a PES scheme where park visitors could compensate the local 
communities to accept a restriction of resource use in the Kgalagadi area.  
 
 
Keywords: choice experiment, conditional logit, ecosystem services, Khomani San, latent 






Note: An extract of this chapter has been submitted to the EfD (Environment for 













Our study area is located in the Siyanda District Municipality (comprising six local 
municipalities) of the Northern Cape province of South Africa, bordering Botswana and 
Namibia. The district is approximately 120,000 square kilometres and includes large areas in 
the Kgalagadi desert. The Mier Local Municipality (one of the six local municipalities) is 
located next to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. 
 
The Kgalagadi area in South Africa is around 160 000 square kilometres with dried-up rivers, 
sparse scrubland and desert (Encounter South Africa, 2011). Despite this harsh dryland 
ecosystem environment, this area harbours unique biodiversity (animals and plants). Thus, 
like many other dryland areas, the Kgalagadi area produces ecosystem services which benefit 
the broader society.
77
 In fact, the area provides a wide variety of ecosystem services ranging 
from medicinal plants, wild fruits, fuel wood, water, grazing (i.e. provisioning services); 
erosion control, climate regulation (i.e. regulating services); Camel thorn trees (i.e. 
supporting services); to eco-tourism, cultural and spiritual benefits (i.e. cultural services). 
While most visitors to the area mostly enjoy the recreational amenities, the Kgalagadi dryland 
ecosystem enables local communities, especially the Khomani San, to practice their culture 
and heritage.
78
 Most important to note is that some of the ecosystem services from the area 
are produced on land owned by the Khomani San (i.e. their communal land and the portion of 
the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) which was allocated to them under land restitution).  
 
The economic importance of the dryland ecosystem services in the Kgalagadi area is 
generally unknown, as is the distribution of benefits from use of the ecosystem services. This 
information can be obtained from an economic valuation of ecosystem services. Most of the 
ecosystem services are not sold on actual markets hence their economic valuation requires the 
use of non-market valuation techniques. Economic valuation of non-traded environmental 
resources is underpinned by the same principle as valuation of any marketed goods and 
services in that the main aim is to quantify the benefits that people obtain from their services. 
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 According to the MEA (2005) an ecosystem is a dynamic complex community of plants, animals, and smaller 
organisms and the non-living environment, interacting as a functional. An ecosystem service is a direct benefit 
that people obtain from ecosystems. Ecosystem services are classified into provisioning (e.g. production of 
food); regulating (climate regulating); supporting (e.g. Crop pollination); and cultural services (spiritual and 
recreational benefits).  
78
 The Khomani San and Mier communities are located in the Mier Municipality. Livelihood strategies in this 
area traditionally combine pastoralism, hunting and gathering. The status of the dryland ecosystem affects the 












Valuation of ecosystem services is not only of economic interest, but also has social and 
political implications, particularly in cases of land restitution in South Africa where policy 
makers ought to keep track of whether the intended outcomes have been achieved. This is 
particularly true in the case where public investment is needed to uplift rural communities 
and where additional sources of income for the local communities are urgently required. This 
suggests that the economic valuation of ecosystem services can demonstrate to decision-
makers how maintaining public conservation investments can benefit beneficiaries of land 
restitution. 
 
This study assesses the economic value of ecosystem services in the Kgalagadi area in an 
attempt to (i) establish the economic importance of conservation in the area, (ii) identify the 
beneficiaries of ecosystem services in this area, and (iii) assess the distribution of such 
benefits to the local communities especially the Khomani San. The economic value of 
ecosystem services computed for the local communities can complement the value of 
resource extraction calculated by other studies such as Thondhlana et al., (2011) to derive a 
full environmental income measure.  
 
This study seeks to value ecosystem services in the Kgalagadi area by applying the Choice 
Experiment (CE) technique and thereafter assess the potential for ecosystem services to 
contribute to the Khomani San livelihoods through a payment for ecosystem services (PES) 
scheme. By assessing the dryland ecosystems in the study area, we acknowledge the 
importance of these systems; seek to understand the trade-off between non-consumptive use 
and conservation through use of market instruments in a manner that will incentivise the 
locals and visitors to utilize these assets sustainably. Given the levels of biodiversity 
degradation in the area and sustainability considerations, there is a need to harness greater 
roles for local communities in conservation in the Kgalagadi area. The value of particular 
attributes can be used as a starting point in the negotiations about price between demanders 
and suppliers of the service. Should these ecosystems services be proved to emanate from 
restituted land and that they benefit non-owners, then it can be argued that there be setting up 
of a PES scheme to generate rewards for local communities’ role in conservation.  
 
The reasons for rarely applying PES programmes in this field include the un-competitiveness 












estimates. The PES concept is expanding both in academic and in policy circles. Dedication 
of Ecological Economics and Environmental and Development Economics to PES is evidence 
of this expansion. Furthermore, the United State Department of Agriculture recently created 
an Office of Ecosystem Services and Markets to create “new technical guidelines and science 
based methods to assess environmental service benefits which will in turn promote markets 
for ecosystem services, including carbon trading to mitigate climate change (Liu et al., 
2010)”.  
 
The CE approach is an ideal method for valuing individual attributes of ecosystems, in 
addition to estimating the total value of the environmental asset as a whole. There are 
different categories of land and land tenure in the Kgalagadi area, and there are different 
categories of beneficiaries from the ecosystem services in that area. The CE approach is 
therefore preferred as it can help unravel the different values assigned to specific ecosystem 
services by their suppliers and demanders. According to Liu et al., (2010) valuation of this 
natural capital is an attempt to provoke stakeholders to acknowledge ecosystems contribution 
and significance. 
 
Although there are several studies that have used CE for valuation, its application in dryland 
ecosystems with contractual parks involving local communities is limited, if not unavailable. 
This paper contributes to the scant literature on estimation of values of dryland ecosystem 
services by both tourists and indigenous communities using CE, and is the first application of 
its kind to be undertaken in South Africa. 
 
5.2. Literature review  
Most ecosystem services are neither rival nor excludable and are likely to be subjected to 
market failure. The implication of this failure is that markets cannot send the appropriate 
price signals to determine the suitable provision of ecosystem services. It is for this reason 
that a variety of methods have been developed to value ecosystem services, including non-
monetary valuation methods, such as ecosystem benefit indicators, and environmental and 
natural resource methods (Liu et al., 2010). 
 
Valuation of environmental and natural resources has come a long way since the first work 












and the TCM. Since then, valuation of non-market goods and/or services has been attempted 
in many fields, such as environmental and health studies, and transport and public 
infrastructure disciplines.  
 
There has been long recognition of the need for valuation techniques that enable the 
estimation of values for specific attributes of ecosystems. The choice experiment (CE) 
method has emerged as the panacea as it allows for multi-attribute valuation. As a valuation 
technique, the CE is deemed as a more generalized version of the single attribute 
dichotomous choice CVM. Indeed both CE and CVM are considered as stated preference 
valuation methods (Adamowicz et al., 1998).  
 
The CE technique was initially developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982) and Louviere and 
Woodworth (1983) as conjoint analysis in a multi-attribute preference elicitation format in 
marketing literature (Louviere et al., 2000). Despite similarity to conjoint analysis, choice 
experiments have a more direct link with economic theory. The approach has its roots in 
Lancaster’s profile of value, as well as in random utility theory and experimental design 
(Adamowicz et al., 1998a; 1999).  
 
Lancaster’s theory of derived utility implies that a consumer’s satisfaction is defined over a 
bundle of attributes of a purchased good or service (Gravelle and Rees, 1992). As a result of 
budget considerations, a change in price can lead to a discrete switch from one bundle of 
services to another that is consistent with cost-efficiency combination of attributes. The link 
between the Lancasterian theory of value and consumer demand models for discrete choices 
enhances the understanding of the underlying theory of choice experiments (Hanemann, 1984 
and 1999).  
 
The CE approach combines elements of experimental design, survey questionnaires, and 
discrete choice modelling to produce estimates of demand as a function of attributes of the 
services and/or goods and alternatives (Naidoo and Adamowicz, 2005). A study by 
Adamowicz et al., (1998) was the first study to use this technique (CE) to value non-market 
environmental services. Ever since, there have been a noteworthy and ever-increasing 












An increase in the application of CE can be attributed to various reasons ranging from the 
technique’s capability to minimize some potential bias of the CVM; more information is 
elicited from each respondent relative to CVM; and the prospect of testing for internal 
consistency (Alpizar, 2002). For example, several studies conducted in the past 15 years 
show that CE has many advantages over the CVM. A study by Boxall et al. (1996) about 
moose hunting found that CE’s were more appropriate than CVM when substitution effects 
were important.  
 
However, one possible disadvantage compared to a CVM may be that because CE surveys 
are detailed, they can be more challenging for respondents or they may make potential 
respondents less likely to participate (Raheem et al., 2009). Furthermore, a study by 
Adamowicz et al. (1998) showed that CE has the same problem of negative welfare measures 
as the CVM. The challenge of negative welfare measures was familiar from the CVM 
literature. The subsequent CE studies that followed have tried in different ways to address or 
minimize this problem. A study by Haffen et al., (2005) applied different hurdle models to 
differentiate serial nonparticipants from other respondents, while Carlsson and Kataria (2005) 
developed a spike model where demanders are distinguished from non-demanders. The use of 
these models can go some way to minimizing the problem posed by negative welfare 
measures. 
 
CE design primarily involves four steps, firstly defining the service to be valued with regard 
to its attributes and the levels these attributes take; followed by experimental design; 
questionnaire design; and sample choice. According to Hearne and Salinas (2002) by 
soliciting people’s preferences for distinct hypothetical packages involving different levels of 
each respective attribute, including price, welfare measures and values can be estimated. 
 
According to Raheem et al., (2009) each attribute contributes to the overall utility that an 
individual derives from the good or service in question. The fundamental idea of a CE is to 
assess how people simultaneously make trade-offs given a multitude of attributes. The fact 
that people have different beliefs and preferences results in them choosing different options, 













In a CE study, given a hypothetical setting, a respondent is asked to select their most 
preferred alternative among a choice set (set of alternatives) and are asked to repeat this 
choice for several sets. The alternatives involve different combinations of attribute levels 
(Kataria, 2007). By assessing the choices made by individuals, it is possible to reveal the 
driving factors which influence their choice (Campbell et al, 2007). For a more detailed 
overview of CE’s, refer to Louviere et al. (2000) and Alpizar et al. (2003). 
 
Given the nature of choice data generated from surveys, the CE method usually uses 
probabilistic choice models such as the logit, probit and conditional logit to generate welfare 
measures (Kataria, 2007). CE-generated welfare estimates are consistent with utility 
maximisation and demand theory because the econometric analysis is based on a random 
utility model that exactly parallels the theory of rational, probabilistic choice (Bateman et al., 
2003). The basis for random utility theory is the hypothesis that respondents will make 
choices based on the profile of the good or service along with some degree of randomness 
(Snowball et al., 2008). This randomness can be attributed to either a component of random 
preferences of the respondent or the incomplete information set that is made available to the 
respondent by the researcher. 
 
The researcher can make use of a set of observed discrete choices to determine different 
marginal values for each attribute used in explaining the policy alternatives, instead of a 
single value for the whole policy scenario (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007). The possibility of only 
getting the latter is considered as a constraint of the CVM, which unlike the CE’s is not able 
to trace out the underlying WTP for each attribute. Nonetheless, the efficiency of the multi-
attribute estimates relies on the choice of experimental designs i.e. how attributes and 
attribute levels are combined to create synthetic alternatives and eventually choice sets to 
provide as much information on the model parameters. 
 
5.3. Methodology 
In generating the choice sets for use in the survey, there are a number of design decisions 
which researchers need to make. These include whether to use main effects or interactive 
effects; generic or specific alternative titles; and the sample size. There are now several 












study was modelled using SPSS. The sub-sections below go through each of the design 
options and motivate the decisions which were adopted.  
 
5.3.1. Main effects vs. interactive effects  
The Kgalagadi area produces ecosystem services which benefit both local communities and 
visitors. Instead of finding the value of the whole ecosystem, this study seeks to value 
selected ecosystem services from the point of view of both local communities and visitors. In 
implementing the CE method, we specify seven attributes associated with the Kgalagadi 
ecosystem for local communities and visitors, namely Camel thorn trees (X1), seeing 
predators (X2), bush food/recreational restrictions (X3), medicinal plants (X4), traditional 
hunting (X5), grazing opportunities (X6) and the bid vehicle (X7). The simple choice model 
would evaluate design i in terms of: 
 
                                                                                                               (5.1) 
 
This is known as a main-effects design as it ignores interactive effects. Ignoring interactive 
effects is synonymous with settling on a first-order approximation of the true model 
(Louviere, 1988). Thus, by estimating the model with main-effects only we are making an 
implicit assumption that all the interaction effects are insignificant. The model with main-
effects only has the benefit of significantly reducing the number of treatment combinations 
required. However, this benefit comes at a cost since each treatment combination represents a 
separate piece of information, and by using only a fraction of possible treatment 
combinations, we are in effect throwing away a significant amount of information (Hensher 
et al., 2005). All the same, main-effects designs tend to account for as much as 80% of the 
explained variance in choice models. Thus, it is generally believed that a simple main-effects 
design predicts choices fairly well (Reed et al., 2007) and is therefore adequate for the task at 
hand. 
 
5.3.2. Generic versus specific alternative designs  
A distinction is generally made between generic and alternative specific titles. A generic title 
(such as Alternative 1, 2, 3) does not convey any information to the decision maker 
(respondent) other than that its position as one of the alternatives. When the alternatives are 












alternative specific experiments (Alpizar et al., 2001; Hensher et al., 2005). Generic 
experiments have the benefit of not requiring the identification and use of all alternatives 
within the universal set of alternatives (Hensher et al., 2005).  
 
Since we are interested in the trade-offs made by respondents between attributes, we focus on 
a generic main-effects model (i.e. without interaction effects) and therefore the degrees of 
freedom )(df  are calculated as ALdf   where A  denotes the number of attributes and L  
refers to the number of levels of attributes. Treatment combinations (i.e. the number of 
parameters which we would like to estimate) should be greater than or equal to df . 
Furthermore, one additional degree of freedom is needed to account for the random error 
component of the model (Hensher et al., 2005).  
 
5.3.3. Determining the sample size  
Given a desired list of attributes and attribute levels, we can apply the following rule of 
thumb to calculate the sample size needed for the CE survey:  
               





 500                                                            (5.2) 
 
where N is the sample size, NLEV is the largest number of levels in any attribute, NALT is the 
number of alternatives per choice set, and NREP is the number of choice sets/questions per 
respondent. Therefore, a suitable experimental design requires a number of initial judgments 
on the number of levels of attributes, the number of alternatives per choice set, and the 
number of choice sets per respondent. Generally, it has been found that the number of 
alternatives and the number of attribute levels do not have significant effects on eventual 
estimates (Johnson et al., 2006). Taking lessons from literature and the circumstances in the 
study area, the following decisions were made: the largest number of levels in any attribute is 
4, the number of alternatives per choice set is 3, and each respondent is presented with 4 
choice sets. Therefore, applying the formula to our CE design yields a sample size of 208 for 
the local communities and 104 for the visitors.  
 
In making the decisions stated above we had to consider issues around level balance and 












level. Our design is balanced in that each level occurs equally often within each attribute 
which therefore means that the intercept is orthogonal to each effect. This essentially ensures 
that we obtain the most information possible about each individual parameter. Introducing 
imbalance is undesirable as it would increase the information we obtain about one particular 
parameter at the expense of another (Johnson et al., 2006). When every pair occurs equally 
often across all pairs of factors, the design is orthogonal. Balanced orthogonal designs are 
desirable as they are 100% efficient and optimal. 
 
5.3.4. Generating the choice sets  
It should be note that the experimental design for both local communities and visitors 
requires seven attributes at 4 levels each. So the full factorial design is given as
1638447 AL . This is just for one of the alternatives. If we however estimate a fractional 
factorial main-effects design we need a minimum of 22 degrees of freedom which 
corresponds to 22 choice sets i.e. 217)74(  ALdf  and adding 1 degree of 
freedom for the error term gives 22 degrees of freedom. However, if we wish to maintain 
orthogonality, the search for an orthogonal array reveals that we need 32 treatment 
combinations. These are far more manageable than 1,638,487 treatment combinations for a 
full factorial design. This is termed a saturated design - the smallest design that can be made. 
More importantly, a saturated design does not need to be the recommended design but 
provides some context for the recommended design size (Kuhfeld, 2010). A search for an 
orthogonal design yields one with 32 choice sets. Each of the designs is orthogonal - every 
pair of levels occur the same number of times across all of the pairs of factors in each design. 
For example the design for each of the 22 pairs appears once across the seven pairs of factors. 
 
In order to create the choice sets from the levels combinations, we use the technique of 
cyclical design (i.e. shifting). We first produce the 32 combinations for the experimental 
design using SPSS. These combinations define the first profile (alternative) in each of the 32 
choice sets. From this we create additional alternatives in each choice set by cyclically adding 
alternatives to the set. For example, the levels of these added attributes add one to the level of 
the previous alternative. When the highest level is attained, the level of the attribute is set to 













Creating the choice sets this way ensures that there is no overlap in attributes (by 
construction).
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 When attributes do not vary in a choice set, the researcher does not obtain 
any information about respondent trade-off preferences from that observation. Clearly, this is 
not a good feature for choice set design, and we will generally want to minimize its 
occurrence (Johnson et al., 2006; Chrzan and Orme, 2000). 
 
5.3.5. Optimal (or statistically efficient) designs  
The designs that SPSS ordinarily produces are known as orthogonal fractional factorial 
designs. Recently, researchers have suggested that from a statistical perspective, experimental 
designs underlying stated preference tasks should impart the maximum amount of 
information about the parameters of the attributes relevant to each specific choice task, 
something that cannot be guaranteed with an orthogonal fractional factorial design. This has 
resulted in the introduction of a class of designs known as optimal or statistically efficient 
designs (Hensher and Rose, 2007).  
 
By construction, orthogonal fractional factorial designs are such that the attributes of the 
design are statistically independent (i.e. uncorrelated). Orthogonality between the design 
attributes represents the foremost criterion in the generation process; the statistical efficiency 
of the design is rarely considered. Thus, while optimal designs optimize the amount of 
information obtained from a design, the construction process for orthogonal fractional 
factorial designs minimizes to zero the correlations evidenced within a design. Optimal 
designs will be statistically efficient but will likely have correlations; orthogonal fractional 
factorial designs will have no correlations but may not be the most statistically efficient 
design available. Hence, the type of design generated reflects the belief of analysts as to what 
is the most important property of the constructed design (Hensher et al., 2005).  
 
In determining what constitutes the most statistically efficient design, the literature has 
tended towards designs which maximize the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix, 
otherwise known as the Fisher information matrix of the model to be estimated. Such designs 
are known as D-optimal designs. In determining the D-optimal design, it is usual to use the 
inversely related measure to calculate the level of D-efficiency – that is, minimize the 
determinant of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix. The determinant of the inverse 
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of the variance-covariance matrix is known as D-error and will yield the same results 
maximizing the determinant of the variance–covariance matrix (Hensher et al., 2005). 
 
Although D-optimal design is appropriate, we used the orthogonal fractional factorial designs 
as we believe that orthogonality (variation of the attributes should be uncorrelated) is of 
paramount importance. Thus, we are mainly interested in estimating the linear main effects, 
effect of each attribute on utility and not interaction between them. The final design used in 
the study was balanced and orthogonal. 
 
5.4. Choice modelling framework for Kgalagadi dryland ecosystem services  
For the purposes of data collection, two different questionnaires were formulated. The 
questionnaire used for visitors differs from the one administered to local communities. 
Nonetheless, both questionnaires
80
 generally seek to gather information on general attitudes 
to ecosystem services, the choice modelling scenario and socio-economic characteristics. A 
total of eight versions of the questionnaires were finally produced. These were then divided 
to give eight blocks, allocation of respondents to a particular block were randomized. An 
equal amount of respondents were required to answer each version.  
 
Visitors are defined as those who had come to the Kgalagadi area for purposes of tourism 
particularly entering the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. The attraction of this semi-arid area is 
based on an assortment of natural and cultural attributes, which collectively contribute to 
visitor experience.  
 
In the choice modelling framework, the focus is on attributes of Kgalagadi ecosystem 
services that are deemed important. The attributes and attribute levels are developed based on 
reviews of the literature, personal observation spanning from 2009 to 2011, communications 
with stakeholders and other researchers working in the study area. The attribute descriptions 
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 Two major concerns with respect to the study’s validity exist. First, whether the questions included in the 
questionnaire was tested for validity. Second, if an internal assessment was conducted to test content and 
construct validity. One of the shortfalls of this study is that the questionnaire did not ask respondents which 
attributes they put greatest weight on when choosing between alternatives. Therefore we cannot shed light on 
compensatory decision-making or the lack thereof. Nonetheless, the questionnaire used in the survey underwent 















 are shown in questionnaire shown in the appendix. However, Table 5.1 
shows one of the typical choice sets presented to visitors: 
 
Table 5.1: A typical choice set presented to visitors
82
  
Attribute Status Quo Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Camel thorn trees 6.75 kg 6.75 kg 9 kg 
Predator 448 700 1050 
Recreational restriction No Restrictions 
No Restrictions Wilderness Experience & 
Primitive 
Medicinal plants 0.3 kg 1.2 kg 0.3 kg 
Bushman cultural 
heritage 2 months 
4 months 6 months 
Grazing opportunities 719 large stock KTPs 958 large stock KTPs 1198 large stock KTPs 
Levy R 0 R 150 R 200 
Your Choice (tick)    
 
Our choice set entails asking respondents to choose between two possible alternatives to 
enhancing ecosystem services preservation, and the status quo (SQ). The SQ is the base line 
for valuation. Alternative options to the status quo would entail a cost to the households. 
However, the subtle message is the status quo is that while no payment would be required for 
it, the ecosystem would naturally continue to be under severe pressure going forwards.  
 
The inclusion of the status quo option may mean that respondents may always select the 
status quo option, which suggest that they apply a simple decision rule and have failed to 
make the necessary trade-offs. As a result, the information on trade-offs is lost if individuals 
prefer the status quo for all choices, but this is also more realistic in terms of generating 
policy-relevant results. Therefore, it is crucial that a test is performed to check for status quo 
bias, see table 5.2 below: 
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 As far as the data setup is concerned, it should be noted that there is no dummy coding of quantitative 
variables (i.e. camel thorn trees, predator, medicinal plants, bushmen cultural heritage and grazing 
opportunities). Instead, the actual values are used. It should be noted that a dummy coding of qualitative 
variables (i.e. recreational) is undesirable. Hensher et al. (2005) provide compelling reasons for the use of 
effects coding as opposed to dummy coding in CE studies (one being the issue of confounding), hence, effects 
coding is used for qualitative variables (i.e. recreational attribute). Only the analyses for park visitors are 
affected. 
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 One of the major content validity issues in CE is that of scenario design (i.e. whether the attributes and their 
levels described in an understandable and clear manner), hence we undertook a pilot study prior to finalizing the 
questionnaire. For example, in the case of the predator attribute, the levels were defined both as the chance of 
viewing predators and the absolute number of predator at a waterhole. Our observation from the fieldwork is 












Table 5.2: Choice frequencies for local communities   
Choice Frequency Percent 
Alternative 1 353 42 
Alternative 2 408 49 
Status Quo 71 9 
   
Total 832  
 
Table 5.2 shows the number of times each alternative was chosen (out of 208 x 4 choice sets 
= 2 496 choice sets across all respondents), and shows that the status quo was chosen 9% of 
the time. Nine percent of local communities chose the status quo, and so preferred to leave 
the ecosystem as it is which would naturally continue to be under severe pressure going 
forward. Although a bias towards the status quo appears, it is insignificant. This suggests an 
insignificant status quo bias. Therefore, the local communities have demonstrated that they 
have not applied a simple decision rule and conclude that there have made the necessary 
trade-offs. 
 
Table 5.3: Choice frequencies for Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park visitors  
Choice Frequency Percent 
Alternative 1 238 57 
Alternative 2 178 43 
Status Quo 0 0 
   
Total 416  
 
Table 5.3 shows the number of times each alternative was chosen (out of 104 x 4 choice sets 
= 1 248 choice sets across all respondents), and shows there was no status quo bias (was 
never chosen at all). This implies that the park visitors preferred enhancing ecosystem 
services preservation. Therefore, there is no status quo bias. We conclude that the park 














5.5. The economic model  
The main aim of our analysis is to estimate welfare measures. To be more specific, we intend 
to obtain the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) or marginal willingness to pay (MWTP). 
In order to evaluate the welfare effects of changes in the attributes, information regarding 
visitors’ and locals’ preferences for attributes of the Kgalagadi dryland ecosystem services is 
needed. According to Bennett (1999), the MRS between attributes can be estimated by 
modelling how respondents switch their preferred alternative in response to changes in the 
attribute levels. Note that we assume a linear utility function: 
 
                                                            Where                                   (5.3) 
 
Our goal is to express the monetary value respondent k attaches to a change in attribute i. In 
the case of small changes, we can approximate changes in v:  
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By setting        we can solve the equation for    .  
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                                                          (5.5) 
 
The MRS or MWTP between an attribute and money is: 
  
                                           
    
       
   
  
   
 
                                                 (5.6) 
 
Thus marginal values are estimated from the MRS between a coefficient    and the 
coefficient for the price parameter,   (i.e. amount visitors would be willing to forego to 
conserve dryland ecosystems). By using the monetary attribute (cost to the respondent), we 
are able to estimate the average individual’s MWTP. Note that, since this is a ratio, the scale 
parameters cancel each other out. Therefore, we can compare across models. A vital point to 
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note is that this welfare measure is not comparable to welfare estimates from CVM-generated 
estimates for the whole good as this is the MWTP for one attribute only (Carlsson, 2008).  
 
There are two sources of variation (Haab and McConnell, 2002): variation across individuals 
and uncertainty from the randomness of parameters. There is no preference uncertainty since 
the error term does not enter the MRS expression. Variation across individuals can be 
obtained by including socio-economic factors which are interacted with the attributes. This 
makes it possible to obtain an average individual MRS for the various socio – economic 
groups. A point to note is that interaction with the alternative specific constant (ASC) does 
not affect MWTP. According to Krinsky and Robb (1986), for policy purposes it is of interest 
that we obtain the distribution of the welfare effects. Uncertainty from the randomness of 
parameters can be handled in various ways: using the Delta method, Bootstrapping, or the 
Krinsky-Robb method. 
 
To illustrate the basic model behind the CE presented here, consider a Kgalagadi visitor or 
local resident’s choice for a dryland ecosystem conservation initiative and assume that utility 
depends on choices made from a set C, i.e., a choice set, which includes all the possible 
conservation options. The representative visitor is assumed to have a utility function of the 
form: 
 
                                                                                                                      (5.7) 
 
where for any respondent i, a given level of utility will be associated with any ecosystem 
conservation alternative j, V is a nonstochastic utility function and   is a random component. 
Utility (   ) derived from any of the conservation alternatives is assumed to depend on the 
attributes (Z), such as probability of seeing predators and recreational restrictions. The 
attributes may be viewed differently by different individuals, whose socio-economic profiles 
will affect utility.  
 
The Conditional Logit Model (CL) has been the work-horse model in CE. The main reason is 
simplicity to estimate. However, the last 10 years or so has seen a rapid development of other 












Given that the CL is restrictive (Alpizar et al., 2001), we also consider a number of 
extensions. These extensions “solve” different shortfalls encountered in the CL models. 
 
The Mixed Logit Models (ML) and Latent Class Model (LCM) are such extensions which 
can approximate any random utility model (McFadden and Train, 2000). The former avoids 
the limitations of the CL as the alternatives are not assumed to be independent, i.e. the model 
does not exhibit IIA, there is an explicit account for unobserved heterogeneity in taste by 
modelling the distribution and it is possible to extend this to panel data. Thus, the stochastic 
component of the indirect utility function for alternative i and individual k is now 
decomposed into two parts: one deterministic and in principle observable, and one random 
and unobservable (Carlsson et al., 2003): 
 
                                                                                                    (5.8) 
 
Where β is the ASC which captures the effects on utility of any attributes not included in the 
choice specific ecosystem preservation initiative attributes. The coefficient vector can be 
expressed as           where the first term expresses population mean and the second is 
the individual deviation that represents the visitors and local’s taste relative to the average 
tastes in the respective population groups. Now we assume that the error term        IID type 
I extreme value, in which case the model is now referred to as a ML (or random parameter 
logit - RPL) (Alpizar et al., 2001). The individual deviation term is a random term with mean 
zero. It can take on a number of distributional forms such as normal, lognormal, or triangular. 
This also determines the distribution of  . If           (the model) aims to estimate the 
density function with the two moment’s b and w (note that the average individual deviation is 
estimated). We now assume that the individual coefficients (the preferences) vary in the 
population with a distribution with density: 
 
                                                  (β | Ɵ)                                                                              (5.9) 
 
First we can illustrate the choice probabilities for a given set of preferences (beta vector). 
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A point to note is that the researcher cannot condition on unknown preferences. The 
unconditional probability is the integral of the standard logit probabilities over all possible 
values of beta.  
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The choice probability in mixed logit is a weighted average of the logit formula at different 
values of beta, with the weights given by the density ƒ (beta). The estimation is more 
complex since the integrals cannot be evaluated analytically (i.e. open-form). Thus gradient-
based optimization method (such as Newton-Raphson or BFGS) cannot be applied unless we 
can express the probabilities to choose the alternatives. As a result of this difficulty, we rely 
on some type of simulation method, called maximum simulated likelihood. These estimation 
techniques were developed in the past decade or so (see Hensher and Greene, 2003). 
Moreover, the computer capacity has of course improved dramatically. The simulated 
maximum likelihood technique simply replaces the     |   argument in the likelihood 
function, which lacks closed form solution, with its simulated counterpart    . Our aim is to 
estimate the moments (b,W) of the distribution θ: 
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In a nutshell, from a given distribution θ, a draw of the individual specific values of β is 
taken. From each draw we approximate the choice probability using the standard logit. The 
mean of Z such draws is the approximate choice probability for individual k, denoted Lk.  
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This by construction is the unbiased estimator of     |  . The simulated log likelihood is 
then where subscript n index sampled individuals. The maximum simulated likelihood 












search given some starting values. In terms of determining the parameters which should have 
a random distribution, we opt to keep only the cost parameter fixed, as is common procedure 
in this kind of analysis. The implication of such an approach is that we know the distribution 
of the MRS and as a result avoid exploding MRS’s.  
 
Determining the distribution of each parameter is very tricky because economic theory has 
very little to offer to guide these decisions (see Hensher and Greene, 2003). A point to note in 
these RPL models is the assumption with regard to the distribution of each random 
parameter. Normal distribution and log-normal distribution are the two common 
formulations. The log-normal distribution stands out due to its restriction that all respondents 
have the same sign of the coefficients. However, we know that the log-normal distribution 
can have a huge impact i.e. mean WTP. Moreover, a log-normal distribution imposes a 
positive preference on everyone. Therefore if one expects a negative preference, one needs to 
estimate the model with the negative values of that attribute. Thus, caution should be 
exercised when using this distribution.  
 
Recent applications of the RPL models seem to suggest that this technique is superior to the 
CL models of overall fit and welfare estimates (Breffle and Morey, 2000; and Carlsson et al., 
2003). In this paper, the RPL model (see Greene and Hensher, 2010; Carlsson et al., 2010; 
Scarpa et al., 2011) and marginal effects are estimated using LIMDEP 9 NLOGIT 4 (see 
Greene 1993, 1998). 
 
In LCM’s, heterogeneity is cast as a discrete distribution, a specification based on the idea of 
endogenous taste segments (Bhat, 1997; Wedel and Kamakura, 2000). The sample consists of 
a finite number of groups of individuals (i.e. segments), each assumed to consist of 
homogeneous tastes. However, tastes and hence utility functions can vary among segments. 
The advantage of using this technique is its ability to explain the taste variation across 
individuals conditional on the probability of membership to a latent segment. The 
fundamental idea behind the LCM analysis is simple, that some of the parameters of a 
postulated statistical model differ across unobserved subgroups. These subgroups form the 
categories of a categorical latent variable (Vermunt and Magidson, 2002).  
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With C classes the basic choice probability is: 
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The class membership probabilities, P(c), and the class-specific betas to be estimated in the 
model. P(c) is normally estimated using multinomial logit specification with or without 
covariates.  
 
The ratio of choice probabilities between two alternatives in a choice set is unaffected by 
what other alternatives that are available in the choice set and the levels of the attributes of 
the other alternatives. This requirement may or may not be satisfied, in many cases not. 
Violations of IIA imply error heterogeneity resulting from omitted variable bias (see 
McFadden, 1986), applying the CL model assumes that the CL model is the true model in the 
application of interest and that IIA is fulfilled (Carlsson, 2008). If there is a violation of this 
assumption, then the HEV or RPL models can also be estimated and reported.  The Hausman-
McFadden test for IIA violation should be performed (1984). 
 
5.6. Data collection and descriptive statistics 
A face-to-face survey was undertaken in May 2012 in the broader Kgalagadi area in an 
attempt to determine how preferences for particular dryland areas are formed. A survey 
instrument was prepared in both English and Afrikaans. English and Afrikaans speaking 
survey enumerators were recruited from among university students and residents in the study 
area. These enumerators were trained and supervised. The survey
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 attempted to measure 
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 As indicated earlier, the payment vehicle was tested beforehand to ensure its credibility. The fact that most 
respondents especially park visitors believes that the government should pay for conservation does not imply 
that the use of a special fund did not convince respondents to pay. These policies (resource use restrictions) 
cannot be implemented without proper funding. The San communities alone cannot fund these activities. 
Evidence from the literature suggests that the contingent valuations conducted in poor communities in 
developing countries have used labour contributions (i.e. willingness to contribute labour) as opposed to 
financial ones – which appear more credible, practical and realistic. In contrast, a study on valuation of 
biodiversity by the South African Khomani San (see Dikgang and Muchapondwa, 2012) shows that those who 
want to contribute labour also have a WTP>0. Therefore in-kind WTP responses were never used. It is on this 












what people think about dryland ecosystem services conservation in the Kgalagadi area in 
South Africa.  
 
For visitors, a survey was conducted with randomly picked park visitors (only park goers, and 
those who already paid to get to the park) at the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. Due to the vast 
size of the park, the surveys were mainly carried out at the gates, accommodation facilities 
and designated resting sites inside the park. Our sample composition is in line with the visitor 
profile at the park.  
 
For local individuals, randomly selected households were surveyed in the Khomani San and 
Mier communal land respectively. Sample size determination took into consideration the 
elicitation format, as well as the budget constraints. Two hundred and eight randomly 
selected households were interviewed. Given that only 120 Khomani San out of 320 
households were using the restituted land at the time of the survey, our sample size of 104 is 
representative of the San population. Thus, we restricted the San sample to those who could 
plausibly have taken up the offer to use Khomani San restituted land. In terms of the Mier, 
we made settlement maps, and identified each household. Then, we used a random function 
in Stata. Thereafter, we gave lists of household numbers and maps to enumerators including. 
 
During the interviews, a map of the Kgalagadi dryland ecosystem location and colour 
photographs were shown to each respondent and enumerators described the Kgalagadi 
dryland ecosystem, its location, ecological importance and enumerated the ecosystem 
services. 
 
The household heads were interviewed in each household. Where the respondents were 
household members other than the heads, their responses were interpreted as coming from the 
heads themselves. An introductory section explained to the respondents the context in which 
the choices were to be made and described each attribute and attribute levels, present status 
and hypothetical future status based on whether preservation action was taken or not. 
Moreover, respondents were told that there were no right or wrong answers, and that all 
answers were strictly confidential.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
study. Thus money WTP is not biased downwards. This implies that it was not necessary to use in-kind WTP 












A total of 312 were completed, of which one third were visitors. Of the remaining 208 
respondents, there were split equally between the Khomani San and Mier people. In addition 
to the CE questions, the survey gathered personal information of respondents to gain more 
insights about factors that affect the way people feel about dryland ecosystems. The 
information is used as explanatory variables to investigate heterogeneity in preferences. The 
descriptive statistics of the sub-samples are presented in Table 5.4: 
 
Table 5.4: Summary statistics of the respondents  
KGALAGADI LOCAL RESPONDENTS85 KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK VISITORS86 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Variable Mean Std.Dev. 
      
Harvest medicinal plants from 
communal land 
0.581       0.493      Willingness-to-pay land owners 
(San) to ensure there is continued 
provision of dryland ecosystem 
services  
0.394       0.489       
Collect bush-food from communal 
land 
0.533       0.499      Regular visitor  0.678       1.263      
Collect firewood from communal 
land 
0.856       0.351      Main attraction for visiting area – 
Birds  
0.982       0.135       
Make crafts  0.327       0.469       Main attraction for visiting area – 
Predators  
.030  0.170      
Involved in game farming  0.130       0.336      Main attraction for visiting area – 
Diversity of plains & Game  
0.962       0.190       
Involved in livestock farming   0.423       0.494       Main attraction for visiting area – 
Landscape  
0  .971       0.167       
Involved in traditional hunting  0.188       0.390 Main attraction for visiting area – 
Hiking Trails  
0.096  0.295       
Involved in tracking activities  0.163       0.369      Main attraction for visiting area – 
4X4 Drivers (Trails)  
0.115  0.320       
Undertake other activities in 
communal land 
0.048    0.214       Main attraction for visiting area – 
San Rock Engravings  
0  .115       0.320     
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 It is vital that we analyse the Khomani San’s preferences pertaining to activities that take place inside the park 
given that they have resource rights inside the park. This information will shed light on the local people’s 
attitudes towards conservation in the area as a whole. 
86
 It should be noted that the Khomani San people as co-owners of the park have resource rights inside the park. 
This implies that the San are entitled to collect medicinal plants, consider grazing opportunities inside the park 
and collect firewood. In fact, some of the San people are already collecting medicinal plants inside the park. 
Their actions will impact on visitor experience, hence it is vital that we assess their preferences. If the activities 
that locals want are in conflict with what tourists want, there will be a conflict. The conflict would be 
detrimental to conservation in the Kgalagadi area, hence it’s vital the visitor’s views about these potential 












Undertake activities in other areas  0.323       0.468       Main attraction for visiting area – 
Presence of San  
0.135       0.341      
Gender of respondent  0.361       0.480      Main attraction for visiting area – 
Other  
0.202       0.468      
Age of respondent  44.230              15.195       Actual number of nights spent at 
the Park  
7.606  5.321       
Responsible for paying household 
bills  
0  .683              0.476       Involved in tracking with the San 
people  
0  .077  0.267     
   
Household size  5.683              3.246      Buy crafts from the San  0  .126       0.332       
Involved in conservation in 
communal land  
0.221             0.415       Involved in taking photos with the 
San  
0.087   0.282      
Education years of respondent  6.697       3.879       Take photos with San in exchange 
for cash  
0  .029   0.167       
Respondent employment status 
(1=fulltime employment; 2=part-
time employment; 3=self-
employment; 4=fulltime student; 
5=part-time student; 6=retired; 
7=other) 
5.269       2.233       Visit the area again in 5 years  0  .726       0.446      
Household Income (Rands) 27 
019.20       
30 249.60      Gender of respondent 0  .486       0.500      
   Age of respondent 58.596       12.588       
   Responsible for paying household 
bills 
0  .808       0.394       
   Household size 2.394       1.139       
   What best describes where you 
currently live (1=city; 2=town; 
3=suburb; 4=small town; 5=farm; 
6=rural area) 
2.423       1.574       
   Education years of respondent 14.548       1.380       
   Respondent employment status 
(1=fulltime employment; 2=part-
time employment; 3=self-
employment; 4=fulltime student; 
5=part-time student; 6=retired; 
7=other) 
3.750       2.333       
   Household Income (Rands) 277 
692.00      
246 280. 
00     
 
Given that the livelihoods of the majority of the Kgalagadi dryland communities are based on 
the natural environment, it is not surprising that most are involved in firewood collection, 












percentage who reported participating in firewood collection is much higher than reported in 
previous studies (see Dikgang and Muchapondwa, 2012). One possible explanation is that the 
respondents collect more than usual during winter period, when the interviews were 
conducted. While the reason of having more respondents reporting to participate in firewood 
collection is because of the seasonality problem, that data were collected during the winter 
season could be correct, it should be noted that majority of the respondents are female (64%) 
whom by African traditions are the ones involved in firewood collection. Thus it is vital to 
control for this possibilities, or else the conclusion based on weather condition might be 
misleading.  
 
Given that the Kgalagadi local people are traditionally involved in livestock farming the 
significant number of livestock farmers reported in this study is consistent. Of particular 
interest is the fact that 81 percent of the San people interviewed were not involved in 
traditional hunting. According to Crawhall (2001), out of a wide-range of reasons, the 
creation of the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park (now incorporated within the KTP) in 1931 
was the most notable reason as to why the majority of the San people were forced to give up 
their hunting and gathering lifestyle to become farm workers. Only a few families remained 
in the park to work as labourers and trackers until they were also removed in the 1970s.  
 
Very few San people who are still more traditional, hunters and gathers are unable to hunt as 
much as they would like due to budget constraint. The San community leaders set hunting 
quotas every year during the hunting time. Hunting time is normally in winter, the hunting 
fee varies from R300 for a springbok to R600 for a Gemsbok. The San community members 
also have to pay if they want to hunt. Their fees are lower than for non-community members, 
R150 for a springbok to R300 for a Gemsbok. Nonetheless, due to their relatively low income 
levels, very few can afford the hunting fees. It should be noted that most seem to be affected 
by the modern development and life style that they are pushing away their traditional life 
style. 
 
Over half (64 percent) of the respondents were female. Most of the respondents indicated that 
there were persons in their households who paid the utility bills, with an average age of 44 
years. The average number of household members is 5.7 persons. On average, most of the 












indicated that there were not aware of any public preservation project within their communal 
land. The local respondents experienced high unemployment levels, 47 percent on average.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the park visitors reveal that most of the park visitors were not 
willing to pay the land owners (Khomani San) to ensure that there is continued provision of 
dryland ecosystem services in the broader area. One of the main reasons cited against such a 
scheme was that the money would be wasted, as well as that ecosystem preservation should 
be financed by the government. The abundance of animals, plants and the unique landscape 
was cited as the main reason for respondents visiting the study area, in particular the park. 
Approximately 68 percent of respondents were regular visitors to the park. Moreover, the 
majority indicated that they would visit the park again in the next 5 years.  
 
On average, Kgalagadi park visitors visited the park for about 7.6 nights. Our data show that 
there is limited interaction between the park visitors and Khomani San people. The most cited 
interaction is taking of photos with the San, with a mere 3 percent having been involved in 
this activity. In contrast to local communities, park visitors are much older, have a 
significantly smaller household size, have completed secondary school (15 years) and have a 
significantly higher disposable household income. About 49 percent of the respondents are 
male and 51 percent are female. A picture that also emerges is that only a mere 4.81 percent 
of the park visitors were unemployed, with 35.58 and 17.30 employed and self-employed 
respectively. It should be noted that the fact that majority of the interviewed local 
communities are female (64%), this kind of results should be expected. In most cases in 
Africa rural women do not have income and also they tend to be younger than males. 
 
5.7. Results and discussion 
In most cases, we observe respondents making several choices. Stated preference literature 
often assumes that preferences are stable over the experiment. As a result, the utility 
coefficients are allowed to vary among respondents but they are constant among the choice 
sets for each individual. In a case where we have ASCs that are randomly distributed, we 















 models where we take into consideration that respondents are making 
repeated choices related to the panel nature of the data. Although the RPL model can account 
for unobserved heterogeneity, the model is unable to identify the sources of heterogeneity 
(Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). The inclusion of interactions of respondent socio-economic 
characteristics with choice specific attributes and/or with ASC in the utility function is one 
way to detect the sources of heterogeneity while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
(Birol et al., 2006). Thus, we also estimate a RPL
88
 model with interactions.  
 
To make our results more robust, we employ the LCM as an alternative model for accounting 
for preference heterogeneity. The number of classes can be chosen by the researcher. To 
identify the optimal number of classes, statistical measures of fitness such as Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) or Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are commonly used. 
However, it is not clear whether the parameters of the classes are valid in a behavioural sense. 
 
Thus we estimate a CL, two RPL models and a LCM. RPL model results are obtained using 
Halton sequences used for simulations, based on 500 draws. The RPL model was estimated 
with all attributes being randomly and normally distributed. The choice of distribution and 
which parameters should be random is a difficult choice. There is hardly any model 
specification which shows a clear dominance. Nonetheless, a specification test was 
undertaken. We keep everything else beside the cost parameter fixed. There are several 
reasons for choosing the normal distribution.  
 
First, the normal distribution has been widely used and entails some convenience features. 
Second, in a situation where there are high parameter values, the probability that a value is on 
the `wrong' side is very low. Thus, the normal distribution can still be a good approximation 
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 Given that we want to use the RPL, we firstly run it and have all the attributes random (except the cost 
attribute). Then we check which of the standard deviations of the random attributes are significant. Thereafter, 
we run the RPL model again and have only those attributes with significant standard deviations random. Since if 
the standard deviations are not significant you do not have any unobserved heterogeneity in tastes of the 
respondents and there would be no need to have those attributes random.  
88
 It should be noted that because of the use of different distributions in the RPL models it would be more 
prudent to estimate implicit prices in the ‘willingness to pay space’. We have obliviously suggested an 
alternative approach. According to Carlsson (2008) a common practice is to keep the cost-coefficient fixed. 
Then we know the distribution of MRS and we avoid exploding MRS. An assumption about the distribution of 
the parameters implies a distribution of WTP. Given a fixed cost coefficient, the distribution of WTP is the same 
as for the attribute. Thus, we can talk about a population distribution of WTP, where the distribution is the 
distribution of preferences in the population. Again, this is NOT the distribution due to parameter uncertainty. 












(Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006; Sillano and de Dios Ortand, 2005). Third, given that at times 
the data is gathered in third world countries where illiterate respondents may make up a 
significant portion of the sample size, it is likely that due to limited understanding, the 
choices are made in an irrational way. Yet it is not possible to identify these `wrong' choices, 
it is likely that some respondents actually have positive parameters for cost. Hence, a wrong 
sign is a problem of data collection rather than of the statistical and behavioural assumptions 
(Sagebiel, 2011).  
 
Fourth, as this paper aims to compare the CL, RPL with the LCM, theoretical assumptions on 
the sign of the parameter do not play a major role. The LCM is also not restricted to one sided 
parameters, so why should the RPL be? Fifth, after estimating several models with different 
parameter distributions, the model with all parameters being normally distributed gives the 
best results. Finally, using different distributions that force the parameter to have a positive 
sign only leads to further challenges with interpretation and estimation (Sillano and de Dios 
Ortand, 2005). The parameter estimates for the CL, RPL model and LCM for the local 
respondents
89
 are reported in Table 5.5
90
. The attribute levels details are shown in Table 2.1 
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 Our data shows that the San people appear to be very poor and relatively uneducated.  The choice experiment 
by its nature is a complex technique which places a cognitive burden on respondents. This is correct, particularly 
given that the San were each exposed to 4 choice sets with 3 alternatives each, and that each alternative 
comprised of 7 attributes – a very complex experiment. Based on the evidence from the fieldwork, the San 
understood the choice scenarios, and the trade-offs. In the presence of evidence from the choice frequencies, the 
San respondents did not choose status quo option all the time. Moreover, a study on valuation of biodiversity by 
the San (see Dikgang and Muchapondwa, 2012) shows that despite their low education, the San understand 
complex environmental issues. 
90
 The problem of multicollinearity occurs when a strong linear relationship exists among the explanatory 
variables. A strong association between the explanatory variables makes it increasingly difficult to assess the 
impact of individual variables on the dependent variable. There are various techniques to check for the presence 
of multicollinearity. We checked for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factors for each of the 












Table 5.5: RPL, RPL with interactions and LCM – local communities
91
   
CL Model RPL Model RPL Model with 
Interactions 
LCM 
|Variable| Coefficient    
(s.e) 
|Variable| Coefficient    
(s.e) 
|Variable| Coefficient    
(s.e) 
|Variable| Coefficient    
(s.e) 
        
Alfa     1.001       









 Utility parameters in 
latent class -->> 1 
 
Cost        -0.009 ***   
(0.002)    
                          
Tree 1  -0.016       
(0.014)     
Tree 2  -0.096     






Alfa     -0.169    
(1.494) 
Tree 2 -0.012       
(0.012)      
Predator 1 0.000     
(.000)       
  Cost        -0.044 ***  
(.011) 
Tree 3 0.003        
(0.008)       
Bush food 1 0.534     





 Tree 1 0.112      
(.073) 
Predator 1 0.000      
(0.000)     
Medicinal 
plants 1 
0.707     
(.538)      
  Tree 2 0.169 *** 
 (.059) 
Predator 2  -0.000       
(0.000)      
Medicinal 
plants 3  
0.795     
(.506)      
Alfa     1.156 *** 
(.403) 
Tree 3 0.173 *** 
 (.048) 






(.001)      
Cost        -0.010 *** 
(.002)  
Predator 1 -0.006 ***  
(.001) 
Bush food 1 0.042        
(0.195)       
  Tree 1 -0.019     
(.016)  
Predator 2  -0.001      
(.001)  
Bush food 2  0.148       





 Tree 2 -0.014     
(.013)  
Predator 3  0.001 *** 
 (.001)  
Bush food 3  0.066        
(0.080)         
                      Tree 3 0.004      
(.009)  
Bush food 1 -1.307      
(1.004)     
Medicinal 
plants 1 
0.519 **      
(0.247)        
Alfa     0.610     
(1.036)       
Predator 1 0.000      
(.000)  
Bush food 2  0.780      
(.451) 
Medicinal 
plants 2  
0.278      
(0.218)      
Cost        -0.020 *** 
(.005)     
Predator 2  -0.000     
(.000)  




0.183       
(0.132) 
Tree 1 -0.014     
(.031)     
Predator 3  0.325      
(.383)  
Medicinal plants 1 0.204      
(1.088) 
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 Essentially, if IIA is satisfied then the ratio of choice probabilities should not be affected by whether another 
alternative is in the choice set or not. One way of testing IIA is to remove one alternative and re-estimate the 
model and compare the choice probabilities. Although you can test for IIA, for generic experiment we often get 
problems with attributes with little variation when we drop an alternative (Carlsson, 2008)). With our data we 














hunted 1  
-0.061       
(0.063)     
Tree 3 -0.006     
(.016)      
Medicinal 
plants 1 
0.104      
(.214) 




hunted 2  
-0.002        
(0.043)      
Predator 2  -0.001     
(.000)     
Medicinal 
plants 2  
0.226      
(.234)  




hunted 3  
 0.026       
(0.031)               
Predator 3  0.216     
(.695)       
Medicinal 
plants 3 
0.202      
(.144)  
Bushmeat traditionally 
hunted 1  





0.001 ***    
(0.000)      
Bush food 2  0.420     
(.285)      
Bushmeat 
traditionally 
hunted 1  
-0.097     
(.070)  
Bushmeat traditionally 






0.001 ***        
(0.000)     
Bush food 3  -0.015     
(.181)      
Bushmeat 
traditionally 
hunted 2  
-0.015     
(.045)  
Bushmeat traditionally 
hunted 3  





0.001 ***        
(0.000)      
Medicinal 
plants 2  
-0.476     
(.555)      
Bushmeat 
traditionally 
hunted 3  
0.017     
 (.033)  
Grazing Opportunities 1 0.002      
(.001) 
  Bushmeat 
traditionally 
hunted 1  
0.036     




0.001 ***  
(.000)  
Grazing Opportunities 2  0.003     
 (.001) 
  Bushmeat 
traditionally 
hunted 2  
0.094     






Grazing Opportunities 3  0.000     
 (.001)       
  Bushmeat 
traditionally 
hunted 3  
0.129     
(.091)      
    




(.001)      
Heterogeneity 
in mean,  
Parameter: 
Variable 
 Utility parameters in 
latent class -->> 2 
 




(.000)      
                     
    Gender      0.000      
(.000)  
Alfa     5.381     
(13.270)       





 Age     -0.206 *** 
(.850) 
Cost        0.049     
 (.109)  




Tree 1 -0.654      
(.738) 
  Tree level 2 0.546 ***  
(.265)      
















  Predator 1 0.287      






 Tree 3 -0.648      
(.871) 
  Bush food 1 0.554     
(2.149)       
  Predator 1 0.021      
(.018) 
  Medicinal 
plants 1 
3.166 *** 






Predator 2  0.002     
 (.003) 
  Medicinal 
plants 3  
3.166 *** 
(.950)   
  Predator 3  -0.002      
(.003)  





  Bush food 1 2.539      
(5.268)  
      Bush food 2  -3.470      
(4.498)      
      Bush food 3  -4.859     
 (6.469) 
      Medicinal plants 1 2.713      
(9.683) 
      Medicinal plants 2  -6.083      
(9.157) 
      Medicinal plants 3 3.073      
(2.733) 
      Bushmeat traditionally 
hunted 1  
-1.731     
 (2.465)      
      Bushmeat traditionally 
hunted 2  
-0.675     
 (.478) 
      Bushmeat traditionally 
hunted 3  
-0.292      
(1.262) 
      Grazing Opportunities 1 0.003     
 (.011) 
      Grazing Opportunities 2  -0.001      
(.010)  
      Grazing Opportunities 3  0.008      
(.006)      
        
      Class probabilities  
        
      PrbCls_1  0.578 ***  
(.015) 
      PrbCls_2  0.422 *** 
(.024)  
 
In the standard CL model, since the coefficients are confounded by scale parameter, we 












significance of the coefficients. From statistical point of view, a parameter is statistically 
significant if the probability of rejecting true null hypothesis is very low. In our case the null 
hypothesizes for each of the above estimated parameters are that the true parameter values of 
corresponding attributes is zero. This means that there is no relationship between the 
attributes and the outcome variable (probability of choosing an alternative containing that 
particular attribute). The sign of the parameter indicates the direction of the relationship 
between the attribute and likelihood of choosing the alternative, i.e., whether the probability 
of choosing an alternative increases or decreases when the level of the attribute increases or 
decreases. 
 
As shown in the second column of table 5.5 above, the coefficient of cost is negative as 
expected and it is significant at 1% level of significance. This means that, all else equal, an 
alternative with high cost is less likely to be chosen. Coefficients of grazing opportunities 1, 2 
and 3 are positive and significant at 1% level of significance. This implies that an alternative 
with these attributes is more likely to be chosen. This is consistent with the a priori positive 
expectation that people’s tendency to like an improved grazing condition of the farmland 
area. Similarly we can see from the column that the coefficient of medicinal plant 1 is 
positive and significant at the 5% level of significant which also suggests that the respondents 
are more likely to choose an alternative with this attribute.  
 
The output shown in column 4 is obtained by restricting the coefficients of Camel thorn trees 
2 (1.5 bundles), predator 1 (700 lions), bush food 1 (1 container), medicinal plants 1 (1 
container), medical plants 3 (2 containers) and grazing opportunities 1(958 large stock KTPs) 
attribute to be random and normally distributed. The randomness restriction suggests the 
presence of taste heterogeneity in the local sample for these 6 attributes. This limitation only 
holds if the estimated standard deviations are statistically significant. Our results show that 
there exists taste heterogeneity in the population for the tree 2, grazing opportunities 1, and 
medicinal plants 1 and 3 attributes. Our results indicate that the local people do not value the 
predator 1 and bush food 1 attributes differently. 
 
As for the rest of the results, Alfa is the ASC common for the new alternatives, its 
significance indicates the effect on respondents’ utility that is not captured by the attributes 












more likely that respondents choose one of the new alternatives instead of the status quo, 
ceteris paribus. Thus, our results show that the Kgalagadi local respondents are not 
supportive of the alternatives. As expected, the cost coefficient is negative, as well as 
significant. This implies that an alternative with high costs is unlikely to be chosen, ceteris 
paribus. Coefficients of grazing opportunities 2 and 3 are positive and significant. This 
implies that alternatives with these attributes are more likely to be chosen. Given that 
livestock farming is one of the main livelihood sources, it is not surprising that an alternative 
that includes maximization of grazing opportunities is preferred.  
 
In the sixth column, when sex, age and household size are interacted with the grazing 1 
attribute we assume that there is preference heterogeneity for this attribute across sex, age of 
respondents and household size. Indeed, our results show that the estimated mean interaction 
coefficients, GR Age and GR Household size, are statistically significant. All other estimated 
parameters can be interpreted in the same way as in column 1 (RPL model). 
 
As shown in Column 8, the first set of estimation results belong to class 1 and the second set 
belong to class 2. In this particular model, we assume that there are two distinct classes of 
choice behaviour or preferences. Our results suggest that 58 percent of individuals with 
similar choice behaviour belong to class 1 and 42 percent in class 2. Thus the majority of the 
respondents belong to class 1. Individuals belonging to class 1 are more likely to favour an 
improved stock of firewood (tree 2 and 3), a moderate to large increase in the chances of 
seeing predators (pred 1 and 3) and an improved stock of bush meat (sting 2 and 3) while the 
preferences of individuals in class 2 for these attributes are insignificant. 
 
CL, RPL and LCM models were used to obtain local respondents’ MWTP for continued 
provision of Kgalagadi dryland ecosystem services. The MWTP estimates are presented in 






































         
Tree 1 -1.88  1.534 - 4.073 Tree 2 -4.89      3.266 – 
10.07 
Male       0 .15  *** 0.045 – 
0.139 
Tree 2 -1.40  1.322 – 
4.076 
Predator 1 .018        0.022 – 
0.068 
Female 0.11  *** 0.036 – 
0.112 
Tree 3 0.296 0.911 – 
2.809 
Bush food 1 27.32       19.044 – 
58.72 
Whole   0.12  ***   0.037 – 
0.116 




36.16       24.887 – 
76.735 
   





plants 3  
40.68       23.706 – 
73.094 
   





***      
0.045 – 
0.139 
   
Bush food 1 4.84 21.414 – 
66.028 
Tree 1 -0.72       1.515 – 
4.671 
   
Bush food 2  17.01 14.943 – 
46.075 
Tree 3 -0.32        0.798 – 2.46    




Predator 2  -0.032        0.018 – 
0.056 







Predator 3  0.00  0.004 – 
0.012 
   
Medicinal 





Bush food 2  21.50  13.924 – 
42.932 
   
Medicinal 
plants 3 
21.14 15.654 – 
48.266 
Bush food 3  -0.79  8.902 – 
27.448 
   
Bushmeat 
traditionally 






plants 2  
-24.35       26.705 – 
82.341 
   
Bushmeat 
traditionally 







hunted 1  
1.85  8.335 – 
25.699 
   
Bushmeat 
traditionally 







hunted 2  






0.04 – 0.124 Bushmeat 
traditionally 
hunted 3  
6.59       4.385 – 
13.517 
   
Grazing 






Opportunities 2  
0.09  
***     








Opportunities 3  
0.10  
***    
0.031 – 
0.095 













In the table above, a positive sign suggests the MWTP for that particular attribute, holding 
everything else constant. In contrast, a negative sign implies WTA compensation for a 
change that brings about that particular attribute, holding everything else constant. The CL 
model shows that respondents are willing to pay R59.88 (US$7.06) for an alternative with 
medicinal plant 1 all else equal, R0.13 (US$0.02) for grazing 1 and R0.09 (US$0.01) each for 
grazing 2 and 3.  
 
The RPL model indicates that only the MWTP for grazing opportunities are positive and 
significant. For instance, local respondents are willing to pay R0.15 (US$0.02) to maintain 
the current carrying capacity of around 958 large stocks on Khomani San farmlands.  
 
From column 8 we can see that males are willing to pay slightly higher than females. Males 
have a MWTP of R0.15 (US$0.02) for a programme that maintains the current grazing 
carrying capacity of their farmland. Females have a MWTP of R0.11 (US$0.01) to remain on 
the same indifference curve. The MWTP for the whole local sample is R0.12 (US$0.01). The 
MWTP estimates for the LCM are presented in 5.7 below. 
 





   
Class 1  0.01        0.02 – 0.062 
Class 2  -0.16        0.303 – 0.451 
Whole  0.08       0.153 – 0.471 
 
Comparison of the two classes in column 2 is difficult given that neither of the attributes was 
statistically significant. Given this complication, it is not surprising that none of the MWTP 













The results for the Park visitors are presented in table 5.8
92
. As shown below, the LCM model 
output is not reported. In this particular sample, our analysis suggests that there are no 
distinct classes of choice behaviour or preference.  
 
Table 5.8: RPL and RPL with interactions – Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park visitors
93
 
CL Model RPL Model RPL Model with Interactions 
|Variable| Coefficient    
(s.e) 
|Variable| Coefficient    
(s.e) 
|Variable| Coefficient    
(s.e) 
      
Alfa     31.925 
(0.000) 
Random Parameters in 
Utility Functions 
 Random Parameters in 
Utility Functions 
 
Cost        -0.005    ***   
(0.001)     
                        
Predator 1 0.000   *    
(0.000)      
Recreational Restrictions 1 0.784     
(0.537)      
Recreational Restrictions 1 2.818 *** 
(1.324)      
Predator 2   0.000       
(0.000)      
    
Predator 3  0.000       * 
(0.000)    
Nonrandom Parameters in 
Utility Functions 
 Nonrandom Parameters in 
Utility Functions 
 
Tree 1 -0.029       
(0.020)     
                        
Tree 2 -0.021       
(0.016)    
Alfa     33.869    
(0.119)       
Alfa     33.869     
(0.113)        
Tree 3 -0.010       
(0.010)      
Cost        -0.009 *** 
(0.003)     
Cost        -0.009 ***  
(0.003)     
Recreational 
Restrictions 1 
0.430    **    
(0.181)         
Predator 1 0.001     
(0.001)      
Predator 1 0.001      
(0.001)      
Recreational 
Restrictions 2 
0.844     *** 
(0.224)         
Predator 2  0.000     
(0.000)       
Predator 2  0.840      
(0.000)       
Recreational 
Restrictions 3 
0.670   ***    
(0.201)     
Predator 3  0.000     
(0.000)      
Predator 3  0.000      
(0.000)      
Grazing Opportunities 
1 
0.000       
(0.000)       
Tree 1 -0.050     
(0.047)     
Tree 1 -0.054      




(0.000)     
Tree 2 -0.015     
(0.041)      
Tree 2 -0.016      




(0.000)      
Tree 3 -0.022     
(0.021)     
Tree 3 -0.019      
(0.020)  
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 The problem of multicollinearity occurs when a strong linear relationship exists among the explanatory 
variables. A strong association between the explanatory variables makes it increasingly difficult to assess the 
impact of individual variables on the dependent variable. There are various techniques to check for the presence 
of multicollinearity. We checked for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factors for each of the 
models, and it was not found to be a problem. 
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 Essentially, if IIA is satisfied then the ratio of choice probabilities should not be affected by whether another 
alternative is in the choice set or not. One way of testing IIA is to remove one alternative and re-estimate the 
model and compare the choice probabilities. Although you can test for IIA, for generic experiment we often get 
problems with attributes with little variation when we drop an alternative (Carlsson, 2008)). With our data we 













Cultural Heritage 1 
-0.000      
(0.045)    
Recreational Restrictions 2 1.524 *** 
(0.371)      
Recreational Restrictions 2 1.528      
(0.369)      
Experiencing Bushman 
Cultural Heritage 2 
-0.013     
(0.036)     
Recreational Restrictions 3 0.900 *** 
(0.256)      
Recreational Restrictions 3 0.913      
(0.254)      
Experiencing Bushman 
Cultural Heritage 3 
-0.011       
(0.023) 
   
Grazing Opportunities 1 0.001     
(0.001)      
Grazing Opportunities 1 0.001     
(0.000)      
Medicinal plants 1 -0.222        
(0.293)     
Grazing Opportunities 2  -0.000     
(0.000)      
Grazing Opportunities 2  -0.000 ***  
(0.000)      
Medicinal plants 2  0.221       
(0.494) 
Grazing Opportunities 3  -0.998     
(0.000)     
Grazing Opportunities 3  -0.271 ***  
(0.000)      
Medicinal plants 3 0.050      
(0.150) 
Experiencing Bushman 
Cultural Heritage 1 
-0.007     
(0.107)      
Experiencing Bushman 
Cultural Heritage 1 
-.024      
(0.102)      
  Experiencing Bushman 
Cultural Heritage 2 
-0.019     
(0.093)      
Experiencing Bushman 
Cultural Heritage 2 
-0.034      
(0.088)      
  Experiencing Bushman 
Cultural Heritage 3 
-0.007     
(0.053)      
Experiencing Bushman 
Cultural Heritage 3 
-0.015      
(0.050)      
  Medicinal plants 1 -0.183      
(0.614)      
Medicinal plants 1 -0.208      
(0.587)      
  Medicinal plants 2  -0.739      
(0.838)      
Medicinal plants 2  -0.631      
(0.810)      
  Medicinal plants 3 0.189      
(0.276)       
Medicinal plants 3 0.173      
(0.272)       
      
  Derived Standard 
Deviations of Parameter 
Distributions 
 Heterogeneity in mean,  
Parameter: Variable 
 
              
  Recreational Restrictions 1 5.617 *** 
(2.862)      
Employment status    -0.519      
(0.296)     
      
    Derived Standard 
Deviations of Parameter 
Distributions 
 
      
    Recreational Restrictions 1 5.111 *** 
(2.525)      
 
There are not many significant coefficients in this table. However, the few significant ones 
meet expectations and are plausible. The CL model shows that the intercept is positive 
implying that with everything constant the respondents would prefer one of the new 
alternatives to the current state. It is however insignificant. The cost attribute is significant 
and has a negative effect on the likelihood of the alternative to be chosen. The predator 1, 
predator 3, recreational 1, recreational 2 and recreational 3 attributes all have positive and 












The fact that the recreational 1 (wilderness experience & primitive) attribute is statistically 
significant proves that there are differences in preferences (see the standard deviation section 
on the output table - column 1). The intercept is insignificant. The cost coefficient is negative 
and significant which implies that an increase in costs reduced the likelihood that the 
alternative is chosen. Recreational 2 and 3 attributes are positive and significant which 
suggest that improved conditions for visitor experience increases the likelihood that an 
alternative to the status quo is chosen.  
 
Column 6 results show that the employment status of the park visitor’s interaction with the 
recreational 1 does not matter. Recreation 2 and 3 attributes are also positive and significant. 
Furthermore, the standard deviation results indicate that valuation of the recreational 1 


















































         




87.93       62.273 – 
192.009 
Whole  94.77 176.725 – 
266.891 
Predator 2  0.06 0.04 – 
0.122 
Predator 1 0.09        0.084 – 
0.26 
   
Predator 3  0.05 0.026 – 
0.08 
Predator 2  0.01        0.055 – 
0.169 
   
Tree 1 -5.44    3.71 – 
11.44 
Predator 3  0.05        0.044 – 
0.136 
   
Tree 2 -3.83 2.878 – 
8.874 
Tree 1 -5.64       5.162 – 
15.918 
   
Tree 3 -1.87 1.87 – 
5.766 
Tree 2 -1.72       4.389 – 
13.533 







Tree 3 -2.52       2.333 – 
7.193 
   
Recreational 
Restrictions 2 























   
Grazing 
Opportunities 1 




0.07        0.049 – 
0.151 
   
Grazing 






Opportunities 2  
-0.02        0.036 – 
0.11 
   
Grazing 
Opportunities 3  
-0.01 0.022 – 
0.101 
Grazing 
Opportunities 3  
-0.011        0.034 – 
0.104 
   
Experiencing 
Bushman 
Cultural Heritage  
1 






-0.82       11.555 – 
35.627 











-2.08       9.992 – 
30.808 













-0.80       5.671 – 
17.485 









-20.55       66.305 – 
204.441 
   
Medicinal plants 
2  
40.89 86.606 – 
267.036 
Medicinal 
plants 2  
-82.93       97.426 – 
300.396 
 













3: Collect 1.2 kg 
(2 Containers) - 
100% more 
9.19 





21.15       28.405 – 
87.583 
   
 
In column 2, keeping other things constant, the respondents are willing to pay R79.40 
(US$9.36) to have the park consisting of wilderness experience and primitive (i.e. 
recreational 1), which is significant at 5% level. The marginal WTP for wilderness 
experience, primitive and comfortable (i.e. recreational 2) is R155.88 (US$18.38) and 
R123.79 (US$14.60) for wilderness experience, primitive, comfortable and developed, both 
effects are significant at all levels. The implication of this is that people have a higher 
preference for wilderness experience, primitive and comfortable than wilderness experience, 
primitive, comfortable and developed and wilderness experience and primitive.  
 
In column 6, recreational 2 and 3 are the most important, with the only significant MWTP. 
Kgalagadi park visitors have a MWTP to have the park consisting of the wilderness, 
primitive and comfortable zones (i.e. recreational 2) of R170.88 (US$20.15), on average. The 
MWTP for those who want the zoning to include a developed section in addition to 
recreational 2 (i.e. recreational 3) is R100.89 (US$11.90), on average.  
 
The results for visitors suggest that they want more recreational zones which entail 
preventing local from extensive use of environmental resources in the area. In particular, 
locals want more grazing opportunities, more trees for firewood, more predators connected 
with more hunting. The acti ities that locals want are in conflict with what tourists want. It 
therefore means that there is a conflict. This conflict is detrimental to conservation in the 
Kgalagadi area because the local who stay there permanently have an interest in activities 
which degrade it. There should therefore be ways to persuade the local to cut down on 
activities which are detrimental to the environment. From their results, it seems they derive 
very little value from the things they want to expand.  
 
On the other hand visitors derive a much larger value from expansion of pristine tourism 
opportunities. Therefore, there seems to be able to compensate the locals and ask them to cut 
down on destructive activities on nature. Thus, there seems to be grounds to suggest that a 












Kgalagadi ecosystem. Of course, the modalities of visitors pay and how local receive and 
what actions locals should desist from would require a more detailed analysis. But it seems 
there is a prima facie case for a PES scheme. 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
We contrasted three different models, namely the CL, RPL (with and without interaction) and 
the LCM. In general, our findings confirm our assumption during choice design that the 
Kgalagadi local residents (San and Mier) have different preferences to the KTP visitors.  
 
In particular, our results show that a preservation initiative that is aimed at increasing grazing 
opportunities would be supported by the dryland communities. Although the San indigenous 
people are traditionally hunters and gatherers, over time a significant number have switched 
to livestock farming. Given that livestock farming is one of the main livelihood sources in the 
Kgalagadi dryland area, the ecosystem service that supports such a livelihood source is an 
important determinant of mode choice. Furthermore, there is considerable taste heterogeneity 
within the local communities.  
 
The park visitors are more concerned about recreational restrictions within the park as a 
whole. Given the highly fragile Kgalagadi ecosystem, it is not surprising that park visitors are 
sensitive about the kind of activities undertaken inside the park.  
 
Our estimates of MWTP suggest that there are significant benefits to be obtained from a 
programme aimed at imposing resource use restrictions inside the park and indeed outside. 
The MWTP results for the local sample gives considerably lower MWTP. If locals have less 
MWTP it means that they value the services less. If visitors have more MWTP it means they 
value the services more. So those who value the services more can pay those who value the 
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Appendix 1: Ecosystem service valuation questionnaire  
 
 
Name of Interviewer:____________________________________ 
Date: ___/___/2012 
This survey attempts to measure what people think about dryland ecosystem services preservation in the South 
African Kgalagadi area. We are interested in how your feelings about possible Payment for Ecosystem Services 
depend on features like Camel thorn trees, biodiversity, and chances of seeing predators, recreational hunting 
and Khomani San cultural heritage. The survey has two sections. 
 
 
INFORMATION BOX: KGALAGADI REGION 
The total area of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park is 387 991 square kilometres, of which approximately 75 
percent is on the Botswana side. The remaining part of the park is on the South African side, which also 
includes communal land within the protected area. The communal land in question refers to the contractual 





































Figure: map of the broader Kgalagadi area 
Source: Massyn & Humphrey, 2010  
Survey Instructions 
 
In section one of the survey, you will be asked 4 choice questions. 
 
In each of those questions, we will ask you to choose between two possible ways to preserve ecosystems and the 
status quo. 
 
The ecosystem service preservation under consideration is on the Khomani San restored land and requires local 
communities’ efforts for the continued provision of ecosystem services in the area as a whole. In addition, 
failure to preserve ecosystems outside protected areas would lead to more pressure on the park especially given 













The valuation of these dryland ecosystem services allows the services to be possibly considered as economically 
productive systems comparable with other alternative land uses. If we attach monetary values on nature and 
related activities, we can compare which ways of living give the most satisfaction. Neglecting features such as 
Camel thorn trees, biodiversity, predators, recreational hunting and San cultural heritage will lead to the gradual 
disappearance of these features and subsequently their unavailability for use by future generations. 
 
Section two of the survey gathers personal information of respondents to gain more insights about factors that 
affect the way people feel about dryland ecosystems.  
 
There are no right or wrong answers, and all answers are strictly confidential. 
 
Section One – Valuation Section 
 
Habitat Preservation Information 
 
The Khomani San people portions of the Park and their communal land provide ecosystem services. While the 
Kgalagadi desert has a physically harsh environment, the region is rich in biodiversity (animals, birds and 
plants) and concentration of animals in the dry Auob and Nossob Rivers. Currently the areas outside the 
Kgalagadi Park faces a threat of resource depletion due to over-harvesting of medicinal plants, fuel wood, 
overgrazing and excessive hunting. This is largely driven by the increased need of these resources for both 
domestic and commercial consumption. The unsustainable resource extraction is of dire consequence to the 
inter-linkages between the broader Kgalagadi area and to the community way of life. Some of these species are 














Ecosystem Services Preservation Features 
A point to note is that depending on how it is implemented, a dryland preservation initiative can have different 
features. The features described below are of interest in this survey. Please read this carefully in order to answer 
SECTION ONE questions of the survey. 
Attributes Description Attribute Levels 
Camel thorn trees (Communal land) 
 
It is the only big tree in the area. The shade of the tree provides 
a favourable microclimate for many animals. The shade also 
benefit human as they tend to camp where these trees are 
located, tend to undertake important traditional, cultural 
activities beneath the branches of Camel thorns and also 
provides firewood. The San households harvest on average 
9kg (1bundle) of firewood daily. 
Level 1: 9 kg - 6.75 kg (three quarters 
of a bundle) - 25% decline 
Level 2: 9 kg (1 bundle) -Current 
level 
Level 3: 9 kg - 13.5 kg (1 and a half 
bundles) -50% increase 
Level 4: 9 kg - 18 kg (2 bundles) - 
100% increase 
Chances of seeing Predators (Lion Population) 
 
The park is renowned for predator watching: Cheetah, Leopard, 
Brown and Spotted Hyena and Black-Manned Lion. All along 
the river bed are man-made waterholes fed with water from 
solar pumps. Along the 120km of the Auob river and the 
300km of the Nossob there is a waterhole every 8-12km.The 
waterholes make for spectacular place for game viewing. The 
main attraction is lions; hence our focus is on lions. 
Level 1: 448: 40 waterholes - 2005 
estimate  
Level 2: 700: 40 waterholes – 
Current level 
Level 3: 1050: 40 waterholes - 50% 
rise 
Level 4: 1400 : 40 waterholes - 100% 
rise 
Bush Food (on San Communal Land) 
 
 
The San live off the land. They collect natural foods: bush food 
and wild fruits (i.e. water melon). The Khomani San 
households collect approximately 0.84kg of the bush food on 
a weekly basis. 
 
Level 1:0.84 kg – 0.42 kg (Half 
Container) – 50% decline 
Level 2: 0.84 kg (1Container) - 
Current  
Level 3: 0.84 kg – 1.26 kg (1.5 
Containers) - 50% increase 
Level 4: 0.84 kg – 1.68kg (2 
Containers) - 100% increase 
Recreational Restrictions 
 
The area is characterized by a striking landscape of wide vistas, 
attractive red sand dunes, large Camel thorn trees and a desert 
bloom. One of the great advantages afforded by the Kgalagadi 
landscape is the ability to watch animals in an open, uncluttered 
landscape. SANParks (Park agency) are currently thinking of 
introducing a zoning programme. Current information on 
mapping sensitivity analysis and value of the biophysical, 
heritage and scenic resources of the park lead to SANParks 
having 4 zoning categories.  
Level 1:No Restrictions  
Level 2: Wilderness Experience (no 
facilities and access by foot) & 
Primitive (controlled access by 
numbers, frequency and size of group) 
Level 3: Wilderness Experience; 
Primitive & Comfortable (access 
roads only open to visitors) 
Level 4: Wilderness Experience; 
Primitive; Comfortable Developed 
(access by sedan with larger self-
















Medicinal Plants (Both inside and outside the 
Park) 
 
The San categorized thousands of plants and their 
uses, from nutritional to medicinal.  Medicinal plants 
are used to treat many illnesses and play a role when 
performing traditions. The most used medicinal plants include 
Gamaghoe and Devil’s Claw as well as the famous Bushman’s 
appetite suppressant Hoodia (Xhoba).  
Level 1: 0.3 kg (Half Container)- 
50% decline 
Level 2: 0.6 kg (Container) – Current 
level 
Level 3: 0.9 kg (1.5 Containers) - 
50% more 
Level 4:1.2 kg (2 Containers) - 100% 
more 
Bush meat Traditionally Hunted (on Khomani 
Farmlands) 
 
Hunting has been a way of life for the San for 
thousands of years although it is now a dying art as a 
result of loss of access to traditional hunting. Game 
meat is an essential part of their diet.  
Level 1: 2 stingboks - 50% less 
Level 2: 4 stingboks – Current level 
Level 3: 6 stingboks - 50% more 
Level 4: 8 stingboks - 100% more 
Experiencing Bushman Cultural Heritage (in 
the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park) 
  
The !ae!hai Heritage Park which was developed in 2009 gives 
Park visitors the opportunity to interact with the San. It can be 
entered through San Community gate and has overnight 
facilities at Imbewu or Sebobugas camp. San guides provide 
interpretive experience, evening walk with a knowledgeable 
guide and sunrise morning walk to see which animals came 
overnight.  
Level 1: 2 months - 50% less  
Level 2: 4 Months – Current level 
Level 3: 6 months - 50% more 
Level 4: 8 months - 100% more 
Grazing Opportunities (on Khomani San 
Communal Land) 
 
Around 36 000 hectares of farmland outside the park, on 
Khomani San restored land is for grazing and game farming. 
The San farmlands are located in an arid savannah with some 
areas densely covered with grasses, trees and shrubs. The 
carrying capacity is around 958 large stock KTPs. The land has 
become overgrazed (two-thirds of the range) and was not 
productive (stocking rates should be kept to a minimum until 
vegetation had recovered). 
Level 1: 719 large stock KTPs - 25% 
less  
Level 2: 958 large stock KTPs – 
Current level 
Level 3: 1198 large stock KTPs - 
25% less 
Level 4:1437 large stock KTPs – 
50% more  
Your One-Off Levy (Rands) 
 
The money from the levy would go into a special trust fund 
specifically for Maintaining Ecosystems.  
Level 1: R50 
Level 2: R100 
Level 3: R150 
Level 4: R200 
 
Section One  













In each set, suppose the three alternatives (Status Quo, Alternative 1 and 2) were the only options available for 
preservation of dryland ecosystems in the Kgalagadi. Please read all the features of each option and then check 
the box that represents your choice. If you do not like either Alternative 1 and 2, then please choose the box 
marked “Status Quo – No preservation”. You can notice that, while the levels of attributes in the status quo 
always stay the same, the levels in the columns of the alternative options changes in each choice set. It is very 
important to consider each set because of its own outcomes irrespective of whether the preceding or the 
following choice sets provide better deals. 
 
We would like to know which option you prefer the most in each choice set. Please bear in mind that we do not 
describe how each option is brought about, so you may find some options seem unrealistic. 
 
CHOICE SET 1 
Attribute Status Quo Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Camel thorn trees 6.75 kg  9 kg  13.5 kg  
Predator 448 448 700 
Recreational 
restriction No Restrictions  
Wilderness Experience; Primitive; 
Comfortable & Developed  No Restrictions  
Medicinal plants 0.3 kg  0.6 kg   0.9 kg  
Bushman cultural 
heritage 2 months 4 Months  6 months  
Grazing 
opportunities 
719 large stock 
units 1198 large stock units 1437 large stock units 
Levy R 0 R 50 R 75 
Your Choice 
(tick)       
 
NEXT QUESTION 
CHOICE SET 2 
Attribute Status Quo Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Camel thorn trees  6.75 kg  9 kg  13.5 kg  
Predator 448 1400 448 
Recreational 
restriction No Restrictions  
Wilderness Experience; Primitive & 
Comfortable  
Wilderness Experience; Primitive; Comfortable 
& Developed  
Medicinal plants 0.3 kg  0.9 kg  1.2 kg  
Bushman cultural 
heritage 2 months 4 Months  6 months  
Grazing opportunities 
719 large stock 
units 719 large stock units 958 large stock units  
Levy R 0 R 75 R 100 



















CHOICE SET 3 
Attribute Status Quo Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Camel thorn trees 6.75 kg  13.5 kg  18 kg  
Predator 448 448 700 
Recreational restriction No Restrictions  
Wilderness Experience & 
Primitive  
Wilderness Experience; Primitive & 
Comfortable  
Medicinal plants 0.3 kg  0.9 kg  1.2 kg  
Bushman cultural 
heritage 2 months 6 months  8 months  
Grazing opportunities 
719 large stock 
units 1437 large stock units 719 large stock units 
Levy R 0 R 75 R 100 
Your Choice (tick)    
 
NEXT QUESTION 
CHOICE SET 4 
Attribute Status Quo Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Camel thorn trees 6.75 kg  13.5 kg  18 kg  
Predator 448 1050 1400 
Recreational restriction No Restrictions  No Restrictions  Wilderness Experience & Primitive  
Medicinal plants 0.3 kg   0.9 kg   1.2 kg  
Bushman cultural heritage 2 months 8 months  2 months 
Grazing opportunities 719 large stock units 719 large stock units 958 large stock units  
Levy R 0 R 100 R 25 
Your Choice (tick)    
 
Let’s assume that setting-up of payment schemes for the ecosystem service was a feasible land use option that 
could enhance Kgalagadi dryland ecosystems.  
 
a) Would you be willing to pay the land owners (Khomani San) to ensure that there is continued provision 
of these dryland ecosystem services?  

























b) If you are not willing to pay anything for ecosystem services, could you please explain why that is the 
case? 
REASON TICK THE MOST SIGNIFICANT 
CHOICE 
I DO NOT CARE ABOUT DRYLAND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 1 
I CANNOT AFFORD TO INCUR ANY ADDITIONAL EXPENSES 2 
IT COSTS TOO MUCH ALREADY TO VISIT THE KGALAGADI 3 
THE MONEY WOULD BE WASTED 4 
OTHER PEOPLE AND PRIVATE SECTOR SHOULD PAY 5 
I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION 6 
THERE ARE MANY OTHER SITES WHICH I COULD VISIT 7 
THE ECOSYTEM PRESERVATION SHOULD BE FINANCED BY THE 
GOVERNMENT 
8 
OTHER  9 




Section Two – Personal Information 
The following information is important to help the researches check that all visitors in the Kgalagadi area have 
been fairly represented. All your responses are anonymous and strictly confidential.  
 
1(a). DO YOU VISIT THE KGALAGADI AREA INCLUDING THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK REGULARLY? 
YES   NO   
 
(b). IF YES, HOW OFTEN? 
............................................................................................................................. 
 
2. WHAT ARE YOUR MAIN ATTRACTIONS FOR VISITING THE KGALAGADI AREA INCLUDING THE PARK ITSELF? 
ATTRACTION TICK THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHOICE 
BIRDS  1 
PREDATORS 2 
DIVERSITY OF PLAINS & GAME 3 
LANDSCAPE 4 
HIKING TRAILS 5 
4 4 DRIVES (TRAILS) 6 
SAN ROCK ENGRAVINGS 7 
PRESENCE OF SAN 8 
OTHER 9 
PLEASE SPECIFY OTHERS 
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3. HOW LONG IS YOUR WHOLE TRIP IN THE KGALAGADI AREA? ...............................NIGHTS 
 
4. DO YOU OR HAVE YOU ENGAGED IN TRACKING WITH THE KHOMANI SAN?  














5. DO YOU OR HAVE YOU BOUGHT THE KHOMANI SAN CRAFTS? 
YES   NO   
 
6. WHERE DO YOU MOSTLY PURCHASE THESE CRAFTS? 
BUSHMAN CRAFT STALLS             SHOPS   
 
7(a). DO YOU OR HAVE YOU ENGAGED IN TAKING PHOTOS WITH THE KHOMANI SAN? 
YES   NO   
 
(b). IF YES, WAS THIS IN EXCHANGE FOR MONEY? 
YES   NO   
 
8. DO YOU EXPECT TO VISIT THE KGALAGADI AREA AGAIN IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS? 
YES   NO    DON’T KNOW   
 
9. GENDER OF RESPONDENT                        
 MALE 1 
 FEMALE 2 
 
10. DATE OF BIRTH.................................................................. 
 
11. ARE YOU THE PERSON IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO PAYS THE UTILITY / MORTGAGE BILLS?  
YES   NO   
 
12. NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN THE HOUSEHOLD: _______ PEOPLE 
 
13. WHAT BEST DESCRIBES WHERE YOU CURRENTLY LIVE? CHECK ONE. 
CITY               TOWN                   SUBURB  
 
SMALL TOWN               FARM                  RURAL AREA  
 
14. WHAT IS YOUR EDUCATION LEVEL 
EDUCATION LEVEL TICK THE 
APPROPRIATE 
SPECIFY THE HIGHEST 
GRADE OR NUMBER OF 
YEARS COMPLETED 
NEVER ATTENDED SCHOOL   
PRIMARY SCHOOL    
HIGH SCHOOL    
CERTIFICATE   
DIPLOMA   
DEGREE   
POSTGRADUATE    


















15. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBES YOUR CURRENT STATE OF EMPLOYMENT?          
EMPLOYED FULL TIME 1 
EMPLOYED PART TIME 2 
SELF EMPLOYED  3 
STUDENT FULL TIME 4 
STUDENT PART TIME 5 
RETIRED 6 
OTHER 7 SPECIFY.............................................................................................. 
 
16. WHAT CATEGORY COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME? PLEASE TICK APPROPRIATE 
CURRENCY: RAND, PULA, OTHER................................................................................................         
PRE TAX INCOME  
0 – 10 000 1 
10 001- 30 000 2 
30 001 –50 000 3 
50 001 – 100 000 4 
100 001 – 150 000 5 
150 001 – 200 000 6 
200 001 – 250 000 7 
250 001 – 350 000 8 
350 001 – 500 000 9 
500 001+  10 
 
17. WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE? CHECK ONE. 
TOO LONG         UN           REALISTIC                  DIFFICULT          
 
INTERESTING                   OTHER  
...................................................................................................................................................                
 


























Appendix 2: Attributes levels in Choice Modelling  
 
 
Table 2.1: Attributes and attribute levels in Choice Modelling  
|Variables| 
 
Tree level 1: harvest 9 kg (1 bundle) of firewood by San -Current level 
Tree level 2: harvest 13.5 kg (1 and a half bundles) of firewood by San -50% increase 
Tree level 3: harvest 18 kg (2 bundles) of firewood by San - 100% increase 
Predator level 1:  chances to see 700 lions – Current level 
Predator level 2:  chances to see 1050 lions – 50% rise   
Predator level 3: chances to see 1400 lions – 100% rise 
Bush food Level 1: San households collect 0.84 kg (1Container) - Current 
Bush food Level 2: San households collect 1.26 kg (1.5 Containers) – 50% increase  
Bush food Level 3: San households collect 1.68 kg (2 Containers) – 100% increase  
Medicinal plants level 1: Collect 0.6 kg (Container) – Current level 
Medicinal plants level 2: Collect 0.9 kg (1.5 Containers) – 50% more   
Medicinal plants level 3: Collect 1.2 kg (2 Containers) - 100% more 
Bushmeat traditionally hunted level 1: 4 stingboks – current levels  
Bushmeat traditionally hunted level 2: 6 stingboks – 50% more  
Bushmeat traditionally hunted level 3: 8 stingboks – 100% more  
Grazing Opportunities level 1: 958 large stock – Current level 
Grazing Opportunities level 2: 1198 large stock – 25% more  
Grazing Opportunities level 3: 1437 large stock – 50% more  
Recreational Restrictions level 1: Wilderness Experience (no facilities and access by foot) & Primitive 
(controlled access by numbers, frequency and size of group) 
Recreational Restrictions level 2: Wilderness Experience; Primitive & Comfortable (access roads only open to 
visitors) 
Recreational Restrictions level 3: Wilderness Experience; Primitive;  Comfortable Developed (access by sedan 
with larger self-catering camps and shops) 
Experiencing Bushman Cultural Heritage (in the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park) level 1: 4 Months – Current 
level 
Experiencing Bushman Cultural Heritage (in the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park) level 2: 6 Months – 50 % more 















Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
6.1. Summary  
This thesis assessed the relationship between use of land and well-being. The fact that land 
rights were awarded to the community rather than individuals is perhaps the reason the land 
effect on poverty is not significant, particularly where the institutional arrangements are weak 
as is the case in the Khomani San community. Land restitution was never meant to target 
individuals or certain sections of the community but the entire community that is eligible 
irrespective of their individual circumstances. Perhaps this limits the potential impact of land 
in terms of reducing poverty.  
 
A positive link between greater access and poverty reduction should not be ignored because 
rural people especially indigenous people are heavily dependent on natural resources for their 
livelihoods. Greater access to nature that is attributed to the availability of land is important 
because natural resources such as wild fruits and hunting off-set the low income and 
consumption levels. 
 
We then examined why the local communities tend to degrade the environment despite 
showing positive support for biodiversity conservation. The South Africa’s Khomani San, 
whose attitudes toward modern conservation have not been evaluated until now, and the 
adjacent Mier community, generally attach a significant economic value to biodiversity in 
their area. The Mier ge erally have higher WTP than the Khomani San. For example, the 
Mier respondents have almost double the median WTP (R25) of the Khomani San (R15) in 
the category of those in favour of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme on 
communal land. However, when adjusted for annual median household income, there are no 
significant differences in the WTP between the two communities.  
 
Thus, understanding the values of biodiversity is a critical step forward, as these values 
illustrate the economic benefits of conservation and therefore justify funding for biodiversity 













Now that some of resource rights inside the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park have been vested in 
the surrounding communities, the park should contribute towards improving the lives of these 
communities for land restitution not to compromise conservation objectives. Given that the 
park has well-established infrastructure to help communities extract more benefit from their 
participation in conservation, this study argues that it is important to establish the possibility 
of generating more revenue from conservation fees for sharing with the new but poor co-
owners of international parklands. If such opportunities exist then the modes of increasing 
income from tourists can vary from a mandatory conservation fee increment to a voluntary 
community-bound donation over and above the regular conservation fee.  
 
Overall, our results suggest that there is underselling of the recreational services offered by 
the South African park systems, which implies that there is room for improvement in the use 
of the conservation fee policy. Revenue could be maximized by increasing conservation fees 
for local tourists at Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park as well as the other parks. The ability to 
raise more revenue by the park agency opens up two possibilities: revenue sharing with local 
communities and more sustainable park management. Our results are consistent with other 
empirical studies on nature-based ecotourism which indicate visitors’ willingness to pay more 
for the recreational services of parks. The policy implication of our results is that the park 
agencies (SANParks & NWPTB) should consider instituting mechanisms for capturing more 
revenue as this will not necessarily jeopardize tourism by reducing the number of visitors.  
 
Finally, the importance and value of ecosystem services in the study area is assessed in an 
attempt to establish their benefits. Some of these services might benefit people who are not 
members of the land claimant community. It is clear that the benefits of ecosystem services 
on the Khomani San people’s land are currently not being transferred to the local 
communities due to the failure to identify and value their services.  
 
Conservation schemes aiming to protect ecosystems, including PES in the Kgalagadi area, 
need to acknowledge that the Khomani San people have different needs and suffer some 
costs. For economic incentives to be effective, the local community needs to be compensated 
for what conservation role society imposes on them. 
 












interesting because the indigenous San people have rights to harvest resources inside their 
contractual park. The current overharvesting of resources in their communal land is likely to 
lead them to harvest more inside the park, which would have a negative impact on visitors’ 
experience.  
 
The policy implication of our results is that there is a demand by visitors that the San 
activities inside the park be restricted. This scenario shows that there is a possibility of 
crafting some PES where park visitors and/or the park agency compensate the San for placing 
restrictions on San activities inside the contract park.  
 
6.2. Policy recommendations  
While our results suggest that restored land plays an important role in any anti-poverty 
strategy (in terms of greater access to nature), identification of socio-economic variables is 
important as it shows that factors other than land rights should be taken into consideration 
when developing anti-poverty measures. This implies that land restitution programmes 
should be part of a more comprehensive strategy to improve the potential of restored land to 
alleviate poverty.  
 
The Khomani San care about modern biodiversity conservation as much as other indigenous 
communities in their area and can therefore be trusted to be good environmental stewards. 
However, in order for all members of the local community to support biodiversity 
conservation unconditionally, mechanisms for fair distribution of the associated costs and 
benefits should be put in place.  
 
In sum, this thesis shows that it is feasible to raise conservation fees at national parks under 
investigation in South Africa. The findings in this study provide strong evidence that a 
carefully crafted and well-thought out pricing strategy such as the one proposed in this thesis 
has the potential to raise additional revenue that can be used to demonstrate that parks can 
indeed play a pivotal role in the local economics surrounding the recreational sites in 
question. Alternatively, these findings can be interpreted as proof that national parks have 
sufficient value to contribute significantly to local communities’ welfare to justify 
continuation of public funding. As a conclusion, the park agency in South Africa should 












The policy implication of valuing environmental services is that when budget allocations are 
made, they can also be fairly considered by taking into consideration their costs and benefits. 
The findings in this study are crucial because they have a bearing on land use decisions, such 
as setting-up of payment schemes for the ecosystem services. Payment schemes can affect 
land use decisions, and land use can be affected by PES. It is on this basis that valuation of 
dryland ecosystem services makes it possible for them to be considered as economically 
productive systems comparable with other types of land use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
